Aristotle's politics and political philosophy

¶ … slavery and citizenship in Aristotle's Politic:

Aristotle believes that most people in the world can be enslaved devoid of injustice as they are born to be slaves. At the same time some are born to be free and dominate as masters. Most modern critics have smeared these concepts of Aristotle. In this paper the writer evaluates the concepts of citizenship and slavery in light of Aristotle's politic to reveal not only Aristotle's thinking but also how his views are inferred by contemporary philosophers.

One is forced to do the disagreeable task of reading Aristotle's account of slavery because of such divergence in the opinions of the expert scholars. If one takes a look onat Aristotle's account of slavery, he/she will notice that on one hand; his opinion about slavery is that the enslavement of someone can't be proved as acceptable merely based on weak arguments and on the other hand; he is known as a very cunning observer of realities based on politics and would indirectly endorse the enslavement of even those people who weren't actually by nature slaves. Although there is a lot of divergence in the opinions of the scholars regarding Aristotle's account of slavery but there is one thing on which everyone agrees that; his account is filled with incoherency and inconsistency (Arnhart, 1998; Fortenbaugh, 1977)[footnoteRef:2]. Comment by patrick: at Comment by patrick: one Comment by patrick:, on one hand, --no semicolon Comment by patrick:, on the one hand, Aristotle believes that slavery cannot be demonstrated acceptable on the basis of weak arguments but, on the other hand, he would indirectly advocate the enslavement of those not slaves by nature. Comment by patrick: Although scholars disgree about A's account of slavery, there is a point of consensus: the account is incoherent. [2: Arnhart, Larry. 1998. Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature Albany: SUNY Press.Fortenbaugh, W.W. 1977. "Aristotle on Slaves and Women." In Articles on Aristotle vol. 2: Ethics and Politics, ed.]

The supposed inconsistencies and incoherency found in Aristotle's account of slavery are either thought of as some mysterious symbols or very powerful force of cultural prejudice while, the presence of such critical stuff should actually be read and researched further by the reader. Schlaifer (1936)[footnoteRef:3] thinks about Aristotle as "an incoherent person [even] in the confines of a single sentence," he also says that the presence of such blemishes in the presentation of a philosopher only shows the extent of his illogicality regarding ethnocentrism; he further believes that Aristotle's "only has argument claiming that all barbarians are slaves by nature." These same sort of problems regarding the interpretation of Aristotle are found in Wood (1978, 209-57)[footnoteRef:4], Mulgan (1977, 43-44)[footnoteRef:5] and Lloyd (1968, 251)[footnoteRef:6]. The presence of incoherency is accepted by Barker (1959, 259-373)[footnoteRef:7] and Smith (1983, 119)[footnoteRef:8] but they refused to accept the statement about ethnocentrism that is found in this same interpretation, in fact they have admirably fought to refuse this charge. In their opinion Aristotle has used natural slave statement in order to state that this kind of creature doesn't exist. The most explanatory analysis has been provided by Bluhm (1980), according to whom what Aristotle wanted to do was secretly point out the unfairness of all kinds of slavery by hinting on the fact that the term natural slaves is in fact a negation (Nichols, 1992)[footnoteRef:9]. Comment by patrick: This incoherence is often attributed to cultural prejudice or interpreted too liberally, whereas what is required is more careful reading and research. Comment by patrick: Period here. He Comment by patrick: Power of ethnocentrism in inducing irrationality Comment by patrick: Period rather tan semicolon Comment by patrick: Without knowing the quote, I can't fix this. Perhaps: that A "only has argument[s] claiming…." Comment by patrick: Wood identifies these same interpretive problems Comment by patrick: Don't accept Comment by patrick: The argument concerning ethnocentric irrationality -- delete the rest Comment by patrick: Period goes here. In fact… Comment by patrick: Redundant Comment by patrick: In their view, A's account of the natural slave is his attempt to demonstrate that no such creature exists. Comment by patrick: The most powerful analysis Comment by patrick: At Comment by patrick: Self-negating? [3: Schlaifer, Robert. 1936. "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle." Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 47:136-204.] [4: Wood, Ellen M., and Wood, Neal. 1978. Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.] [5: Mulgan, R.G. 1977. Aristotle's Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.] [6: Lloyd, G.E.R. 1968. Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.] [7: Barker, Ernest. 1959. The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York: Dover.] [8: Smith, Nicholas D. 1983. "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery." Phoenix 37:109-122.] [9: Nichols, Mary. 1992. Citizens and Statesmen: A Study of Aristotle's Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.]

