Interwar
Essays

The two wars, WWI: 1914-18 and WWII:1939-45, brought Europe to the brink of destruction. Two of the major players, France and Germany, had a relationship between the wars which makes one think that WWII was merely a…

Giovanni Capoccia's journal article "Defending democracy: Reactions to political extremism in inter-war Europe" provides readers with historic data demonstrating that a democracy does not function merely as a result of…

The period following the First World War was economically difficult for the German nation. The country was force to shoulder the burden of large reparation payments and eventually also suffered from hyperinflation which resulted in its currency being rendered nearly useless. Although the nation recovered from the hyperinflation this was soon followed by a depression that led to major political and social changes within the country.

This paper examines the interwar years between World War 1 and World War 2 and discusses the role of the US during that period. It shows how the US was largely to blame for the rise of imperialism and how its empty rhetoric of peace and disarmament masked an ulterior motive of aggression and dominance in foreign affairs.

Problems Faced While Balancing Mortgage Rates

During the interwar period a number people advocated major changes in military doctrine and organizations, particularly in the use of airpower. Three important airpower advocates were Giulio Douhet, Hugh Trenchard, and Billy Mitchell, who all insisted that the air arm should be independent of the army and navy. Trenchard in fact was the commander of the first independent air force in the world, the Royal Air Force (RAF), while the United States Air Force (USAF) did not become fully independent of the Army until 1947. Both Douhet and Mitchell were sufficiently outspoken in their support of airpower that they made enemies among traditionalist generals, and both faced court-martials for their views. In the low-budget years of the 1920s and 1930s, Trenchard also had to battle the army and navy for scarce resources and to protect the survival of the independent air arm from the rival services. He was also a convinced supporter of Douhet's main theory that massed strategic bombing of the enemy's industry, cities and transportation could win a war and spare armies from the mass slaughter in the trenches that had occurred during World War I