Vehicle-Borne IEDs: Threats, Tactics, and Countermeasures

Introduction

"Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are intended to kill and nothing else." — Chris Greenwood, 2008

Despite the investment of enormous amounts of national blood and treasure, the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan failed to prevent the resurgence of terrorist activity, and the Afghan government remains unable to cope with the growing threat. Some of the more effective tools used by insurgents in the asymmetric warfare in Afghanistan — tools that helped produce this undesirable outcome — were improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in general, and vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) in particular. To determine how these weapons emerged, the manner in which they were deployed, the problems associated with defusing them, and the countermeasures taken against them, this paper reviews the relevant literature concerning these issues, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion.

Background and Overview of VBIEDs

Insurgents create improvised explosive devices by exploiting any available materials to develop deadly bombs of varying types and explosive intensities. According to Dowle (2006), "These range from simple pipe bombs to under-vehicle booby traps to sophisticated timer-operated cassette-sized incendiaries" (p. 28). One type of IED that gained increasing popularity with insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan was the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, in which ammonium nitrate is packed into a vehicle that is then used against Coalition forces.

As the term suggests, VBIEDs are IEDs installed in some type of civilian vehicle — even animal-powered — in order to maximize the amount of explosives used and facilitate their delivery to the target (Lubold, 2009). Vernon (2008) reports that "VBIEDs have come in all shapes, sizes, makes, models, and colors of vehicles, ranging from the small, simple two-door passenger car to the large cement or sewage truck. In Iraq and Afghanistan, there have even been instances of fire trucks, ambulances, trailer-mounted generators, and donkey-drawn carts used to attack Coalition forces" (para. 4). While insurgents continue to use suicide belts and vests as well as other delivery modes to inflict harm on civilian populations, VBIEDs are especially lethal. These weapons are increasingly popular among insurgent factions because of their cost effectiveness, lethality, and flexibility in the choice of materials. In Iraq, "Insurgents there are still using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks as their weapons of choice" (Lubold, 2009, p. 2).

Generally speaking, VBIEDs use a vehicle as the delivery mode for an explosive device (VBIEDs, 2015). What makes them especially insidious is the fact that virtually any type of vehicle can be pressed into service as a weapon of potentially mass destruction. The security consultants at Global Security emphasize that VBIEDs "come in all shapes, colors, and sizes which vary by the type of vehicles available — small sedans to large cargo trucks. There have even been instances of what appeared to be generators, donkey-drawn carts, and ambulances used to attempt attacks on Coalition Forces" (VBIEDs, 2015, para. 2). Triggering mechanisms differ from device to device, but most VBIEDs encountered to date have been equipped with the same types of mechanisms used for other IEDs (VBIEDs, 2015). Global Security notes that "Functioning of devices can vary within the same methods as the package types and can have the same common characteristics or indicators as other IEDs" (VBIEDs, 2015, para. 3).

There have been some high-profile incidents in recent years involving VBIEDs, including the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Murrah Federal Office Building explosion in 1995 (Vernon, 2008). In both of these cases, the VBIEDs were created using widely available commercial products such as ammonium nitrate, a common fertilizer ingredient (Vernon, 2008). Other high-profile incidents include the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and the Air Force's Khobar Towers in Khobar, Saudi Arabia (Caudill & Jacobson, 2013).

Given the destructive power available with a relatively low-cost VBIED, it is not surprising that insurgents have increasingly adopted this method. As Caudill and Jacobson (2013) conclude, "We see the same intent at play in the Taliban's detonation of a truck bomb on the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 — a strike that wounded 89 people, including 77 Soldiers" (p. 31). While other hazards are certainly arrayed against Coalition forces, the ease of manufacture and the potential destructive capabilities of VBIEDs make them an especially significant threat. Vernon emphasizes that "VBIEDs constitute one of the largest hazards in Iraq and Afghanistan that Coalition forces have faced" (2008, para. 5). This assessment reflects the fact that VBIEDs are a "poor man's Predator drone," providing attackers with the ability to initiate an attack from a distance and to employ large amounts of high explosives, thereby maximizing the casualty ratio (Vernon, 2008).

Other general countermeasures that can be used to thwart a VBIED attack include the following potential indicators provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for domestic situations, but which have widespread applicability:

Theft of explosives, blasting caps, fuses, or chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives; delivery of chemicals from a manufacturer to a self-storage facility, or unusual deliveries of chemicals to residential or rural addresses; chemical fires, toxic odors, brightly colored stains, or rusted metal fixtures in apartments, hotel rooms, or self-storage units; and modification of a truck or van with heavy-duty springs to handle heavier loads (Home on the page, 2009, p. 21).

