Afghanistan the Central Issue at

Afghanistan The central issue at hand is with respect to U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan has dragged on for years, with little prospect for resolution. There is concern that this involvement is fueling terrorist recruitment rates, at little benefit to American interests. The group therefore needs to address the twin issues of for long the U.S. will be engaged in Afghanistan and what the character of this engagement will be. There are a number of competing goals for this issue.

One objective is to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan so that it is no longer a haven for terrorists, as it was after 9/11. This has been the primary objective since the outset of this conflict. The second objective is to reduce the risks associated with terrorism to the United States. The third objective is to defeat the Taliban, a victory that while critical for the Afghan people has little direct impact on the U.S. The fourth objective is to balance the positive impacts of U.S.

actions with their financial and human costs. There are areas where these objectives intersect but there are also areas where these objectives are in conflict with one another. There are a number of different policy options with respect to Afghanistan. The first is to continue the current course of military action until the Taliban is defeated and Afghanistan has reached a point of peace and stability. This option could take years to implement, at a high cost and with significant opportunity costs in terms of military and budget options elsewhere.

The second course of action is a gradual withdrawal, similar to what has occurred in Iraq, where military action has ceased. A third course of action could be a repositioning of American involvement in Afghanistan. This option would consist of a combination of gradual cessation of combat operations while increasing other operations. The third option is similar to the one that Canada is undertaking in Afghanistan currently, having committing to ending its combat involvement. A fourth option would involve a full scale withdrawal from Afghanistan, giving the conflict up entirely.

It has been suggested in some quarters that negotiating with the Taliban may be a solution, but at no point has that group ever demonstrated a propensity to negotiate nor has it demonstrated the integrity to follow through on any agreements. Thus, this option is impractical. Each of these alternatives meets at least one of the objectives, but each comes with an associated cost.

The first alternative addresses the first and third objectives, but carries with it a high cost, uncertain time frame and allows for the second objective to fail. The second course of action makes the first and third unlikely to succeed, may not address the second and only partially addresses the fourth objective. It is a compromise, but a relatively poor one. The third option allows for the first option to be addressed, probably the second and maybe the fourth, but it does little to ensure the third objective will succeed.

The fourth option allows the fourth objective to succeed, and may contribute to the second objective succeeded, but does nothing for the first and third objectives. It is recommended therefore that the third option be accepted. By slowly reducing combat operations but maintaining them until the country is ready, but repositioning American.