Battle of Cowpens

Battle of Cowpens

The British Are Not Coming: How the Read Coats Lost the Battle of Cowpens

The Battle of Cowpens is considered by many historians to be a critical battle, which to a large extent shaped the outcome of the American Revolutionary War or War of Independence. This is due to the fact that it was seen as a "…decisive first step by American forces in reclaiming South Carolina from the British and ultimately turning the tide of the Revolutionary War." [footnoteRef:1] The following discussion will provide a brief overview of the battle and attempt to provide an answer to the question, "how did the British lose the Battle of Cowpens?" [1: "Battle of Cowpens," accessed February 19. 2012, http://battleofcowpens.com/.]

Thesis statement

Although, there were other factors involved, the defeat of the British at the Battle of Cowpens was attributed to the superior strategy on the part of General Morgan and his clever use of troop positioning and movement. It is also suggested that the reason for his victory was his astute ability to ascertain the intentions and likely strategy of the enemy as well as understanding the capabilities and weaknesses of his own men. The thesis is that Morgan's strategy, more than any other factor, was responsible for the defeat of the British at the Battle of Cowpens.

Overview and Discussion

The Battle of Cowpens took place on January 17, 1781 in South Carolina in an area close to the border of North Carolina. The American War for Independence was in a stage of stasis with neither side making any dramatic progress. The reason for this situation was that "… both sides didn't have enough strength to make full offensive attacks." [footnoteRef:2] As a result "…both the British and the Colonists fought this war ferociously with tactics such as guerrilla warfare." [footnoteRef:3] This resulted in a war that consisted mostly of small skirmishes. The lack of ability to conduct a large offensive on either side, meant that neither side could make significant progress in their goals. [2: "What happened at the battle of cowpens?" Answers.com, accessed 18 February, 2012, http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_happened_at_the_battle_of_cowpens.] [3: "What happened at the battle of cowpens?" Answers.com, accessed 18 February, 2012, http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_happened_at_the_battle_of_cowpens.]

The war had been dragging on for six years. However, the Continental Army had not had any decisive victories over the British in more than three years. [footnoteRef:4] The overall Commander of the British forces, General Cornwallis, also found himself in difficulties as the campaigns in the southern states of the country had lasted longer than he had originally anticipated and his troops had been forced to forage for food. Fighting a battle so far from one's own supply lines was proving difficult. This meant that food was taken from the colonialists to feed the British army. This angered the colonists even further, resulting in increased anti-British sentiment and an increase in the number of recruits to the militias opposed to the British occupancy. [4: Frank Stroupe, "Battle of Cowpens," Free Info Society, accessed 18 February, 2012, http://www.freeinfosociety.com/article.php?id=193.]

There was also strong sentient in South Carolina against the brutal tactics that were being employed by the British troops in the area. For example, the British commander under Cornwallis, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton, "…had been known to murder prisoners rather than capture them." [footnoteRef:5] Tactics such as these only angered the colonists further. The British were fighting a battle in a land of enemies, one in which they found themselves with decreasing allies and increasing enemies. However, up until this point, the British had been able to make significant progress, or at least halt the revolution through better trained troops and superior equipment as compared to the American forces. [5: Frank Stroupe, "Battle of Cowpens," Free Info Society, accessed 18 February, 2012, http://www.freeinfosociety.com/article.php?id=193.]

Even though they were at a disadvantage, the British had been able to levy defeat after defeat to the American forces. This significantly affected the morale of the American military and the colonists as well. They were beginning to lose heart and see the British as an unstoppable force. A major military defeat of the British at this juncture would consequently have larger ramifications in terms of morale for the American Revolutionaries. Therefore, the Battle of the Cowpens was not only a single victory against the British but is seen as the beginning of the eventual defeat of the British in the American War for Independence.

