This paper examines virtue ethics as a major normative ethical framework, tracing its origins to Plato and Aristotle and its modern revival in response to perceived shortcomings in consequentialism and deontology. The paper outlines how consequentialism evaluates actions by their outcomes and deontology by adherence to principles, then explains how virtue ethics differs by centering moral character rather than discrete actions or rules. It highlights the flexibility and realism that virtue ethics offers, while also addressing significant criticisms—including the difficulty of defining universal virtues, resolving conflicts between virtues, and establishing a practical system of moral education in a pluralistic world.
The philosophy of virtue ethics holds that being a "good person"—or what one might call "character"—is the most important determinant of moral action. Virtue ethics is considered one of the major philosophical orientations in the field of normative ethics, alongside consequentialism and deontology (Hursthouse 2010). Many consider it the oldest form of ethics, harkening back to Plato and Aristotle's attempts to define what constitutes a good and moral person. Virtue ethics fell out of favor for many years, but there has been a revitalization of interest in the concept in the wake of controversies over the flaws of consequentialism and deontology.
To understand the strengths—and also some of the weaknesses—of virtue ethics, it is essential to understand the ethical systems to which the modern incarnation of virtue ethics was responding. The system of virtue ethics "may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism)" (Hursthouse 2010).
Consequentialism, of which utilitarianism is one variety, stresses that the consequences of actions are the standard by which ethical choices should be evaluated. This is commensurate with Jeremy Bentham's principle of doing "the greatest good for the greatest number." "Consequentialists thus must specify initially the states of affairs that are intrinsically valuable — the Good" (Alexander & Moore 2007). Utilitarians like Bentham often had complex, almost mathematical formulas to determine what constituted The Good. "They [consequentialists] then are in a position to assert that whatever choices increase the Good, that is, bring about more of it, are the choices that it is morally right to make and to execute" (Alexander & Moore 2007).
"Moreover, consequentialists generally agree that the Good is 'agent-neutral' (Parfit 1984; Nagel 1986). That is, valuable states of affairs are states of affairs that all agents have reason to achieve" regardless of culture or circumstance (Alexander & Moore 2007). However, as straightforward as this sounds, there are serious problems with consequentialism's assertion of what is "Good," given that this has proven to be inherently subjective. It raises the question of whether one person's Good is the same as another's—for example, killing may be deemed "against the Good" unless it saves lives, but that raises the further question of which lives are deemed more valuable or which lives "count." Consequentialism also appears to justify potentially abominable actions, so long as the agent acts in the name of the majority or the ends are said to justify the means.
In contrast, deontological, or principle-based ethics holds that the intended nature of actions—rather than their outcomes—is what matters morally. "Roughly speaking, deontologists of all stripes hold that some choices cannot be justified by their effects—that no matter how morally good their consequences, some choices are morally forbidden. On deontological accounts of morality, agents cannot make certain wrongful choices even if by doing so the number of wrongful choices will be minimized" (Alexander & Moore 2007). Kant's famous categorical imperative stated that ethical actors should behave as if setting a precedent "for all time" with every decision they make. Because the consequences of actions are impossible to predict, the principles one obeys must themselves be correct.
The problem with deontological ethics, however, is determining whose principles and whose rules are "correct," given that they vary from society to society. Deontological ethics also places a tremendous emphasis on the mental state of the actor, which can be problematic to determine. Is an action good simply because a person meant to "do good" and follow a "good rule"? It is easy to imagine many instances in which a good intention and a good rule did not produce a good result.
Virtue ethics takes a different point of view. Rather than focusing on discrete actions, it focuses on the character of the moral actor, and assumes that if a person is taught to be moral, he or she will act morally. "To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. (Hence the extreme recklessness of attributing a virtue on the basis of a single action.)" (Hursthouse 2010). The great advantage of virtue ethics' emphasis on the person rather than the action is that it allows for a certain flexibility in decision-making. There may be a principle of "do not lie" that a deontologist would argue must be obeyed inflexibly, or that a consequentialist would argue should be enforced only when it promotes the majority's welfare. A virtue ethicist, by contrast, would recognize situations in which small lies might be permissible to promote the social order, while still regarding lies in certain contexts as abhorrent and against the general good.
The fact that virtue ethics focuses on creating "states of being" rather than discrete actions also makes it an ethical system that promotes a continual state of community harmony, rather than fixating on a single result (as in consequentialism) or a narrow set of rules (as in deontology). Virtuous people who value honesty are assumed to act at all times in ways that promote honesty—choosing virtuous friends, pursuing virtuous occupations, and engaging in public life that upholds such virtues (Hursthouse 2010). Ethical actions are not confined to a single facet of the person's life, nor are they always conscious, deliberate choices.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of virtue ethics is that it frees the moral actor from the constraints of both consequentialism and deontology, which rarely seem to mirror how individuals make decisions in real life. Most ethical decisions are made fairly spontaneously, based on past knowledge and moral formation. Virtue ethics also avoids the dangerous inflexibility of either competing system—the cold utilitarian calculation that fewer deaths might result from a particular action, or the deontological tendency to ignore common sense simply to follow a rule. Virtue ethics, in this respect, is more faithful to the actual lived experience of moral agency.
"Examines objections including moral education challenges"
Critics further note that virtue ethics shares some of the problems of both deontology and consequentialism. Like deontology, it cannot reconcile situations where cultures hold different values or where values conflict with one another. Just as a deontological system cannot cope with rules that contradict one another, a virtue ethicist cannot resolve the dilemma of when compassion should trump honesty, or vice versa. Like consequentialism, virtue ethics must ultimately justify what it considers "the Good" in all instances—though virtue ethics frames this as "Good Character" rather than as an aggregate outcome. Each of the three major normative frameworks offers genuine insights while leaving important moral questions unresolved.
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