It is disturbing to see how Bluhm has concluded this but it is more surprising that a lot of other people think as well that Aristotle would support and agree with the enslavement of the people who are not in fact slaves by nature (see Strauss 1953, 158-60; Strauss 1964, 22-23; Arendt 1958, 84; Nichols 1983, 171, 176, 182; and Ambler 1987, 405)[footnoteRef:10]. Comment by patrick: My guess: It is disturbing to see Bluhm ultimately take up the thesis endorsed by so many others, that A advocates the enslavement of those who are not slaves by nature. [10: Strauss, Leo. 1953. Natural Right and History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Strauss, Leo. 1964. City and Man. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nichols, Mary P. 1983. "The Good Life, Slavery, and Acquisition: Aristotle's Introduction to Politics." Interpretation 11: 171-83. Ambler, Wayne. 1987. "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery." Political Theory 15:390-410.]

As the slaves are thought to be a form of luxury and they can provide leisure for their master, the scholars believe that Aristotle thinks of the slaves as defensible as they can provide leisure whenever they are alone. However, this point-of-view is found problematic as well. Although the intense kind of leisure is one of the most important and attractive features that is provided by a slave to his master, Aristotle has very strongly condemned the people who believe in unjust domination or enslavement of the people who don't deserve it, he said that "a person who commits this crime can never justify or make up for this sin even by the positive results that he might get from committing this kind of sin" (Politics 1325b5-7; see also Nicomachean Ethics 1142b24-26)[footnoteRef:11]. In Aristotle's view the actual and true destination of the human race is simply impossible to achieve through this easier way of the enslavement enslaving the undeserving of people (Nussbaum, 1988)[footnoteRef:12]. Comment by patrick: It is hard to know what this sentence means. Guess: A slave is a luxury item that provides the master leisure, and scholars believe it is the provision of leisure that is decisive for A. Comment by patrick: However, this view is problematic. Comment by patrick: I see this as apples and oranges. But, to stay with editing for a moment, my guess: Although A finds leisure extremely valuable, he strongly condemned unjust enslavement. He says that "a person…." Comment by patrick: This is not explicit enough for the reader. Easier than what exactly? What is deserving vs. undeserving? [11: Aristotle. 1998. Aristotle: Politics. Translated by C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett.] [12: Nussbaum, Martha. 1988. "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution." In Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Supp, Vol. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Pp. 144-84.]

The different speculation that have been just mentioned regarding Aristotle's hidden intention such as; the ethnocentrism or the imputation of racism, think that the troubles that had been posed by Aristotle's account of natural slavery have actually been due to the inconsistencies in his presentation (Dobbs, 1994)[footnoteRef:13]. However, this paper argues that all these supposed inconsistencies will vanish once one recalls the content of Aristotle's natural teleology. Almost all the commentators have read the term "natural" used by Aristotle in a very primitive fashion under which it meant "native" and for this reason they think that the term natural slave (physei doulos) points to a congenital or genetic condition but, I will make it evident to you that how this assumption fails to actually get the teleological importance of the term physei used by Aristotle which means "by nature." All these misunderstandings are the reasons why people think that Aristotle's text is full of inconsistencies, whereas, it is not his material that has inconsistencies in it rather the misunderstandings of the people who think that way. Also, how people mostly fail to understand that Aristotle's teleology is in accordance with his text creates more misunderstandings and lead the readers to believe that there are inconsistencies while, it is the fault of the readers which leads them to believe that there are inconsistencies (Maritain, 1943)[footnoteRef:14]. Comment by patrick: Guess: Despite all of the speculation about A's ethnocentrism, I think the hermeneutic problems of the account of natural slavery are due to an incoherent presentation. Comment by patrick: However, it is also my view that these inconsistencies are only apparent and that they vanish with consideration of A's natural teleology. Comment by patrick: Almost all commentators have read the term "natural" to mean "native" with the suggestion of slavery as congenital or genetic. Comment by patrick: Such a translation overlooks entirely the teleological signifiance of the term "physei." Comment by patrick: A's ostensible incoherence is merely apparent. It is introduced into the material by the readers, the same readers who do not appeciate the contextual significance of A's teleology. [13: Dobbs, D. (1994). Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle's Defense of Slavery. The Journal Of Politics, Vol. 56, No.1.] [14: Maritain, Jacques. 1943. The Rights of Man and Natural Law. New York: Scribner's.]