Explosive Capacity and Delivery Methods

Larger vehicles can carry an enormous amount of explosive material, capable of damaging buildings and killing people more than a mile away. As shown in Table 1, the explosive capacity of VBIEDs ranges from exceedingly lethal to completely devastating, depending on the vehicle type and the explosives used.

Table 1: U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Explosive Standards for VBIEDs

Compact Sedan — Max Explosive Capacity: 500 lbs (in trunk); Lethal Air Blast Range: 100 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 1,500 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 1,250 feet.

Full-Size Sedan — Max Explosive Capacity: 1,000 lbs (in trunk); Lethal Air Blast Range: 125 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 1,750 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 1,750 feet.

Passenger/Cargo Van — Max Explosive Capacity: 4,000 lbs; Lethal Air Blast Range: 200 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 2,750 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 2,750 feet.

Small Box Van — Max Explosive Capacity: 10,000 lbs; Lethal Air Blast Range: 300 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 3,750 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 3,750 feet.

Box Van / Water-Fuel Truck — Max Explosive Capacity: 30,000 lbs; Lethal Air Blast Range: 450 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 6,500 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 6,500 feet.

Semi-Trailer — Max Explosive Capacity: 60,000 lbs; Lethal Air Blast Range: 600 feet; Min Evacuation Distance: 7,000 feet; Falling Glass Hazard: 7,000 feet.

Source: Based on data from VBIEDs, 2015, GlobalSecurity.org

There has been growing evidence that insurgents are using ever-larger vehicles for VBIEDs, with explosive charges ranging from 100 lbs to more than half a ton; the potential exists for even greater explosive capacities to be delivered by these weapons (VBIEDs, 2015). Because they are improvised — sometimes quickly and under field conditions — the explosive charges used in these devices have varied widely. Reports indicate the use of rocket motors, mortar rounds, rocket warheads, artillery rounds, and PE4 explosives (VBIEDs, 2015). Vernon likewise notes that "The explosives component of a VBIED can be anything from homemade improvised explosives to sophisticated military ordnance" (2008, para. 4). There have also been instances where VBIEDs included chlorine, flammables, shrapnel, and white phosphorus (Vernon, 2008).

In addition, there have been reports of multiple vehicles being used as a force multiplier to maximize the impact of a VBIED attack. In these scenarios, a lead vehicle serves as a decoy to draw attention away from the actual weaponized vehicle or to breach a barrier. When this lead vehicle is neutralized, the real VBIED accelerates into a crowded area in an effort to target as many people as possible (VBIEDs, 2015).

Conclusion

As the debate continues over the appropriateness of drones and other robotic weapons used by the United States and its allies, terrorist organizations of all ideological persuasions have found in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices a weapon that can help level the playing field. The research shows that VBIEDs have been increasingly used by insurgents in the Middle East, including Afghanistan, due to their lethality and cost effectiveness. Even small vehicles can carry enough explosives to cause hundreds of casualties, and the potential for truly devastating attacks using semi-tractor trailers is sufficient reason to give even battle-hardened military commanders pause and grudging respect for these bombs on wheels.

References

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Bless, S. J., Wilson, B. A., Pederson, L., Wienman, L., & Garnier, J. (2008, September). National Institute of Justice Final Report: Development of nanothermite projectile for improvised explosive device (IED) and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) neutralization. Institute for Advanced Technology.

Caudill, S. W., & Jacobson, B. R. (2013, May/June). Nowhere to hide: The growing threat to air bases. Air & Space Power Journal, 27(3), 30–35.

Dowle, J. (2006, September). Improvised explosive devices. Law & Order, 54(9), 28–31.

Greenwood, C. (2008, December 2). They wanted to kill . . . and nothing else. Daily Record, 4.

Home on the page. (2009, February). Security Management, 48(2), 20–22.

Lubold, G. (2009, September 1). Iraq attacks raise questions about U.S. withdrawal. The Christian Science Monitor, 2.

VBIEDs. (2015). Global Security. Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied-vehicle.htm

Vernon, A. (2008, September 1). Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Fire Engineering. Retrieved from http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/2008/09/vehicle-borne-improvised-explosive-devices-planning-and-response.html