Fichte separate right from morality and is it a good thing? Should they be separated?
Fichte's Philosophy of Right and Ethics
Why does Fichte separate right from morality and is it a good thing? Should they be separated?
Moral and political anxieties animate Fichte's entire philosophy and his perceptions to these issues that are innovative and at times tied together. His responses to Kant's vital philosophy in 1790 was a retaliation to the Kantian moral perception and its outset of human self-esteem as embedded in freedom and the moral outlook of human beings as normal agents. Fichte's perception on Wissenschaftslehre principle was a far from the conceptions developed in 1974 by the philosophers of Foundations of the entire Wissenschaftslehre. Fichte's major works in the principle of right and morality are extensively covered in these two areas; Fichte's Foundation of Natural Right (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy) And the Neuhouser article "Fichte and the Relationship between Right and Morality. The elucidation of these two significant works will assist analyze why Fitch endorses separation of right from morality.
It is normal to consider Fichte's ethical ideas as an illustration of Kantian ethics. This is certainly right as a first estimation; however, it may develop some aspect of undervaluation of Fichte's uniqueness and innovativeness. Fichte is an earlier philosopher and has a good relationship with Kant. The publication of Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right came before Kant published his Doctrine of Right in 1797, while as Fichte's System of Ethics publication followed slightly after Kant's Doctrine of Virtue in 1798. The slight difference between the two publications does not mean they presented a similar message; their content differed in various perspectives. For that reason, if the moral theories presented by these two great philosophers cropped up in an extensive sense from a general concept or insight, they vary tremendously in very many areas from the way the ideas work out.
When Kantian ethics portrays a remarkably unique evaluation of 18th century matters regarding sense of duty, motive, concern, good value and ethical feeling, Fichte's ethical theory accentuates on the connection of moral qualities to its personification and character identity, and on the subject of personality moral agent in a living society with others . That is, on the issues that only determined ethics and social concerns in the 19th and beyond. In this case, undermining Fichte's moral and political ideas emanates serious challenges to human understanding of their own ideas and origins of problems encountered.
Fichte's philosophy was animated by political concerns and moral issues through implementation of innovative and extreme (passionate) demonstration of the views. Fichte's interaction with Kant's critical philosophy in 1790 focused on the moral outlook, human dignity, freedom, and concepts of rights. Fichte focuses on the concept of separating rights from morality because of various reasons and objectives. Fichte's decisive development period was dominated by the production of the chief ethical writings. It is customary to think of Fichte's ethical thought as an example of Kantian morality or ethics (Fichte 2007). This is an indication of under-appreciation of Fichte's originality and distinctiveness despite the essence of truth in the relationship between Fichte's ethical thought and Kantian ethics. Fichte is related to Kant as an ethical thinker thus the opportunity to focus on the differentiation of rights and ethics. This relationship is not as a follower but as an immediate and independent contemporary. The publication of the Fichte's Foundation of Natural Right was way before Kant's Doctrine of Right. This was followed by the development of Fichte's System of Ethics thus independent of the illustration of Kant's doctrine of virtue. This is an illustration of differentiation between the ethical doctrines of the two philosophers despite adoption and implementation of broader perspectives or inspiration.
The first principle in relation to the Fichte's separation of rights and ethics is based on certain thus, illustration of certain propositions ground. It is essential to note that separation of ethics and rights by Fichte is for the purposes of certainty and simplicity rather than demonstration of complexity of the events or themes. Fichte indicates that the awareness of the "I" is crucial in relation to every act of awareness. This is an indication that no object come to awareness without the concept of self-awareness. For instance, in the reading of a novel, the focus of the reader is not on himself or herself, but on the characters of the story or play. In case of an interruption during the reading process, it is essential to note that the response to the question on what is going on relates to the concept of the self-awareness (Fichte 2007). This indicates certainty and not ambiguity is a crucial concept in relation to the aspect of awareness thus essential in the differentiation of rights and ethics. According to Fichte, it is essential to note activity and freedom in the thinking or passive state of perception thus a reflection of the concept of self-awareness. Fichte refers to "I" as the absolute principle of all philosophy thus awareness of individual's activity.
The condition for the reflective self-awareness in the formation of a conception of oneself in the form of "I" is opposed and limited by the concept of not-I. One of the illustrations of this expression is the aspect of limitation by material world. Another illustration indicates opposition or limitation by other I's. It is essential to note that an "I" cannot conceive itself at all unless it conceives itself as one of a plurality. This is an indication of the need to accompany consciousness of individuality by another consciousness. The argument presented by the Philosopher indicates that the existence of the concept of "I" must be limited by the aspect of "not I." This demonstrates on the need for the "I" to limit its own action in relation to the concept of outside limitation known as the demand (Fichte 2007).
Fichte also focuses on the concept of recognition as presupposed condition of all interactions between free human beings that is reciprocal in nature thus the relation of right. This is an illustration of the concept of recognition by the aspect of "I" must recognize the free being outside an individual. The principle of right by Fichte indicates the essence of existence of the external spheres for enhancing and limiting freedom of an individual within the society. According to Fichte, the concept of "I" and external sphere must interact effectively and efficiently in accordance with the ethical aspect to limit and enhance the freedom of human beings. This is evident in the differentiation between the rights and ethical concepts determining interactions within the society.
Fichte also adopts and integrates an essential perspective in relation to the concept of property rights. According to the philosopher, the main aspect of the property rights is the ability to limit interference with one's actions. This entails application of ethics and rights in the demonstration of effective and efficient interaction within the society. According to this proposition, Fichte notes that there is no existence of any right of property to the substance of things or to land. This is an illustration of the existence of right to actions rather than things thus determination of the rights of an individual through actions or external sphere. The rights of property must enjoy expression in terms of the external sphere or action to which an individual is entitled by right (Fichte 2007).
According to Fichte, the recognition of others and mode of treatment of the individuals in accordance to the original rights does not incorporate any moral concept or principle as the rational basis. The recognition of the individuals on the concept of the original rights requires implementation of consistent logical or critical thinking. Fichte notes that this essence does not offer the reason for respecting the rights of others in practice or expecting respect from others. This is because it would be advantageous to contradict oneself in the case it seems beneficial to violate the rights of other individuals. This is an indication that the actualization of the community of rational beings must depend or rely on the external forces for the generation of the rational beings in adherence to the laws. According to the philosopher, each individual has the right to coercion. This relates to the concept that it is not wrong to coerce others to the extent that they violate the principle of right (Fichte 2007). Fichte also notes that there is no community developed on such principles because of the expectation of the subjection of the members of the community to the principle of right. This is applicable in the case of implementation of equal rights and logical reasoning in relation to the situation affecting the society. This power is vital in the establishment of the laws for the purposes of creation and protection of the rights of the individuals within the society. This right is the basis of the penal law under subjection to a mutually advantageous contractual arrangement.