Altruism and human reciprocity

Altruism and Human Reciprocity

The purpose of the present study is to explore, both conceptually and empirically, the relationship between human connectedness to nature dimensions, various conservation behaviors, and altruism. This study is unique in that while attempting to explore the relationship between connectedness to nature and conservation, the role of altruism will also be looked at as a possible moderator within the relationship.

Additionally, this study developed a new and more comprehensive measure of individual conservation behaviors. To further clarify how connectedness to nature, conservation and altruism will be examined in this dissertation, a brief explanation of connectedness to nature and conservation, along with a working definition of altruism human reciprocity.

Altruism and Human Reciprocity

Introduction

Altruism is a phenomenon existing on the very simplest of planes in nature. Modern examples of such are the Boy Scout helping the elderly person cross the street or an individual opening a door or holding an elevator for another without gaining any apparent reward for such behavior. (Henrich & Boyd, 2001, pp79-89) We generally learn of altruism at a young age and examples are often those of one animal in the natural world participating in an act to help another animal without any anticipation of formal gain or recognition. These types of acts transcend the hierarchy of being and occur in human lifestyles also. (Bowles, 2001, pp155-90)

Literature review

A study conducted by Hartig (1991) begins to explain the dynamic that occurs when individuals have the opportunity for mental restoration facilitated in natural settings. (Gachter & Falk, 2002, pp1-25) He notes that many daily activities in our contemporary society require directed attention. Hartig, (1991) theorizes that the reduction of mental fatigue is a crucial element in self- restoration. This theory suggests that in the face of continual demand over time, a person's capacity for directed attention can become depleted, necessitating the need for self-restoration. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87) the restorative settings mentioned the current study refers to should promote fascination and some sense of being away. It is imperative that the extent and type of setting be compatible with the individual. (Bewley, 2000, pp80-96)

Though a wide variety of intermediate positions exist, such broad human nature concerns as sociality are often presented as conflicts among mutually exclusive notions, stressed in an "either-or" framework. The issues of good vs. evil, freedom vs. determinism, reason vs. passion, are further examples of aspects of human experience singled out by political philosophers and treated as distinct elements of human nature. According to some formulations, the core of the human nature issue revolves around the role of altruism and its opposite, egoism, as mainsprings of human behavior. (Andreoni et al., 1998, pp818-60)

Though the distinctiveness of this issue has a long tradition in political philosophy, it bears important resemblance and logical connection to many of the human nature issues cited above, and to some degree embraces all of them. (Bowles, 2001, pp155-90) Though the philosophic argument which posits egoism and altruism as opposing motivational forces is a modern one and does not appear fully-fledged until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the roots of this debate date back to ancient Greece. (Henrich & Boyd, 2001, pp79-89) Plato's rejoinder to Thrasymachus is a statement of a different view of human nature in which pursuit of the 'good as such' and the pursuit of 'my' good necessarily coincides.

The argument presented by medieval Christian thought stresses a tension between the body and the soul, the former seeking self-gratification, the latter aspiring toward good works (including acts of charity) and those directed toward the glory of God. Only in the after life when prior altruism is rewarded is the tension between egoism and altruism ultimately resolved. But these early positions were not immediately concerned with matters of internal motivation, matters which most clearly characterize the modern argument. (Henrich et al. 2001, pp73-78)

The modern restatement of the altruism-egoism controversy comes with Machiavelli, but is perhaps most forcefully advanced as a full-blown theory by Thomas Hobbes. (Foster et al. 2001, pp229-38) Man is pictured as a bundle of appetites and passions, a truly self- interested animal that can consistently be counted on to selfishly seek his own ends in the absence of social restraint. Altruism is rendered incompatible with man's true nature. (Bewley, 2000, pp80-96) With Darwin, new light is brought to bear on this issue by relating biology to human nature, even if misguided followers misunderstood and distorted important revelations he introduced. (Falk et al. 2002, pp117-28)