One can easily understand that the slaves are not born but rather made once one reads the Aristotle's defense of natural slavery in its teleological context and fully understands the term physei. Slavishness; so strong that it seems like it a second nature can be instilled in people someone through because of the persistent manipulation of a dysfunctional culture. All the freedom of access to the human telos is stopped due to this second nature. As a result the protection of the capacity ofprotecting the slave's capacity to share in telos solely depends on his being a member of this dictatorial partnership. Also, according to Aristotle, you can identify a slave as your property but only if you don't think of him them as a tool of production or as and think of them as but as a human being who deserves carehumans., Tthis point-of-view of Aristotle is very understandable (Mulgan, 1977)[footnoteRef:15]. Comment by patrick: This is so ambiguous that it is almost imposible to tell what it means. My guess: the protection of slaves in their telos depends upon his being….[But this seems illogical now.] Comment by patrick: Ambiguous [15: Mulgan, R.G. 1977. Aristotle's Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon Press.]

Therefore, if one carefully read Aristotle's account of natural slavery one will see that it's very justly devised and also, that it provides us with solid basis on which one can condemn the actions of any tyrinical government justice should be done to the slaves and condemns from involving in the practices that would result in injustice done to the slaves and also abuse and cruelty meted to slaves (Mulgan, 1977)[footnoteRef:16]. Comment by patrick: This is ambiguous. Guess: If carefully read, A's account is logically compelling as well as a basis for the just treatment of slaves. [16: Ibid 14]

Aristotle philosophy on citizenship and slavery

Politics I that is associateddeals with the justice and hierarchy's nature, in regards to this reading sounds hardly like a wrong start to theand is the perfect place to start political association of Aristotle's comprehension of politics. Several very important questions have been asked by Aristotle regarding slavery in the context of politics. Against the people who consider that Aristotle's account of nature in his political and ethical writings was very equivocal and questionable and also, against the people who think that his writings were very straightforward and fixed (Annas 1993, 146)[footnoteRef:17], but in my opinion and I would show you as well that his writings on nature were actually complex, metaphysical, vibrant, psychological and incorporated. Comment by patrick: Deeply ambiguous. Guess: A raises a number of questions regarding slavery in the context of politics. Comment by patrick: Scholars, both those who find A's politics and ethics equivocal and those who find them unproblematic, overlook the real complexity and dynamism (psychological and metaphysical) of them. [17: Annas, Julia. 1996. "Aristotle on Human Nature and Political Virtue." The Review of Metaphysics 49: 731-53.]

The discussion done by Aristotle's discussion on the natural slaves has a lot of may include a number of inconsistencyies however in it but in no way is it should not be simply dismissed as an incoherent document (Smith 1991).[footnoteRef:18] Similarly, one should also avoid calling his account as or to settle it into "obvious as well as noncontroversial" suggestions. In my opinion the vagueness that can be found here and in other natural scientific, ethical and opinionated writings of Aristotle, if properly read are actually the representation of people with the human nature who change over that transforms with time and also act according to the situations. Comment by patrick: A's discussion of the natural slave…. Comment by patrick: In my ears this sound like self-contradiction. What does it mean to be self-inconsistent but coherent? [18: Smith, Nicholas. 1991. "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery." In David Keyt and Fred Miller, eds. A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 142-55.]

The first portion of this essay is about the discussions done by Aristotle on citizenship and slavery, this portion is about the citizenship and slavery in order for relationship between the human nature and activity to develop. The second portion of the essay talks about Aristotle's philosophical way of treatmenting nature in order to understand how he categorically separated necessity from nature. In the last portion of the essay I have formulated some instructions for the politics as well as interpreted the treatment of Aristotle towards certain foreigners (Dobbs, 1994). Comment by patrick: This isn't where such a section belongs. Guess: The essay begins with a consideration of A's views on the subjects of citizenship and slavery. It then takes these same subjects and treats them in terms of A's reflections on nature. Finally, it points the way to a different reading of the politics and of A's attitude toward foreigners.

