Union Military Strategy in 1864: Grant, Lincoln, and the Civil War
This paper examines the Union's military strategy in 1864 following Ulysses S. Grant's assumption of command. It explores how Grant shifted the Union's approach from a defensive blockade strategy to an aggressive, multi-front offensive aimed at overwhelming Confederate forces. The paper discusses both the successes of this strategy — most notably Sherman's march on Atlanta — and its significant failures, including costly defeats in the Shenandoah Valley and the failed Mobile campaign. It also considers Lincoln's role, the problem of politically appointed generals who undermined Grant's plans, and how the Emancipation Proclamation complemented military efforts. The paper draws on Brooks (2017) and Pearlman (2016).
- Introduction: Grant Takes Command in 1864: Grant's 1864 promotion reshapes Union war effort
- Lincoln's Frustration and the Shift in Union Strategy: Lincoln pushes for multi-point offensive over blockade
- Grant's Offensive Approach and Total War: Grant and Sherman adopt aggressive total war tactics
- Failures and Near-Disaster in 1864: Costly defeats threaten Grant's five-army offensive plan
- Political Generals and Their Impact: Politically appointed generals undermine Grant's strategy
- Lincoln, the Election, and the Road to Victory: Union survival tied to Lincoln's reelection and emancipation
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What makes this paper effective
- The paper balances praise for Grant's strategy with honest acknowledgment of its failures, presenting a nuanced rather than one-sided historical account.
- It connects military events to political consequences — specifically the risk to Lincoln's reelection — giving the analysis broader historical significance.
- The use of two distinct sources allows the paper to present complementary perspectives on the same period, strengthening its argument through corroboration.
Key academic technique demonstrated
This paper effectively uses source integration to build a layered argument. Rather than relying on one authority, it draws on Brooks (2017) for the strategic overview and Sherman's campaign, then introduces Pearlman (2016) to complicate the narrative with evidence of near-failure. This technique — using a second source to challenge or qualify the first — is a hallmark of analytical historical writing at the undergraduate level.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens by situating Grant's promotion within Lincoln's prior frustration with Union generals. It then traces the evolution of Union strategy from blockade to total war offense, using Sherman's Atlanta campaign as a central example. The argument pivots to acknowledge failures in 1864 caused by politically appointed generals. It closes by connecting military outcomes to political stakes — Lincoln's reelection and the Union's survival — and notes the Emancipation Proclamation as a complementary political-military tool.
Introduction: Grant Takes Command in 1864
In 1864, Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of the Union Armies, fundamentally shifting the Union's military strategy and leading to several key victories. However, the Union also faced serious setbacks during this phase of the war. The question of how the Union's strategies in 1864 succeeded and failed — in both the eastern and western theaters — reveals a complex and often precarious road to final victory.
Lincoln's Frustration and the Shift in Union Strategy
The military strategy of Ulysses S. Grant and the leadership of President Lincoln are widely credited for the success of the Union Army during the Civil War. Yet Grant's strategy at the time was not viewed as an uncomplicated success, despite some eventual, notable victories over his Confederate opponents. According to Brooks (2017), before Grant's promotion, Lincoln was extremely frustrated by the tactics deployed by his generals. He believed that the Union should take advantage of its superior numbers and overwhelm the Confederate forces. The Confederacy was engaging the Union through a series of more limited skirmishes, attempting to exploit its greater familiarity with the terrain on which the battles were fought. Lincoln himself had little military experience but stressed the need to press the Confederacy at multiple points of attack simultaneously, rather than at a single point (Brooks, 2017).
Grant's Offensive Approach and Total War
Grant decided that the best defense was a strong offense, and resolved to engage the Confederacy offensively throughout the war (Brooks, 2017). Although this may seem like an obvious plan in retrospect, it was not at the time. Previous Union generals had hoped to blockade the Confederacy and starve its residents, thereby triggering pro-peace and anti-secessionist sentiment. From a morale standpoint, however, this approach merely seemed to encourage greater resolve among the Confederate states to refuse surrender.
Grant, by contrast, was highly aggressive. Perhaps the most famous example of the new Union strategy was Sherman's march into Atlanta, in which he employed a total war strategy — burning whatever he encountered across the countryside. Although the South was a largely agrarian society, the tactics used against it by Lincoln's later generals have been described as one of the first modern, or total, war strategies. This proved a more effective means of breaking Confederate resistance, and eventually contributed to the Confederacy's surrender (Brooks, 2017).
References
Brooks, R. (2017). What were the major strategies of the Civil War? Civil War Saga. Retrieved from: http://civilwarsaga.com/civil-war-strategies/
Pearlman, M. (2016). Union at risk: How Lincoln and Grant nearly lost the war in 1864. Civil War Times. Retrieved from: https://www.historynet.com/the-union-at-risk-how-lincoln-and-grant-nearly-lost-the-war-in-1864.htm
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