¶ … Moral Minima" by Lenn E. Goodman. (2010) The Good Society 19(1): 87-94 Discussion of morality is almost always contentious. Who defines morality? Whose morality is it? Can one culture's morality be imposed on another's? Can the Westerners judge non-Westerns based on Western understandings of morality and vice versa? These are obviously legitimate questions. Philosophers, social scientists, human rights activists, politicians, and even criminals engage in this debate. In the last sixty years, advocates of diversity and respect for all cultures have condemned old colonial and racial classifications of the world, arguing that cultural practices of different nations must be analyzed and understood within the context of these specific nations. These people are generally called "moral relativists," especially by critics of such a view. Critics argue that moral relativism is morally bankrupt and that it ends up justifying abhorrent practices around the world. They argue that there are certain practices that must be universally condemned. Lenn Goodman, in his article "Some moral minima" makes this argument. He harshly criticizes "moral relativists" for justifying practices which must be universally condemned. But Goodman fails to convince the reader because his assumptions are patently wrong and the examples he provides to support his argument are mostly irrelevant to the discussion.

Goodman has valid points. And he is not totally against moral relativism...

He notes that certain harmless cultural practices must be understood within the cultural context and respected. It is also true that dictators in Asian and African countries sometimes try to justify their oppressive cultural practices under the banner of moral relativism. And one would be hard pressed to disagree with the following words: "There is no proper compromise with Nazis in full spate, or the Khmer Rouge. What can link us morally to the Hutus at the door, or Mongol invaders, Inquisitor torturers, Red Guards, ethnic cleansers, Mujahidin, or Janjaweed? Here the human bonds demanding universal respect and sincerity can become otiose, even obscene" (p. 87). Goodman has a compelling case against these examples of human depravity.
Goodman is again in a strong position when he lists certain practices which can never be justified on relativist terms. Such practices are: genocide, politically-induced famine, terrorism, hostage taking, germ warfare, child warriors, slavery, rape, incest, polygamy, and cliterodectomy (p. 88). But here is the problem with Goodman's argumentation. With the exception of the last three, no "moral relativist" ever tries to defend any of these practices. It is not clear from Goodman's reading why it is even necessary to point out that these practices are abhorrent. Does anyone in domestic or international public try to justify genocide or slavery on cultural grounds? No one does, but if someone tries to justify these…