Psychology, early in this century, seemed the appropriate place to turn for a scientific evaluation of philosophic issues confronting altruism. Explorations into instinct and the psychoanalytic theory of Freud offered clarification and expansion of the Hobbesian premises. But contemporary psychology has taken a variety of directions and presents conflicting evidence on this topic from competing methodological camps. (Bingham, 1999, pp133-69)

One problem involved in evaluating these approaches has been the lack of any critical tests which can readily adjudicate among contrasting viewpoints. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87) This is partially due to the conceptual confusion which continues to plague psychological accounts of altruism as well as to the fact that different approaches seem to speak to different aspects of the phenomenon and not to confront the same issues. (Bingham, 1999, pp133-69)

Some like Hobbes, following the Newtonian model, explained behavior by reference to covering laws which apply uniformly to all individuals; while others claim that such nomothetic procedures misconstrue human behavior, and search instead for full specification of contextual variables which account for human diversity. (Henrich & Boyd, 2001, pp79-89) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we found disagreements over the motivational base of altruism, with some like Rousseau claiming an emotive spring, and others, like Kant, specifying that true altruism emerges only from the conscious recognition of the rights of men. (Henrich et al. 2001, pp73-78) Turning our sights toward modern psychology in an attempt to discover empirical resolution of these concerns, we found little consensus on any issue, with different psychological schools approaching the question from different methodological and conceptual perspectives not themselves subject to empirical adjudication. (Andreoni, 1995, pp891-904) Having noted both the basic approach and application of sociobiology to human altruism, we now turn toward extracting from socio-biological accounts answers to these philosophic queries which continue unresolved. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87) the rhetorical claims made by some socio-biologists suggest that sociobiology will be more successful than psychology in resolving these issues. (Bewley, 2000, pp80-96)

However, in the case of sociobiology, confusion may result not so much from a clash of various behavioral level models which remain unresolved, but from a fundamental difference in the ways genetic level and behavioral level explanations proceed. (Gachter & Falk, 1999, pp341-69) After all, an understanding of genetic function does not automatically yield apparent implications for human behavior. As we will see, although sociobiology may be well suited to address genetic level questions, the transition to behavioral level queries of philosophy is not easily made on the basis of genetic function alone. (Gachter & Falk, 2002, pp1-25)

As will be seen, many of the incongruities which are identified arise because of the very different ways in which sociobiologists and philosophers classify, conceptualize, and analyze behaviors. The fact that these two disciplines appear to often be speaking past each other about different phenomena and in different ways is not merely incidental or a problem which will soon be overcome. While we should not demand sociobiology at this early stage of its development to offer a complete resolution of those concerns which have plagued philosophers for centuries, we should at least expect a discipline which boldly calls for the "biologizing of philosophy, as sociobiology does, to be able to speak to the relevant issues with some clarity. (Foster et al. 2001, pp229-38) There is a conceptual fuzziness which arises in sociobiological accounts with reference to the true direction of the altruistic impulse. (Henrich et al. 2001, pp73-78) Barash and Wilson appear ready to consider acts guided by kin selection and parental manipulation as revealing some other-regarding properties of behavior, while those issuing from reciprocal exchanges are pictured as far more selfserving. Dawkins and Trivers, on the other hand, appear more forthright (or, cynical, depending on one's perspective) in their appraisal of all human behaviors as essentially guided by self-interest. (Falk et al. 2002, pp117-28)

This difference may represent more a difference in emphasis rather than actual division and conflict. Nevertheless, it reveals a basic ambiguity inherent in the sociobiological conceptualization of altruism which needs to be explored. (Andreoni, 1995, pp891-904) Let us probe deeper into the sociobiological conceptualization of altruism and attempt to understand exactly what sociobiologists mean when they talk about altruism and selfishness. (LukeF, 2000, pp27-33) Dawkins' position, utilizing the metaphor of the "selfish gene," implies that sociobiological logic necessitates the classification of virtually all forms of cooperative behavior as selfish. (Andreoni et al., 1998, pp818-60)