General Daniel Morgan

General Morgan was not new to the battlefield and brought with him a strong background of battle experience. Morgan's military experience dated back to the French and Indian War as well as the Siege of Boston. In 1775, he fought in the Battle of Quebec, a battle which ended in Morgan's defeat and subsequent capture by the British.[footnoteRef:6] Morgan was freed in a prisoner exchange in 1777 and placed in command of a handpicked force of 500 rifleman by General Washington. Morgan and his group of elite rifleman played as decisive role in the victory at Saratoga. [footnoteRef:7] [6: Buchanan 270-284] [7: Buchanan 285]

Despite these victories, Morgan was passed over for advancement. This discouraged Morgan regarding his military career. Morgan became plagued by attacks of sciatica and left the army in 1779 as a result. However, he returned only one year later and was promoted to brigadier general.[footnoteRef:8] This military background and experience gave Morgan the advantage and the ability to assess his own troops and those of the British that he would face. Morgan and his troops were under the direction of General Greene of the Southern Division. [8: Buchanan 292]

Before the Battle of Cowpens, General Greene knew that his army was weak and would be unlikely to be able to face the British head on in a fight. Therefore, he decided to do something unconventional and split his troops.[footnoteRef:9] Splitting one's troops was typically considered to be a bad idea because it reduced the numbers available to face the enemy. General Greene sent a detachment west of the Catawba River to attempt to raise the morale of the locals in support of the war efforts. He hoped that they would contribute supplies beyond those available around Charlotte. [footnoteRef:10] Greene gave Morgan command of the wing that was supposed make this maneuver and later join him west of the Catawba River. [9: 70th Congress 54-56] [10: Buchanan 292]

Morgan headed out on December 21 with approximately 600 men, four hundred of which were from the Continental Army. He took position between the Broad River and Pacolet River, assisting civilians that needed it along the way. Once they reached the Pacolet River they were joined by 60 South Carolina militia. There also are joined by other militia from Georgia and the Carolinas.[footnoteRef:11] This significantly bolstered his troops. [11: Buchanan 296-302]

Lieutenant Commander Tarleton

While this was going on, the British troops led by Lord Cornwallis were planning to invade North Carolina, an action they had postponed after the defeat it Kings Mountain. [footnoteRef:12] Morgan, in his position by the river, posed a threat to Cornwallis's ability to do invade the southern states. One of the key turning points in the southern campaign came when Cornwallis received incorrect intelligence that Morgan was going to attack the British fort at Ninety Six, South Carolina. His main objective was to save the fort and defeat Morgan's command. On January 2, Cornwallis's ordered Lieutenant Commander Banastre Tarleton to head west to meet up with Morgan and defeat him.[footnoteRef:13] [12: Ibid. ] [13: Buchanan 306-309]

Lieutenant Commander Tarleton was much younger and less experienced than Morgan. His military career began when he and a very small party captured General Charles Lee in New Jersey in December of 1776. He served with distinction at the Seige of Charleston and the Battle of Camden. With this little bit of experience, he was given some of the best British troops in the Carolinas. He soon gained a reputation for being ruthless and was one of the most hated by the American soldiers and colonists alike. His men killed American soldiers after they had surrendered, which made him a target to be had by the American troops.[footnoteRef:14] This did not gain him popularity with the locals either. [14: Buchanan 309]

Tarleton, following orders from Cornwallis, marched to the Ninety Six only to find that Morgan was not there. However, Tarleton decided to follow Morgan anyway and sent word back to Cornwallis to send reinforcements of British regulars. Tarleton set out to meet Morgan and drive them across the Broad River. On January 12, Tarleton learned the location of Morgan's troops and began a hard march to catch up.[footnoteRef:15] It was Tarleton's intention to catch Morgan between both his and Cornwallis's troops. It appears that both sides had a good understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each other and the inability of American troops to face forces that were large and well trained. [15: Buchanan 311]

