Typhoon Morakot: Emergency Management and Citizen Participation in Taiwan

Introduction: Typhoon Morakot and Its Impacts

During one regular summer, more than twelve typhoons can occur in Taiwan, and they can often cause disastrous effects. Ironically, the word typhoon is etymologically associated with deadly storms in the region. The most recent of these — Typhoon Morakot — proved to be the most damaging on record.

A typhoon features a large low-pressure center and numerous thunderstorms that produce strong winds and heavy rain. These conditions typically cause landslides and mudslides. On August 8, 2009, Typhoon Morakot hit southern Taiwan. It is the deadliest typhoon to sweep Taiwan in recorded history. The storm brought record-setting rainfall — nearly 3,000 mm (almost 10 feet) accumulated over 72 hours. The resulting mudslides caused devastating damage to several villages and buried hundreds of lives (Taniar, Gervasi, Murgante, Pardede, and Apduhan, 2010). Sadly, at the time of the mudslides, no warning mechanism had been in place.

The immediate impacts of the typhoon were immense. There was a noted loss of over five hundred lives, along with the destruction of homes and entire villages buried under land and mudslides. Beyond the immediate human tragedy, the country also faced significant long-term economic consequences. Within the tourism industry — one of the most important contributors to the state budget — the typhoon caused losses of over 800 million New Taiwan Dollars (approximately 25 million United States Dollars at the exchange rates of April 2010). These losses accounted for both physical destruction within the industry and the inability to deliver tourism services as planned. "Morakot has led to losses worth some NT$670 million in the six national scenic areas in terms of income and facilities, not including damage worth some NT$137 million to 17 hotels, such as the 30-year-old Chinsuai Hotel in the Chihpen hot spring area of Taitung County, which collapsed early Sunday due to serious landslides" (Wang, 2009).

There were also significant losses in the agricultural sector, as crops were destroyed. This created a socio-economic problem of reduced food sufficiency and self-sustainability, as well as an inability to honor export contracts. Infrastructure in the southern part of the island was also severely damaged, disrupting future operations in the area in numerous ways (Oxford Economic Country Briefings, 2009). Collectively, these effects placed a heavy toll on the country's national output and, consequently, on its international competitiveness.

Given this situation, a question arises as to whether better crisis management could have reduced the intensity of the disaster's impact. To answer this question, it is first necessary to understand the concept of emergency management. Once this foundation is established, it becomes possible to assess the emergency management response in Taiwan from various standpoints, including organizational accountability, victim perspectives, and citizen participation.

It is rather difficult to offer a precise definition of emergency management, and editors within the specialized literature have often overlooked this aspect. In the most basic terms, emergency management refers to the best possible administration of an emergency situation — such as a hurricane or a terrorist attack — with efforts generally undertaken by governmental institutions. Amy Donahue and Philip Joyce (2001) attempt a definition and argue that "implementation of disaster policy is the province of a public administrative function known as emergency management, the modern approach to which involves a multidimensional effort to reduce the threat of the occurrence and the magnitude of disasters and to prepare for, respond to, and recover from those that do occur."

Emergency Management: Concepts and Functions

The necessity for emergency management arises from a local event that creates extraordinary consequences with which a community is unable to cope on its own. In other words, the need for emergency management is "triggered when hazards, such as a flood, train derailments, or industrial accidents, interact with vulnerabilities — physical, social, economic and environmental conditions — that make a community susceptible to hazards" (Henstra, 2010).

Before continuing, it is useful to define several key concepts related to emergency management:

Organizational accountability — The degree to which public and private institutions assume responsibility in the management of an emerged crisis.

Citizen participation — The degree to which citizens in an affected community become involved in the management and resolution of the crisis.

Victim perspective — The opinion of the crisis management process as experienced by those directly affected by the disaster; it is generally subjective and can range from deep gratitude to sharp criticism of insufficient efforts.

Central government — The federal agency located in the country's capital and dealing with matters of national importance.

Local governments — Smaller governmental agencies responsible for wellbeing at a more localized level.

Preparedness — The means by which a community has prepared for a disaster and its capacity to face that disaster with minimal damage.

Response — The means by which a community answers to a disaster once it occurs.