Human Reciprocity

Reciprocity Soft-core altruism is the major conceptual alternative to the hardcore variety proposed by sociobiologists. It differs from hardcore altruism in a variety of ways. Unlike hardcore altruism, no assumption of relatedness is necessary. Soft-core altruism is directed beyond kin as a simple exchange of favors. (Gachter & Falk, 2002, pp1-25) Unlike hardcore altruism, the soft-core variety is less firmly triggered by the spontaneous calculus of the genes and more "deeply influenced by the vagaries of cultural evolution. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87) Unlike the hardcore species in which the altruistic act is genuinely directed at others even though one's own genes are benefited, soft-core altruism is ultimately more selfish and dependent upon reciprocation as a condition for its arousal. (Bingham, 1999, pp133-69) Unlike hardcore altruism which is largely "irrational," soft-core altruism requires calculation, "often in a wholly conscious way, to ensure one's needs are served, even though emotive mechanisms like deceit and pretense may also inform this behavior. Wilson's term "softcore" app11es to the principle of reciprocal altruism first outlined in a paper by R. Trivers in 1971.

According to Trivers, the kin selection and parental manipulation models (hardcore varieties) are insufficient to explain examples of apparently altruistic acts which occur among unrelated individuals and even among members of different species. The concept Trivers introduces is meant to account for these latter occurrences. (Bowles, 2001, pp155-90) by reciprocal altruism Trivers refers to a straightforward process by which one individual performs an act which is beneficial to another, though perhaps potentially harmful to him, when he can establish with some certainty that the favor will be returned in kind. (Bowles, 2001, pp155-90)

Thus, reciprocal altruism involves the direct trading of a favor for the promise or expectation of some return in kind, either immediately or in the near future. As with the kin selection model, some estimate of cost and benefit must be established by the organism before warranting the risk taking which altruistic behavior entails. Similarly, inclusive fitness is used as the yardstick to establish the measurement of such costs and benefits. (Luke, 2000, pp27-33) as Barash points out: "The basic requirement in order for altruism to evolve via reciprocity is that performance of altruistic behavior must result in a return of altruistic behavior toward the original altruist such that the ultimate benefit in units of inclusive fitness is greater than the cost." (Gachter & Falk, 1999, pp341-69) Thus, altruistic behavior should occur among unrelated individuals only when the eventual benefits from an altruistic act contribute more to the inclusive fitness of the altruist than the risk costs. Gains and losses must be traded along selfishly motivated lines, each party ultimately gaining in the bargain and the inclusive fitness of each maximized. (Luke, 2000, pp27-33) One case which illustrates the operation of reciprocal altruism across species, and thus among unrelated individuals, is the case of cleaner fish and their hosts. Several species of fish have been discovered which act as "cleaners" by picking parasites off larger fish. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87) the host reciprocates for this apparently altruistic behavior by refraining from eating the fish once they have completed their work, even though the "cleaners" are about the same size as their usual prey. (Bowles, 2001, pp155-90)

Though the behavior of each appears to be altruistic, a close examination of costs and benefits shows that each party gains fitness directly and in accord with the principles of reciprocal altruism. The "cleaners" benefit by feasting upon the parasites which constitute their natural food. The host fish benefits by having these parasites which would cause infection removed from his body. (Bewley, 2000, pp80-96)

The cost to the "cleaners" in terms of risk seems to be warranted by their experience with hosts which leave good cleaners unmolested. Meanwhile, the host, by sacrificing a meal of cleaners ensures the return of proven groomers, a return which empirical studies seem to confirm. (Gachter & Falk, 2002, pp1-25) the example of cleaning symbiosis just described involves direct and immediate returns. But can the reciprocal altruism model account for instances of delayed benefit and what evidence it produce of such instances? Trivers extends his model to account for cases of delayed reciprocity by identifying the preconditions necessary for such a pattern to evolve. (Andreoni, 1995, pp891-904)