When Like Aristotle asks has asked in the beginning of Politics III about someone qualifying as a citizen or who is indeed a citizen, it is just like asking someone about his identity or the nature of a citizen. In the case of Aristotle, his asking this question -- ; who is a citizen? -- , basically means that he is trying to ask what are the merits for getting the political advantages or goods of a citizenship or who have the right to be a citizen and who don't. The response to this question is given by Aristotle in the way that; the things that won't qualify someone for a citizenship: not blood, or birth, or ancestry (Pol. 1275b32-34)[footnoteRef:19]; not location, nor the capability to sue and to be sued, or place (Pol. 1275a7-11)[footnoteRef:20]. But in fact a citizen is the one who takes interest and is involved in declaring and judging (Pol. 1275a22-23)[footnoteRef:21], a person who plays a part in the legal and deliberative offices of a polity (Pol. 1275b18-20)[footnoteRef:22] and one who rules and is also ruled (Pol. 1277b13-16)[footnoteRef:23]. In Aristotle's point-of-view the place [of what?], parentage, birth and legal capacity-(as it has been statistically qualified)- do not demonstrate [citizenship?]. Even though slight differences may be there in the formulation that is approved by Aristotle but what they have in common is the emphasis on the activity: Iin Malcolm Schofield's (1999, 144-49)[footnoteRef:24] the phrase "Sharing in a constitution," qualifies a person for citizenship (Dobbs, 1994). Comment by patrick: Extremely hard t oread. Guess: A is trying to determine the advantages that accrue to the citizen and who has the right to become one. Comment by patrick: A first considers those things that disqualify one for citizenship. These are [now list them in parallel fashion] Comment by patrick: He then considers those attributes that characterize the citizen positively: [list these] Comment by patrick: Guess: These different elements share one feature -- the emphasis on activity. Comment by patrick: period Comment by ali atta: This quote was taken from Dobb. Comment by patrick: Schofield's phrase? If so, it is "sharing" or "[s]haring." No comma. Why cite Dobbs to cite Schofield? [19: Ibid 8] [20: Ibid 8] [21: Ibid 8] [22: Ibid 8] [23: Ibid 8] [24: Schofield, Malcolm. 1999. "Equality and Hierarchy in Aristotle's Thought." In Saving the City: Philosopher-Kings and Other Classical Paradigms. New York: Routledge. Pp.100-114.]

The importance that Aristotle has given to activity and the way that he has emphasized on it has a peculiarly self-contained and repetitive quality. Ist seems like while practicing citizenship what Aristotle is saying is that make someone a citizen: A "citizen becomes a citizen when he acts like a citizen" (Winthrop 1975, 407)[footnoteRef:25]. Comment by patrick: Diction: self-contained? Comment by patrick: Guess: It seems A is saying that practicing citizenship makes one a citizen. [This is hardly surprising given the centrality of activity in A generally.] Comment by patrick: I think it would be better to quote Aristotle here. [25: Winthrop, Delba. 1975. "Aristotle and Political Responsibility." Political Theory 3:406-22.]

According to Aristotle says, in doing, "the end never can be separate from the overall act" (NE 1140b6)[footnoteRef:26]. Echein is found in entelecheia, activity or energeia and is intended at -- an end or telos-in, en, itself (Meta. 1050a23-24)[footnoteRef:27]. TEven though the external influences can have an effect on the human activities even if they are self-controlled, one can't carry out the activities in a void. Aristotle has emphasized that there can't be any citizen qua citizen preceding the regime that the citizen is actually a part of (Pol. 1275a3-4)[footnoteRef:28]. In order to find out the answer to this question and to carry out his research further regarding the citizenship, he asks has asked whether you are a citizen of an oligarchy or a democracy. To be a citizen is like depending on a regime institutions and the reason for that is that the education, laws and political and social institutes of that specific constitution determines decides what it can and can't share in that constitution. It is due to the contribution of all these institutions that a citizen is formed (Pol. 1275b4)[footnoteRef:29]. Comment by patrick: diction Comment by patrick: A citizen is formed by way of the contribution of all of these institutions. [26: Ibid 8] [27: Ibid 8] [28: Ibid 8] [29: Ibid 8]

All this suggests that, it takes a complicated combination of creation from the political and social institutes and doing on the part of citizen practitioners in order to be a citizen. It has been mentioned by Aristotle in the very beginning of his inquest regarding citizenship that "those who became citizens by any accident or who were made citizens otherwise" should be left to one side, as it's of great importance here to do this (Pol. 1275a5-7)[footnoteRef:30]. This sentence is the key in all this as it tells us why and for what philosophical reasons did Aristotle thought think that in the inquiry regarding the nature and identity of a citizen some things should be left out. It is also very clear here that the people who were included into the category of "made citizens" because of their ancestry, location, birth or parentage have to be excluded (Dobbs, 1994). Comment by patrick: Guess: Becoming a citizen involves a complicated combination of formative social and political institutions as well as practice. Comment by patrick: Diction -- inquiry? Comment by patrick: diction [30: Ibid 8]