The management of emergency situations has been present throughout human history, though it was not always formally recognized. European history reveals numerous instances in which authorities managed disasters, such as the Great Fire of London (1666) or the Black Death, one of the largest and deadliest pandemics in history, which manifested in Europe between 1348 and 1350. In the immediate aftermath of these disasters, central authorities developed and implemented new legislation. In England, for instance, insurance companies were required to better cover fire losses and compensate policyholders. In Italy, authorities focused on improving sanitation as a means of preventing further illness.

In 1803, a fire broke out in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, resulting in the loss of 132 buildings. The United States Congress issued its first emergency management law, stating that all federal resources were available for use in situations of national disaster. In the context of ongoing fires and other national disasters, Congress continued to develop its approach to emergency management. Between 1803 and 1950, it issued an estimated 128 acts regulating emergency management.

Some of these regulations expanded the role of the Red Cross in disaster relief. Others increased public access to federal loans for rebuilding homes and infrastructure damaged by disaster. At the same time, federal efforts were made to encourage the public to become more involved in the resolution and management of disasters (Canton, 2007).

Throughout the years, emergency management has evolved from ad-hoc arrangements into a solid, nationwide discipline with trained organizations and established frameworks. Modern emergency management tools and techniques embody decades of hard-won lessons, and incorporate developments in civil, political, and technological spheres, including international aid coordination and information technology support.

Contemporary scholars identify four pivotal functions of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery (Donahue and Joyce). Each function is characterized by specific requirements and operations, as well as distinct responsibilities for central and local governments.

At this stage, gradual and long-term steps are taken to ensure that disasters do not occur, or that when they do, they cause minimal damage. Actions at this stage include the identification of hazards, research into the causes of disasters, the creation of means to modify those causes, the development of ways to reduce community vulnerability, efforts to better consolidate older buildings, construction of disaster-resistant structures, public education, and the provision of insurance.

Emergency Management of Typhoon Morakot

The responsibilities of the central government at this stage include: identifying hazards and researching their causes; researching how the causes of disasters can be modified; offering research and development grants to local projects; and promulgating building safety standards. The responsibilities of local governments include: the adoption and implementation of zoning; the enforcement of building codes; and the rebuilding or consolidation of older facilities.

At this stage, individuals, organizations, and governments implement short-term decisions that will help them better respond to an upcoming disaster. Central government responsibilities include: offering intergovernmental grants; creating a national emergency management system; monitoring risks; and maintaining an inventory of available resources. At the local level, responsibilities include: planning and training for disaster; early warning and evacuation of target populations; and interagency collaboration and the implementation of aid plans.

Throughout this stage, action is taken in the immediate aftermath of a disaster to bring relief to victims and reduce ongoing threats. Central government responsibilities include: granting intergovernmental loans and access to national resources; collecting data and assessing damages; and restoring roads and other infrastructure necessary for crisis resolution. Local government responsibilities include: maintaining emergency communications; searching for, rescuing, and evacuating victims; organizing medical, fire, and police actions; and providing food, water, and shelter for victims.

In the fourth stage of emergency management, short- and long-term actions are taken to restore people and infrastructure to their pre-disaster state. Central government responsibilities include: offering governmental loans and grants; and restoring national economic stability. At the local level, responsibilities include: restoring infrastructure (including the removal of debris); restoring public services; repairing public and private property; restoring individual health; and redeveloping the local economy (Donahue and Joyce).

On August 5, 2009, television and radio stations began broadcasting an announcement from Taiwan's Central Weather Bureau indicating that Typhoon Morakot — meaning emerald in Thai (The Mirror, 2009) — was forming at sea. It had begun to form on August 2, but was initially classified as a regular tropical storm. As it gained in size and intensity, meteorologists paid closer attention and eventually upgraded it to a typhoon. Given its wind speed of 150 kilometers per hour, Morakot was comparable to a category 1 hurricane. On August 7, Morakot hit central Taiwan. Initial reports described heavy rains, a small number of drowning deaths, and a few landslides. Yet as the storm continued, over 500 lives were lost in a single town buried under a landslide. The heavy rainfall brought by the typhoon surpassed all previous records, including those set by Typhoon Herb. Eleven days after Morakot left Taiwan, over 11,000 Taiwanese residents remained without water or electricity. The total number of people affected rose to nearly 150,000. On August 9, Morakot moved toward China, leaving behind deaths, million-dollar losses, and a devastated population. The Central Weather Bureau stated that the storm had passed but urged citizens in mountainous regions to remain alert to the possibility of landslides and mudslides in the days that followed (Kuo, 2009).