Prelude

The setup for the Battle of Cowpens began when Morgan learned that Tarleton was in hot pursuit of him. He was afraid that he would get caught between Tarleton and Cornwallis, so he decided to do a tactical retreat to the north in order to avoid having to face both Tarleton and Cornwallis's troops at the same time.[footnoteRef:16] This was an excellent move by Morgan and demonstrated that he had the ability to analyze his own forces as compared to the other side's forces. Morgan continued to march quickly towards the Broad River with Tarleton's troops on their heels. Tarleton was ambitious and had a reputation for being relentless when in pursuit. [16: Buchanan 312]

On the afternoon of January 16 Morgan was approaching the Broad River. The Broad River was high with flood waters and difficult to cross at that time. By nightfall Morgan came to a place called Cowpens, justly named as it was a grazing area for local cattle. Morgan knew that the delay caused by floodwaters meant that Tarleton would soon catch up to him. Another reason for Morgan's decision to stand and fight was that he was afraid that if he ran, it would cause the locals to lose heart in the cause.[footnoteRef:17] He did it as much for them as for himself. [17: Edwin Bearss. The Battle of Cowpens: A Documented Narrative and Troop Movement Maps. (Johnson City, Tennessee: Overmountain Press. 1996),9. ]

Morgan met up with Pickens and his troops, which consisted of a large group of militia. Pickens and his troops had been patrolling the area. Morgan had to make a choice. He knew that he could not continue to retreat and that Tarleton's troops would catch up due to the delay in crossing the river. He decided to stand and fight, rather than to get caught unprepared while crossing the river. Tarleton received word of Morgan's location and began marching for him. Tarleton made his troops to rise at 3:00 AM and march, rather than camping for the night.[footnoteRef:18] The stage for the battle was set. [18: Buchanan 314-315]

The Troops

The size of the American army is a much disputed topic. Lawrence Babits found that although Morgan's troops were not that great in number, they were joined by several other battalions and militia, making their numbers much bigger than is often reported by many sources. Morgan's troops are typically reported as 600-800 men, but this does not count those that joined him at the river. In this battle the Continental forces led by General Daniel Morgan being comprised of about 1000 men, mainly militia.[footnoteRef:19] According to Babits, the list of troops joining Morgan is as follows: [19: "The Battle of Cowpens 1781," British Battles.Com, accessed 17 February, 2012, http://www.britishbattles.com/battle-cowpens.htm.]

A battalion of Continental infantry under Lt-Col John Eager Howard, (300)

Virginia State troops under Captain John Lawson (75)

South Carolina State troops under Captain Joseph Pickens (60)

North Carolina State troops under Captain Henry Connelly (number not given)

Virginia Militia battalion under Frank Triplett (160)

Three companies of Virginia Militia under Major David Campbell (50)

North Carolina Militia under Colonel Joseph McDowell (260 -- 285)

A brigade of four battalions of South Carolina Militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens, (730)

Three small companies of Georgia Militia commanded by Major Cunningham (55)

detachment of the 1st and 3rd Continental Light Dragoons under Lt-Col William Washington (82).

Detachments of state dragoons from North Carolina and Virginia (30)

detachment of South Carolina State Dragoons, with a few mounted Georgians, commanded by Major James McCall (25)[

A company of newly raised volunteers from the local South Carolina Militia commanded by Major Benjamin Jolly (45)

As one can see, there were many more troops than many history sources would have one believe. Babits is considered to be the authoritative source on the numbers of Morgan's troops. It was not just Morgan and his small battalion of roughly 600 men. If one adds the numbers accounted for by Babits, one easily comes up with a total of 1,887 to 1,912 officers and men. Morgan's troops can be described as veterans, at least the continental troops. His militia had also seen action at the battle of Musgrove Mill and the Battle of Kings Mountain.[footnoteRef:20] His regulars were well seasoned. However, the same cannot be said for his militia. [20: Buchanan 319]