Now the question here is how to comprehend Aristotle's apparently far-fetched exclusion of all of the "made citizens," when he himself has accepted and acknowledged the role played by the political and the social institutions in the formation of a citizen. Aristotle gives an example of the people who should not be included in the deliberation of the nature of citizen. Hhe says that, those who were made citizens "via the magistrates," should be excluded (Pol. 1275b29-30)[footnoteRef:31] as well as those that have been made the citizens "as a result of a revolution" (Pol. 1275b35-36)[footnoteRef:32]. "The capacity to sue and be sued," is one the qualifications that Aristotle rejectsed for citizenship. Comment by patrick: Paragraph unity and coherence are not obvious. [31: Ibid 8] [32: Ibid 8]

The people who have been made citizens by any of the above mentioned ways are not considered citizens by Aristotle. In Aristotle's point-of-view just like Hhe thinks that the people who were given citizenship by accident (i.e. due to birth, location, parentage); are not actually citizens, because this kind of citizenship is given to them and not earned by them (Frank, 2004)[footnoteRef:33]. Comment by patrick: redundancies [33: Frank, J. (2004). Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature. American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 1.]

Unlike the magisterial edict, treaty or revolution-- which make the actions of a citizen irrelevant, like a force or an accident-- Aristotle emphasizes on the complete formation of citizens due to political and social institutions, laws and education as unlike the magisterial edict, treaty or revolution, the polity's institutions don't make the citizen's activity irrelevant, rather they guide and protect it (Pol. 1258a22-23)[footnoteRef:34]. Without a doubt one can't understand the identity of a citizen without knowing how he or she it came into being (Salkever 1990b, 176). Therefore, the identity of a citizen is basically a product of doing and making, where making is actually the shaping that is guided by the education, laws and other institutions and doing is a form of self-making, and the making basically implies the citizenly doing. In order to actually find out what is the basis of both formsations of the citizen identity, a person must put force and accident to one side, as this will ensure the proper investigation of the citizen: the reciprocal and dynamic relationship between the people doing stuff and their deeds and identity and action (Frank, 2004)[footnoteRef:35]. Comment by patrick: Deeply problematic sentence structure and, even then, ambiguity. [34: Ibid 8] [35: Ibid 32]

It is by their collective activity that the citizens are made citizens (i.e. not just by their individual or particular activities but also by allotment in a constitution) (Pol. 1275b4- 6)[footnoteRef:36]. The collective activity is the basic step that helps in the formation of a citizen, as through the collective activities the political and social institutions are formed. The importance of the collective activity can also be judged by the fact that the institutions are formed by it and in return these institutionses form the citizens. Therefore, along with the individual activities, the collective activities are very important as well. It is due to the "dynamic tensions" between participation and institutionalization that democracy is formed by the institutions rather than popular action alone or the institutions alone., reading it in this way one finds something pleasantly democratic about the understanding that Aristotle had about citizen identity. Individual self-determination and its participatory is what citizenship is about (Arendt, 1958)[footnoteRef:37]. Comment by patrick: Wordy. Guess: Democracy is formed in the dynamic tension of participation and institutionalization. It isn't formed by popular action or institutions alone. Comment by patrick: New sentence: Reading Comment by patrick: Participatory, individual self-determination is what…. [36: Ibid 8] [37: Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.]

Citizens by sharing in the constitutions and by acting in consent form the institutions which then guide the citizens and also help in the formation of more citizens but these institution can't and do not keep a check on the individual activities of these citizens (Arendt, 1958)[footnoteRef:38]. Comment by patrick: Wordy and very hard to reconstruct. Guess: Citizens who share a constitution and through consent form instutitions create in this manner more citizens. However, institutions are not a check on individual activity. [38: Ibid 36]

Not only those who are included in the list of citizens but also those who have been excluded should try to see why Aristotle believes this and what he has said on political and citizenship participation. In fact it is more important for the people whom he has excluded to read this. It is actually not due to the kind of work that they do (shopkeeper, banker, etc.) but rather who they are (natives, foreigners, women, etc.). The reason why Aristotle has excluded them is that he finds the nature of these people very different from the natives that he has excluded them from. I disagree with this and to explain why I am not in agreement with this I will come to the Aristotle's account of slavery in Politics I and, the very difficult claim that I am building regarding nature (Arendt, 1958)[footnoteRef:39]. Comment by patrick: Not citizenship pcartcipation. Guess: what he has said about political participation and citizenship. Comment by patrick: This sounds like it should be all you and not Arendt. [39: Ibid 36]

