Bahrain February 14

¶ … movement is an anti-government political movement in Bahrain. The Bahraini government has placed the group on its list of terrorist organizations (Saeed, 2014), a move not mirrored by the United States or its allies. The group began in 2011, as part of the February 14th uprising that was part of the broader Arab Spring movement. The group comprises a range of pro-democracy advocates and protestors, and its efforts are primarily focused on political reform in Bahrain.

By all appearances, it seems rather disingenuous to call the February 14th Movement a terrorist group, as it is neither a group by formal structure, nor is it engaged in terrorist acts. Bahrain is an absolute monarchy, run by the al-Khalifa family. The family has come under criticism from observers for human rights violations on numerous occasions, and it has a reputation for using brutal tactics to repress opposition (Fisk, 1996). This repression is combined with diverse ethnicity among native Bahrainis to create a situation of simmering tensions.

The ruling class are Sunni, while most Bahrainis are Shia. The Shia are split among those of Arab and Persian descent. A similar split applies to the Sunni. There are very small Christian and Jewish native communities, and a large immigrant population. The political issues surrounding the February 14th movement are largely concentrated with native Bahrainis. Several anti-government movements exist in Bahrain, reflecting the interests of different disadvantaged groups.

While Bahrain overall is considered to be a high income country due to its oil wealth, Sunni Arabs hold a disproportionate amount of wealth and political power. The Arab Spring gave rise to street protests around the region, and many Bahraini opposition figures took the opportunity to agitate for political change within their own country, an objective that most opposition figures had long before 2011.

It was in this milieu that the February 14th movement, named for the protests that first broke out in the country on February 14th, 2011, first rose to prominence from among the many opposition movements. Mission of the Movement The February 14th movement has as its stated goal "to bring down the regime of Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa" and there are claims that the group has sought to acquire explosive devices for this purpose (TRAC, 2015).

The group is shadowy, as are many opposition groups in Bahrain, given the brutal and omnipresent nature of the country's security apparatus. The movement's principals are unknown. Members of the movement organize using modern telecommunications and social media, as this allows them to move more quickly. Their primary activities, beginning in 2011, are to agitate against the Bahraini regime, and organize protests. Since its inception, it has organized many protests. Among the largest of these are those on the anniversary of the initial mass protests on February 14th (Al Jazeera, 2015).

If there is a formal power structure to the group, it is not known. February 14th is more reasonably classified as a fluid opposition movement. The goal remains the same, and many of the players are doubtless the same, but ultimately their tactics and operating style may be quite flexible. Because of the nature of the movement's objectives aligns it with the main opposition party, al-Wefaq, and its leader Sheikh Ali Salman. Other groups active in the country are the Ashtar Brigade and Saraya al-Muqawama.

Al-Ashtar claimed responsibility for the bombing that killed three policemen, but that did not stop the Bahraini government from putting three opposition groups on its terror list, and continuing its crackdown on all dissidents (Saeed, 2014). Despite being aligned with groups claiming terrorist acts, and reports circulating about the February 14th movement members seeking to acquire explosives, there is no evidence that this group has ever committed a terrorist act, nor that it has targets other than the al-Khalifa regime.

Bahraini state media -- not exactly a reliable source -- has linked members of the February 14th movement with terrorist acts inside the country. Among them was a bombing in Hamad Town that left one Bahraini dead, a Manama bombing on November 5th, 2012 that killed two Asian guest workers, and a warehouse at a Hyundai warehouse. The Bahraini state media (2013) specifically attributes significant ties to foreign countries. It argues that many leaders of the movement are based overseas, specifically the UK, Lebanon, Iraq and Iran, where they raise funds.

It is further argued that one of the main leaders of the movement is Hadi al-Madrasi, who has promoted sectarian schism (BNA, 2013). The loose and relatively informal structure of the movement presents challenges for Bahraini authorities. They note that many of the movements leaders operate outside the country, and hint that foreign governments might be involved in lending support for the group, though the sources making this claims are little more than propaganda arms, and as such cannot be taken seriously in lieu of genuine evidence.

US Interests The U.S. has significant interests in Bahrain, and is therefore aligned with the al-Khalifa regime. The Fifth Fleet is headquartered in the country, making it a key strategic ally in the region. Furthermore, Bahrain is also an oil producer -- by no means the largest in the region. Arguably, it is the Fifth Fleet that motivates America's relationship with Bahrain more than anything else. Instability in the country can be perceived as a threat to U.S. interests there, particularly the Fifth Fleet (Shadid, 2011).

Underpinning this is not just the threat of instability, but that of a Shia majority rule, which would not only increase the risk of sectarian violence after what is perceived by many Shia as two centuries of Sunni repression, but the possibility that Iran is involved in some of the Shia opposition. The Bahraini government has at times intimated as much (Saeed, 2014) and there is little doubt that an Iran-backed Shia government of any form would be a threat to U.S.

interest not only in Bahrain but in the entire region. That said, there is little evidence that the February 14th Movement has targeted U.S. facilities in Bahrain. The group has, however, noted that the U.S. presence lends at least tacit support to the Khalifa regime, if not active support. There may not be any overt evidence of anti-Americanism within this movement at present, but any hint that the U.S. is backing al-Khalifa would create strong anti-American sentiments among members of this movement.

It is also possible that should the movement see its objectives come true, it might turn its attention to others. But for now, evidence suggests that the movement and its member are concerned with domestic considerations, and the U.S. presence in the country is merely tangential (Wehrey, 2014). Recommendations There is little threat associated with the February 14 movement in Bahrain. The State Department does not recognize this movement as a terrorist group, nor should it. There is no evidence that the February 14 has the formal organizational structure.

There is no evidence that this movement has ever committed a terrorist act, and the only implications that it might have been involved in such activity come from the very government that it opposes. The movement opposes a brutal authoritarian regime. Its aims appear to be purely domestic in nature. There is no surprise in the slightest that a group opposed to such a regime might undertake violence, propaganda and protest as means of waging its struggle, though there is only evidence of the latter two.

The best recommendation for the U.S. is to stay out of the Bahrain conflict. There may be some perception that the U.S. is taking sides, but right now this perception is theoretical, and minimal, and there is no evidence that members of those movement have specifically targeted U.S. interests, the Fifth Fleet or even foreigners in the street. If the U.S. becomes involved in Bahrain's internal affairs, that is when the problems will occur. The U.S.

has to understand that while it has a good relationship with the Khalifa family, they are dictators and their treatment of minorities has ranged from indifference to brutality. Supporting this type of regime may help the U.S. To meet broader strategic goals in the region, and the country will have to accept that it may paint it in a negative light among groups who are opposed to this regime. This is not to say that U.S. policy in Bahrain should be changed.

If anything, it is fairly evident that the motivations for having the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf are far greater than anything to do with February 14. And, indeed, the Khalifas were brutal dictators before the U.S. became involved in the region. Most members of opposition groups seem well aware of this fact, and characterize their struggle as one that has been ongoing for over two hundred years. Whatever antipathy they might feel towards the U.S.

As allies of the Khalifas, ultimately the grievances expressed by the February 14 movement are domestic in nature, and anything.