The British forces, numbering about 1100 were led by Colonel Banastre Tarleton. His command consisted of 7th Light Dragoons, 7th Royal Fusiliers Regiment, 71st Regiment (Fraser's Highlanders) and a battery of Royal Artillery. [footnoteRef:21] These troops were considered to be more experienced and better trained than the militia under General Morgan. This was a condition that was not unique to this battle. Throughout the revolutionary war the Americans faced British troops that were larger, better trained, a better equipped for the battle.[footnoteRef:22] Yet, by the end of the war, it was the Americans that defeated a seemingly insurmountable foe. [21: "Battle of Cowpens," accessed February 19. 2012, http://battleofcowpens.com/.] [22: Thomas Raddal."Tarleton's Legion."Collections of the Nova Scotia Historical Society. Vol. 28. Halifax, NS: Allen Print Limited, 1949. ]

Tarleton's men consisted of both experienced soldiers and new recruits that were intended to reinforce the garrison at Fort Ninety Six where they were to receive additional training before going into action. Raw recruits comprised approximately 10% of Tarleton's troops. Tarleton's regular troops were considered to be a formidable foe when they were pursuing someone. However, when the opposition turned and gave them a good fight, they were uncertain.[footnoteRef:23] This would prove and important factor to the outcome of the battle. [23: Babits 46. ]

According to many sources, other than Babits, it makes it sound as if Morgan was severely outnumbered by the British troops. However, when one begins to look of the other detachments that were with Morgan, one can see that Morgan's troops significantly outnumbered the British troops. Even with superior numbers on his side, Morgan's strategy still played a key role in the defeat of the British. When one closely examines the details of the battle, it becomes clear that the numbers had very little to do with Morgan's victory, and it was Morgan's strategy that won the day. Let us now closely examine the strategy used by Morgan to defeat Tarleton's troops in the battle of Cowpens.

Strategy

Morgan's strategy when he decided to stand and fight may gave derived from the fact that if he stood and fought, then he would have the assistance of the other troops. If he continued to run, when Tarleton caught up with him, he would be largely on his own. He felt that he stood a better chance to stand and fight than to continue to run under the circumstances. However, Morgan only had a short time to devise his strategy before he would face Tarleton's troops. He knew that the element of surprise would be a key to victory.

Morgan decided to use the unique landscape of Cowpens to his advantage. One of his key advantages was and he knew his men and he knew his opponent. He knew that Tarleton would be more likely to attack from the front and face them head on, as this was the most widely used strategy by British troops at that time.[footnoteRef:24] They depended on force to defeat an opponent. Morgan also I knew that his own militia troops are notorious for running as soon as they see the first shots fired. This leaves the regulars abandoned and with reduced numbers. The habit of militia running at the beginning of battle made them more of a hazard than a help in many situations. When the militia would run, it would give the British confidence and encourage them to press on even harder. [24 V.G. Fowler, V.G. "Brigadier General Daniel Morgan." U.S. Department of the Interior: National Park Service: Cowpens National Battlefield South Carolina. 2005. ]

Morgan knew that his militia were likely to run at the first sign of battle, so he decided to use them in an unconventional way and place his army between the Broad River and Pacolet River. This would make it impossible to escape and they would have nowhere to run. Typically, one would try to leave themselves an escape route should things go wrong. However, Morgan's experience at the Battle of Camden taught him what could happen if the militia turned and ran. At this battle the militia ran as soon as the shooting began, leaving half of the force on the battlefield.[footnoteRef:25] Leaving the militia with no way to escape was one way to ensure that they would remain on the battlefield, rather than running. He left them no choice but to stand and fight. [25: Buchanan 328]

Anticipating a direct attack, Morgan chose a low hill as a center of his position. This is where he placed his continental infantry. He deliberately left its flanks exposed to his opponent top draw them to what they would see as an error on his part. Morgan planned is attack in three phases. He arranged its troops in three main sections. The first consisted of skirmishers and sharpshooters. One consisted of militia and the main forces consisted of the continental army.[footnoteRef:26] [26: Victor Brooks and Robert Hohwald. How America Fought Its Wars: Military Strategy from the American Revolution to the Civil War. (Da Capo Press. 1999), 134]