The Taiwanese population was affected not only at a socio-economic level but also emotionally, due to the slow and insufficient response of the federal authorities. From the perspective of victims and, as it would soon become clear, from the perspective of the international community, President Ma Ying-jeou's administration poorly managed the disaster. The initial governmental response was delayed, and even when it emerged, the actions taken proved insufficient. President Ma delayed his decision-making, a delay that cost lives. He initially ordered 2,100 soldiers deployed to the affected regions to conduct rescue missions, before reconsidering and assigning a total of 46,000 soldiers to rescue operations. Days after the disaster, while visiting the town of Xiaolin — entirely buried by a mudslide in which 500 people were killed — President Ma stated his belief that the mudslide was not caused by the typhoon but by construction works begun five years earlier. The construction project in question, the Tsengwen Reservoir Water Diversion Project, became a focal point of controversy, and the president's deflection of blame demonstrated a lack of accountability on the part of the central government, resulting in increased public dissatisfaction.

During the same press conference, the president argued that the government's intervention had been proportionate to its assessment of the situation, but that the intensity of Typhoon Morakot had taken them by surprise. He stated that the government had launched several relief actions, but that these were delayed due to factors beyond its control. "Pressed by the fear of a party collapse in upcoming elections scheduled for the end of the year, today Ma went to visit the village of Hsiaolin, among the most affected by the flooding. Yesterday he held a press conference in which he defended the actions of his government, highlighting that the strength of the typhoon was completely unexpected, that delays in aid were caused by the impossibility of transport and rescue helicopters being able to take off. In an attempt to restore the image of the military, Ma has also said that he will create an agency to deal with disasters (a kind of Civil Protection) by re-organizing military troops" (Asia News, August 19, 2009). He also stated that an investigation would be launched to assess the potential responsibility of state leaders in the management of the emergency. This investigation, however, would only begin the following month.

While President Ma was visiting Xiaolin, his Defense Minister submitted his resignation. Other resignations followed, but the premier stated that he would not be accepting any, as the country was facing more pressing matters that required assistance, not resignations. The political crisis continued to intensify. In the aftermath of the disaster, people fiercely criticized the government's delayed actions and its inability to provide adequate support in the affected regions. The president and his cabinet were also blamed for having refused international aid from China. The Taiwanese leader publicly apologized for the inadequate crisis response, but his popularity and that of his government continued to decline. Two weeks after Typhoon Morakot struck Taiwan, the central government allocated a total of 100 billion New Taiwan Dollars to the reconstruction of the affected regions (Asia News, August 20, 2009).

Public debate focused on the government's poor performance in addressing the crisis. Yet, citizens rarely distinguished between central and local governments, placing blame on the entire federal structure. Some of the complaints voiced by victims or their relatives include the following:

Julien wrote: "I'm Taiwanese and am writing from this country. The government of Mr. Ma has been doing a very poor job from the beginning. His supporters don't want to see the facts. Mr. Ma was absent from the national scene during the first three days of the disaster. Where was he? What did he do during those three days? He is like a general who believed himself to be a soldier. He doesn't know how to command — or he doesn't want to. I look forward to the day he steps down in 2012, or before that for the better."

Frank Kao wrote: "If you can read Chinese, local news here in Taiwan, and if you noted Ma's statement at the first press conference, then you will realize why people here are so angry. The disaster got worse and worse because of lost timing and failed command, causing more and more civilians unable to be evacuated from villages, and the following days were digging and body bags. [...] I'm from Taipei, Taiwan."