The handling of slavery has been opened by Aristotle in the same way as he had opened his account of citizenship. He asks, Who is a slave? asking: who is a slave? Similarly, like he has done in the case of citizenship, he asks this question with regards to justice and qualification [qualification to what?] and for that reason rejects ancestry, parentage and convention because in his opinion all these factors do not justify were not enough justifications for slavery [Pol. 1255b2, 15][footnoteRef:40], Aanother thing done by Aristotle here, just like he did in the case of citizenship, is that he has pushed the slaves to one side who were made slaves by force or accident. If the activity of a citizen (including the methods in which the political and social institutions guide the activities of the citizens and not the people who were given citizenship by force or accident) defines and tells us about the nature and identity of the citizen, then the nature of the slave should be defined by the definition of slaves (Arendt, 1958)[footnoteRef:41]. Comment by patrick: How close to the source is this? [40: Ibid 8] [41: Ibid 36]

All these are the conclusions made by Aristotle. He says, "the good citizen, good man and the statesman should not learn the tasks that are done by the inferior as, if they will learn them then there won't remain any difference between them and the slaves" [Pol. 1277b5-7][footnoteRef:42]. [42: Ibid 8]

If all the things mentioned above are true and theOne can asume that the identity of a slave is actually like the citizen's identity, decided and determined by the prohairetic activity, then there is absolutely no difference between the citizen and slave. If all this is true, then, in Politics 1 the account of slavery is actually to caution the citizens as well as the slaves, of the vulnerability regarding their acting power and forming their political destines, rather than to set apart and explain a domain that is not political at all and very important (Mara 1995, 286, 296; Davis 1996, 22)[footnoteRef:43]. However, there is one major difference between the citizens and the slaves, and that difference is that the political and social institutions that are formed for the slaves and the citizens are made by the citizens alone. Hence, I have been made a slave by the social and political institutions in whose formation I have played no part in and, therefore, I'm made a slave independent of my actions as well as agency. Comment by patrick: I have no idea what this means. As such, I do not know how to fix it. Comment by patrick: By agency I asume free agency, which means free action. [43: Mara, Gerald. 1995. "The Near Made Far Away: The Role of Cultural Criticism in Aristotle's Political Theory." Political Theory 23: 280-303. Davis, Michael. 1996. The Politics of Philosophy: A Commentary on Aristotle's Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.]

One can't find anything about the nature of the slaves who have been made into the slaves by the exclusionary of the political and social institutions and this is what happened when a study was conducted on the slaves. Although this kind of system doesn't reveal anything about the slaves, it does however, tell us something about the dominant and ruling nature of the citizens who make these social institutions, which according to Aristotle is what triggers the destruction of their society's social fabic unmakes their polity [Pol. I.7, V.10; 1292a14-38][footnoteRef:44]. Therefore, the institutions built for slavery and the practice of slavery as a whole areis not only bad for the individual citizens but also for the citizen community as a whole (i.e. The polity). Comment by patrick: I will have to guess: Nothing is revealed about the nature of the slaves who have been made into slaves by virtue of exclusion. There is an interesting study in this regard. Comment by patrick: I can't make sense of this at all. [44: Ibid 8]

You can be assured that this is not a normal reading of the Politics 1. In order to justify this I will talk about a question that was mentioned by Aristotle while he was discussing slavery and Hhe didn't return to this question again very openly when he discussed citizenship (Frank, 2004)[footnoteRef:45]. The question was: Who is by nature a slave? This question has also been imported in the political language that has been introduced by Aristotle in physics. He has basically divided this question into two parts., Ffirst,; if nature ias matter (i.e. The bodies of humans) will we be able to differentiate the non-slaves from the slaves? Second,; if nature ias form, (i.e. As souls of people) will we be able to distinguish the slaves from the non-slaves?. However, as it has become very clear that nature does not actually differentiate the slave from the non-slaves on the basis of the physical appearance. Bodies of the masters often belong to the slaves, and the bodies of the slaves are said to belong to the masters [Pol. 1254b31][footnoteRef:46]. Therefore, the nature doesn't distinguish the material object (i.e. A body) as slave and non-slave. can't tell the material object i.e. A body who deserves to be a slave and who don't. [45: Ibid 32] [46: Ibid 8]