Morgan's plan was to count on the militia turning and running as soon as they see the cavalry, if not before. Therefore, he did not tell them to stand and fight. Morgan used their weakness as a strength that was built into his battle plan. He told them to fire two volleys and then withdraw around to the left and re-form in the rear. They would do this under the cover of the reserve under the command of William Washington and James McCall. The movement of the militia would draw British attention away from the third line, hiding them from the British. The plan was to make Tarleton think that militia was abandoning the battle as usual.

The third line was manned by his best troops of about 550 men. These were the highly trained Continental Army from Delaware and Maryland.[footnoteRef:27] The purpose of this strategy was to weaken and confuse Tarleton's forces, which would be more likely to go straight for a frontal attack on the third line uphill. Morgan placed Tarleton's troops at a disadvantage by having them fight his best troops uphill. His men would not have to fight as hard, moving downhill rather than uphill. [27: Ibid.]

General Morgan decided to place his troops in a simple position in open woodland and on two low hills. His strategy was to make take an uncomplicated position that would entice his enemy to make a straightforward, headlong attack. His understanding and estimation of his enemy's actions were correct and the over-confident Colonel Tarleton sent in his troops to the attack, without considering a more subtle strategy. He thought that, the Americans had "…put themselves in a vulnerable spot, especially considering his superiority in cavalry. Tarleton thought this would be an easy win with very little causalities and death for his troops." [footnoteRef:28] This was a typical British attitude towards Americans. The British prided themselves on their firepower and the precision and training of the troops. Tarleton's young arrogance was also a factor in this battle. [28: "What happened at the battle of cowpens?" Answers.com, accessed 18 February, 2012, http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_happened_at_the_battle_of_cowpens.]

The primary battle tactic was to weaken and disorganize Tarleton's forces before hitting them with his best trained troops. The hope was that the first two lines would inflict both physical and psychological damage on the advancing British troops before the third line would come into action. Morgan's troops were protected from flanking moves by a ravine on one side and a creek on the other. Morgan planned to weaken them before the final attack. Morgan would lead Tarleton into a trap as they came uphill for the final attack. He also hoping to reduce the size of the troops by the time they hit the continental army.

Tarleton's strategy was quite different and not as well planned as Morgan's. On January 17, 1781 Tarleton arose his troops from sleep at 2:00 AM and took them on a fast march to catch Morgan. The British troops were already exhausted, having been up for a 3:00 AM march the night before and were suffering from a lack of sleep and a lack of food. Two days before the battle the British had run out of food and had less than 4 hours of sleep.[footnoteRef:29] Tarleton was consumed with a desire to earn more fame by defeating Morgan. Tarleton was overly confident and nothing could convince him to delay the battle. He felt that Morgan's troops were trapped between his superior and more highly trained British troops and the flooding river.[footnoteRef:30] [29: Buchanan 316] [30: Babits 156]

The British viewed the American militia as unskilled rogues that needed to be put into place. They often under estimated the Americans and abilities to out strategize them. Their habit of underestimating the raggle taggle American militia was a key advantage for American generals. The Battle of Cowpens was only one of many battles where the Americans were able to out maneuver the British by doing something that the British did not expect the Americans to have the foresight to do.

Morgan made optimum use of his sharpshooters, placing them in a strategic position and instructing them to target British officers, which would cause confusion in the ranks. Morgan also placed his troops in lines with a reserve force out of sight of the British. This highlights another key difference between British troops and American troops. The British were highly structured and had established hierarchy in the ranks. The foot soldiers and cavalry men were only trained to take orders. They were not required to be able to devise battle strategy or to act without the guidance of their superior. If the British troops lost their leadership they became confused and lost their cohesion.