Norman wrote: "I am in Taiwan and I knew from the day the president started to visit the grieving families whilst holding a microphone that his advisors were still playing political games. To visit someone in grief and then broadcast their sobbing pleas was inhumane and thoughtless. A few days later I watched the news as he stepped up his visual mercy policy, and lo and behold he stepped from a helicopter. There were villages that could not be reached because of a mysterious lack of helicopters, but we were treated to the president using one to visit the grieving. He is a nice man, but his advisors should be sacked."

An ordinary citizen from Taiwan wrote: "The government reacted way too slowly. All the officials were nowhere to be seen, including Mr. Ma. Remember the earthquake in China last April? China's premier was on the scene the second day — China is a big country, it does take a while to get there — but Taiwan is tiny, it doesn't take three days. I don't care if he was there only for show; during this time, you need some kind of leadership, and when Mr. Ma took the position of president, he was supposed to be that leader, but he is not" (The Boston Globe, 2009).

These comments represent a clear picture of the victim's perspective, categorically holding the government accountable for the extent of the damage caused by Typhoon Morakot. Yet a distinction should be made between the local and central governments. Given the short period elapsed since the disaster and the limited number of available sources and research at the time of writing, this distinction is most apparent at a theoretical level. Victims rarely made this distinction and simply argued that blame fell with the government as a whole. If anything, they placed the greatest blame on the central government headed by the president and ministers.

It should be acknowledged that the central government did implement some measures in administering the disaster, but on several occasions it expected local governments to step in and carry forward specific processes. This situation reveals that another root cause of the poor emergency management was the dysfunctional relationship between central and local governments. Specifically, the actions undertaken by the government included the following:

In the immediate aftermath of the typhoon, the Central Weather Bureau announced that Morakot had left the country but warned citizens in mountainous regions to remain alert to the possibility of landslides. The Council of Agriculture issued two types of alerts: a red alert for 519 locations in 12 counties presenting high risks of rock and mudslides, and yellow alerts targeting 163 villages in 14 counties, both in direct response to the typhoon's heavy rainfall. The central government stated that its role in issuing alerts was complete, and that it was thereafter the responsibility of local governments to warn residents and implement necessary evacuation procedures (Kuo, 2009).

The international community offered troops and volunteers to assist in search and rescue missions. Yet the Taiwanese government refused this offer, arguing that guiding foreign personnel would drain national resources. Other sources noted that foreign troops had made a significantly positive difference in search and rescue missions following the 1999 earthquake in Taiwan (Branigan, 2009). President Ma also blamed the water and central weather agencies for failing to predict the true intensity of the typhoon, stating that investigations would be launched to identify culprits and implement corrective measures (Jacobs and Yu, 2009). Fault also lies with local governments, which proved unable to maintain communications with affected regions or to estimate the number of people killed or missing, further impeding efficient rescue missions.

Ultimately, Typhoon Morakot was an unfortunate storm that gained in intensity beyond what had been anticipated. Yet the question remains whether this scientifically valid explanation constitutes sufficient grounds to excuse the lack of preparedness and response on the part of the government. The most probable answer is no — meaning that the greatest share of accountability for the poor management of the situation rests with the government, and particularly with the central government. While local governments could also have acted more promptly, they do not possess the authority to request and accept foreign aid or to command military forces. These powers rest exclusively with the central government, which proved inefficient in exercising them. Furthermore, while the international community acknowledged that the typhoon's intensity caught the authorities off guard, this does not excuse the poor management. Taiwan is a typhoon-prone region — over twelve storms can occur during a regular summer — and this reality alone should be sufficient reason for authorities to always remain prepared for the risks any storm may bring.

Conclusion

Taiwan is a region rich in typhoons — over twelve storms are common during a regular summer — and this simple reality should be reason enough for authorities to always remain alert to the risks posed by any storm. Typhoon Morakot exposed significant shortcomings in Taiwan's emergency management framework, particularly in the areas of preparedness, inter-agency coordination, and governmental accountability. The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that while the typhoon's unprecedented intensity was a genuine contributing factor, it does not excuse the inadequate response of the central government. Improvements in citizen participation, organizational accountability, inter-agency collaboration, interstate partnerships, staff training, and a shift toward a network-based management approach all represent viable pathways to reducing the human and economic toll of future disasters, not only in Taiwan but in any region vulnerable to natural catastrophe.