Among those conditions which unambiguously contribute to reciprocity rather than other models of altruism are: 1) a long lifetime, long enough to ensure that the same two individuals will encounter many situations in which mutual assistance may be required; 2) a low dispersal rate to ensure that the same individuals will likely interact repeatedly with each other; 3) a high degree of mutual dependence to keep members of a species close to one another for defense, hunt, or other purposes; 4) an absence of a strong linear dominance hierarchy to increase opportunity for altruistic behavior. (Jean, 1964, pp12-16) in general, these conditions argue for the development of reciprocal altruism only among the "more intelligent, closely integrated social species in which opportunities for reciprocity and individual recognition would be greatest. (Thomas, 1970, pp24-37)

Aside from the case of man, for whom these conditions are obviously met, there is little evidence to show that these conditions result in reciprocal relations among other animal species. Trvers admits that although many species probably meet and display these conditions, it is hard to produce evidence which distinguishes the reciprocal model from other explanatory modes especially in those cases where reciprocity is directed toward other members of the same species. (Falk et al. 2002, pp117-28)

Motivational Source Concerns

One of the major problems arising from our philosophic discussion of the nature of altruism, a problem for which we have been searching for some empirical resolution, has been the question of whether altruism emerges from a conscious source or from some emotive base. Although holding conflicting positions on the true direction of altruism, both Hobbes and Rousseau agree on the emotive spring of such behaviors; while Kant, emphasizing rationality as a distinguishing feature of man, holds altruism only to be genuine when emerging from conscious deliberation. (Andreoni et al., 1998, pp818-60) Having found that no definitive answer to this question emerges from psychological accounts, we now turn our attention to the nature of the sociobiological response to our philosophic query concerning motivational source. As with the responses to other philosophic concerns we have reviewed, the sociobiological account of the motivational source of altruism is fraught with ambiguity. (Foster et al. 2001, pp229-38) Part of this stems from a strong strand in sociobiology to ignore or discount the role of consciousness in human behavior. (Yamagishi, 1992, pp267-87)

In light of the importance generally attributed to this property in philosophy, it is most surprising to find that Wilson in Sociobiology virtually ignores the role of conscious human faculties C.H. Waddington, in his review of Wilson's magnum opus notes: "In the index covering more than thirty pages of three columns each, there is no mention of mind, mentality, purpose, goal, aim, or any other word of similar connotation. Given the wide scope of Wilson's work as well as its grandiose claims, Waddington finds such an omission surprising. (Andreoni et al., 1998, pp818-60)

But Wilson appears to have made amends for this shortcoming in his later volume, on Human Nature, where he does speak of the property of human consciousness, albeit in less than thorough manner. "Consciousness," says Wilson, "consists of simultaneous and coordinated, symbolic representations by participating neurons in the brain and neocortex. In materialist fashion, he equates consciousness with "the action of organic machinery. (Bingham, 1999, pp133-69)

Yet, Wilson warns that despite his own mechanistic description of consciousness, we should not "underestimate its power. In what appears to be only a partial listing of such mental powers, Wilson includes the ability to recreate reality from sense impressions, to stimulate realty by recall and fantasy, the ability to invent stores and to run imagined and remembered events back and forth through time. Using Sr. Charles Sherrington's metaphor, he describes the center of conscious activity as an enchanted loom where millions of flashing shuttles weave a dissolving pattern.

Conclusion

The ambiguity over the true direction of altruism, sociobiology's ambivalence on the extent to which altruism is reducible to genetic function, and its near exclusive concentration on the functional aspects of human behavior for genetic fitness are all signs of an uncomfortable fit between the issues which confront sociobiology and those which remain largely philosophic. This lack of fit arises at least in part because sociobiology on the one hand and philosophy and social science on the other speak to different orders of phenomena at different levels of organization. (Gachter & Falk, 1999, pp341-69)

Whereas, philosophy and the social sciences are predominantly concerned with issues of proximate causation, i.e., those like motivation which express the immediate antecedents of behavior, sociobiology deals best with matters of ultimate causation, those which set preconditions for behavior by equipping the organism with abilities found adaptive over the course of evolutionary history. (Keser & Van, 2000, pp23-39) Similarly, whereas human behavior is the immediate unit of study or phenomenological event with which philosophy and the social sciences deal, the genes are the raw materials from which sociobiology proceeds. (Gachter & Falk, 2002, pp1-25)