The American militia was different in that they were not as highly trained and structured as British troops, but they knew how to fight. The American militia still had a hierarchy but the troops were much more autonomous than British troops. If the leaders of the American militia fell, the American troops could continue the fight without them. The American troops did not fall apart when they lost their officers. This was a key difference between the British and American troops that was to prove decisive in the battle of Cowpens. Morgan's plan to take out the British officers was not uncommon and was a well-known tactic among American generals. They knew that if the British troops lost their leadership, then it became a battle of individuals rather than the well organized front that they presented with their leadership intact. This was a key weakness in the British troops that could be capitalized upon by American military leadership. This weakness was leveraged throughout the revolutionary war by the Americans.

The British relied on the fact that in most instances the militias were prone to retreat in disorder before a charge of the British cavalry. Morgan therefore placed his militia troops in such a way that they would be required only to fire two shots before retreating to the rear, leaving the British to face his more experienced troops. His strategy was correct and the British did not expect this and thought that they would face only inexperienced militia. However, they found themselves instead confronting the experienced Continental Army troops.

Tarleton did just as Morgan expected. As soon as Tarleton reached the place where Morgan had set up his troops he formed a battle line, according to traditional British strategy of the time. This formation consisted of Dragoons on the flanks, two grasshopper cannons between them, as well as British regulars and a troupe of American Lovalists. Tarleton's plan was simple. His infantry was assembled in linear fashion and would move directly upon Morgan. The right and left sides of his flanks would be protected by dragoon units. The Dragoons consisted of a 250 man battalion of Scottish highlanders known as the 71st Regiment of Foot. He expected that the Americans would break and run as they always did when faced by a superior British battalion. He knew this was particularly true of the militia. As soon as the militia and the rest of the Americans broke into chaos and ran he planned to unleash his 200 man cavalry to finish them off. Tarleton saw the day as an easy win.

The British troops set up just as Morgan expected them too. He also knew that the British expected them to run and that as soon as they ran they would be finished off by the cavalry. This knowledge was a result of Morgan's experience and knowledge of standard British tactics, which had remained largely unchanged since it beginning of the war. Morgan's plan worked perfectly due to his prior knowledge and the predictability British strategy.

The British drove in successive lines, expecting victory at the beginning of the battle. However, to their surprise, they encountered successively stronger lines of troops on the American side. Morgan's plan allowed the American troops to absorb the shock of the British advance. At 6:45 AM, just a few minutes before sunrise, Tarleton's troops emerged from the woods just in front of the American position.[footnoteRef:31] Tarleton ordered his Dragoons to attack the first line of skirmishers, which one will recall consisted of American militia, who were expected to run at the first sign of battle. However, instead the skirmishers opened fire and took out 15 of Tarleton's Dragoons. [31: Babits 156]

The Dragoons retreated immediately and Tarleton immediately ordered an infantry charge. Tarleton did this without stopping to study the American deployment or to allow the rest of his infantry in cavalry reserves to make it out of the woods.[footnoteRef:32] This may have been a fatal mistake on the part of Tarleton. He also had not deployed his main body or his two grasshopper cannon. The reasons for these mistakes are not known but they may be a result of Tarleton's inexperience and Morgan's unusual plan of attack. Nonetheless, the results of this error would prove to be devastating for the British troops in the next moments of the battle. [32: Ibid. ]

Tarleton had expected the American militia to run long before this. However, the militia kept firing as they withdrew to join the second line manned by Pickens' militia.[footnoteRef:33] This diversion from typical behaviour caused confusion. Tarleton decided to attack again, this time targeting the militia men. His plan was apparently to break the American ranks by causing the militia men to flee, as had happened many times in the past in encounters with American troops. The militia men did just as ordered and fired two rounds into the enemy, then retreated. [33: Buchanan 320]

