US Military Doctrine, DOD Strategy, and Counterinsurgency

Introduction: Evolving Roles of US Military Branches

Over the last several years, the role of the US military has been changing as the overall nature of threats to the nation has evolved. This is part of a larger historical trend that has caused the various branches of the military to adapt to different challenges. A good example of this can be seen by examining the history of the United States Marine Corps. The Corps originally began in 1775, modeled after the Royal Marines of Great Britain. Its original objective was to serve aboard naval vessels, providing added security to the ship and functioning as a quick-reaction force. This was in response to the fierce hand-to-hand combat that occurred when opposing ships came into close proximity, as enemies would attempt to board and seize vessels in order to commandeer them. At the same time, Marines served as a strike force used to attack beaches and coastal infrastructure.

As time passed, the overall nature of warfare began to change quickly. Marines took on a different role, serving as a combat force to augment other branches of the military, and the phrase "first to fight" became a defining motto for the Corps. Then, following the downfall of the Soviet Union, the role of the Marines changed once more, as they began to engage in rapid-strike and counter-terrorism operations (Benson, 2005, pp. 5–17). This is significant because it illustrates how the nature of the military has been continually evolving over the decades, driven in large part by the changing threats facing the nation. All branches of the military have begun to play unique roles in addressing these underlying challenges.

When examining how these changes are occurring, it is clear that the military maintains an interconnected relationship among its branches, with each supporting the long-term goals of the Department of Defense while fulfilling various responsibilities in achieving those objectives. Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the branches worked together to achieve general long-term objectives, yet intense rivalries and disputes over areas of influence existed among them. This created an atmosphere of competition and a reluctance to fully cooperate with other services in joint operations. Over time, these divisions affected not only the military but also the government agencies that worked alongside it, as bureaucrats were hesitant to collaborate with military officials out of concern for their own areas of responsibility.

Then, in 2003, Under Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz began implementing Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Instruction 5000.2, CJCSI 3170.01C, and CJCSI 3170.01. These directives streamlined the way the military and government agencies would interact across a number of areas, shifting the relationship from intense rivalry to forced cooperation in sharing information and responsibilities. This is significant because it shows how a dramatic shift would occur in the way military branches interact with civilian agencies, establishing unprecedented levels of cooperation. The continuing challenge is to reduce the rivalries that developed over the years and to encourage all levels of the military — along with civil service employees — to work together toward the same long-term objectives (Garrett, 2007, pp. 1–14; Garrett, 2007, pp. 15–29).

Stakeholders and Civil-Military Relationships

The US military is organized under the Department of Defense (DOD), which maintains an interconnected relationship between military and civilian personnel, as well as other government agencies. A civilian is in charge of running and administering the armed forces — a responsibility that rests with the Secretary of Defense, who sets military policy and procedures. At the same time, relationships exist between the military and various civilian contractors that it uses to help achieve its mission objectives. The military frequently contracts and subcontracts different projects to the private sector, ranging from mess hall services to private security contractors working alongside American troops. In this respect, the changing role of the military means that more traditional responsibilities are being outsourced, as civilians are now providing services that were once performed by uniformed personnel. This illustrates how the military is utilizing civilians and government agencies as private stakeholders who play an important role in helping it achieve its objectives.

Alongside this outsourcing, the military has begun to specialize in how it utilizes its own personnel. There is an increasing emphasis on having members of the armed forces focus on specific mission areas such as special operations, cyber warfare, intelligence, and analysis, while general responsibilities are outsourced to private contractors. Together, these elements highlight how the evolving mission has made all stakeholders more focused and has caused the relationship between military and civilian personnel to become more deeply interconnected (Garamonne, 2001).

Historical and Current Gaps in DOD Strategy

DOD strategy is at a crossroads. Some former military officials working in civilian agencies and private contracting firms hold a view of military doctrine rooted in the past — specifically, the traditional model of maintaining a large number of troops in a theater of operations to ensure adequate support. The problem with this approach is that it requires a large army with continuous logistical support to sustain combat operations. During the Cold War, this was an ideal strategy for engaging the Soviet Union. However, after hostilities ended between the two sides, the US military struggled to adjust. As it sought to refocus on future challenges in an era of declining budgets, the emphasis shifted toward special operations forces and small-unit tactics. The prevailing thinking was that future conflicts would involve low-intensity combat, making large ground forces unnecessary (Kord, 2007).

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the military focused on small-unit tactics and counter-terrorism operations. This shift in US military doctrine was reinforced by the push from then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who believed the military could achieve its objectives using smaller numbers of ground forces overwhelming the enemy through air superiority (Kord, 2007). During the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, this strategy proved effective as a model for quickly defeating the enemy and supporting capitulation. This new doctrine redefined how the military would conduct warfare, relying on private security contractors to protect supply lines while military forces focused on engaging the enemy in their strongholds (Jones, 2008, pp. 7–24).

The problem with this strategy is that it did not account for maintaining the peace. The military did not have enough personnel on the ground to secure the theater of operations after initial combat ended. This allowed terrorists and criminals to establish safe havens in areas that were assumed to be secured, from which they launched attacks on military units and supply lines. Over time, the mounting casualty figures — even after declared hostilities — turned public opinion against the wars, as many people believed the fighting should have been over. This created divisions within the DOD: one faction of strategists believed that successfully fighting wars required hundreds of thousands of troops on the ground, while planners who shared Rumsfeld's views considered such large buildups obsolete. The reality, as demonstrated by the initial successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, is that a large military buildup is not necessary to prevail on the battlefield. Effective air power combined with agile ground forces can achieve comparable results without the large troop numbers or lengthy preparation time. In this sense, the strategy was effective at achieving initial battlefield success, overwhelming and destroying enemy forces to the point of temporary capitulation (Jones, 2008, pp. 7–24).

However, once major combat operations ended, a concentrated follow-on surge was needed to secure the country and establish civilian control — one that would place enough forces in remote regions on a sustained basis to improve security. The strategy as implemented gave the enemy a chance to regroup. In warfare, once momentum is gained, it must be maintained to prevent remnants of the enemy from launching a guerrilla campaign. The failure to account for this in Afghanistan and Iraq allowed terrorists to conduct insurgencies against American forces. A clear example of the consequences is seen in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, when widespread looting was reported at numerous historical and archaeological sites across the country ("Looters Ransack Baghdad Museum," 2003). This lawlessness created an environment in which terrorist groups and remnants of the Iraqi military could regroup and resume operations against US forces. The biggest gap in US military doctrine, therefore, was the lack of follow-up planning in the aftermath of conflict (Jones, 2008, pp. 7–24).

This strategic shortfall worsened the situation on the ground in both Iraq and Afghanistan. With smaller forces unable to protect all infrastructure and civilian population centers, terrorists were able to create and exploit an atmosphere of lawlessness that eroded both military morale and public support. In Iraq, this chaos enabled insurgents to advance their goals and caused the security situation to spiral downward, prompting many politicians to question the rationale for continued US presence. It ultimately led to the 2007 surge, which helped retake many areas that had fallen back under terrorist control. This is significant because it demonstrates how US military doctrine could win the war yet fail to win the peace. A mini-surge incorporated during and immediately after combat operations — rather than years later — could have prevented the initial looting and lawlessness. If such an approach had been applied in both Iraq and Afghanistan from the outset, the outcomes would likely have been more favorable.