At this point the British had 40% of their officers down as casualties. As Morgan planned, this left the British troops stunned and confused. However, the British were able to reform and continued to advance. Tarleton ordered one of his Dragoon officers to charge into the "defeated" Americans. His men moved forward and were momentarily stopped by musket fire. However they continued to advance. As planned, Picken's militia went to the left as planned after their second round was fired.[footnoteRef:34] As expected, Tarleton thought that the first two lines were retreating and running as they had always done. This caused the British to do as they always had done in the past and advance into the final line of disciplined regulars who awaited them on the hill. Tarleton ordered the 71st highlanders to flank the American right. John Eager Howard spotted the flanking and ordered the Virginia militia who were manning the American right side of the battle line to turn and face the advancing highlanders. However, the noise of the battle muffled Howard's order and the troops began to withdraw. [34: Buchanan 321]

At this point it was 7:45 AM in the British and Americans had been fighting for nearly an hour. They had been up all night for two nights, were tired and had a long march prior to the battle. They had lost much of their command, were tired, and disorganized. However, when the militia began to withdraw it encouraged them, as they believed that the Americans were on the run as usual. This caused the British troops to charge, breaking formation and attacking in a chaotic mass of soldiers. Morgan ordered a volley which caused Howard's militia to stop their retreat and do an about face-to-face the British troops head on.

The Virginia militia fired into the British at close range. This stopped the British troops in their tracks, many of them falling dead. Tarleton's efforts to get his troops to turn around were useless. They were not listening at this point.[footnoteRef:35] John Eager Howard took advantage of the halted advance and ordered his troops to charge with bayonets.[footnoteRef:36] The Americans mounted a bayonet charge. This surprised Tarleton's force and they did something unexpected. Some surrendered on the spot and others turned and ran. This opened the opportunity for Howard's men to charge forward and take the British cannons. Next Washington's cavalry came around from behind the Americans and hit the British on their right flank and rear. Picken's militia, rather than running, had reformed and charged out from behind the hill. They had made a complete circle around the American position and hit the 71st highlanders on the British left flank and rear.[footnoteRef:37] It was Howard's Virginia militia's withdrawal that brought the British charge. This time, rather than continuing to run, they turned and attacked the Scotsman from the other direction.[footnoteRef:38] [35: Thomas Anderson. "Journal of Lieutenant Thomas Anderson of the Delaware Regiment, 1780-1782." Historical Magazine, 2d ser., 1 (1867), 207-11. ] [36: Buchanan 322] [37: Lynda Worley Skelton, ed. General Andrew Pickens: An Autobiography. (Clemson, SC: Pendleton District Historical and Recreational Commission, 1976.)] [38: Buchanan 323]

Once again, expectation was the downfall of the British troops. The element of surprise was a key deciding factor in the ability of Morgan to surprise British leadership. As expected by Morgan, the British attacked confidently from the front. However, the well placed sharpshooters decimated their changing cavalry. The British then confronted the militia who, fired two shots and then retreated, as they had been ordered. Thinking that the militia troops were fleeing and that the battle was all but over, the British charged. However, instead of troops running away they were met by the Continental Army. At the same time the militia and sharpshooters flanked the British, which ensured their defeat. Tarleton then fled with the remaining British troops.[footnoteRef:39] [39: William Waller Edwards. "Morgan and his Riflemen." William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., 23 (1914), 73-106.]

In total, 39 British officers, and 60 British soldiers were killed during the Battle, with 829 soldiers captured.[footnoteRef:40] In contrast the Americans lost only 12 soldiers killed and sixty wounded. They also captured the colors of the 7th foot of the British army.[footnoteRef:41] The Americans had won the day and the British left the battlefield wounded and damaged. Those that ran and were still alive would be certain to face court martial when they arrived back of the British camps. The British did not take running in battle lightly, even under the circumstances. [40: "The Battle of Cowpens 1781," British Battles.Com, accessed 17 February, 2012, http://www.britishbattles.com/battle-cowpens.htm.] [41: "The Battle of Cowpens 1781," British Battles.Com, accessed 17 February, 2012, http://www.britishbattles.com/battle-cowpens.htm.]