¶ … Integration in the CI/HUMINT Community An Analysis of the Benefits of Integration in the CI/HUMINT Community and Strategies for Effective Implementation

Shea Larson

The success of any counterinsurgency operation depends largely on the effectiveness and appropriateness of intelligence gathered. Human subjects are a crucial source of intelligence for counterinsurgency operations. Several years back, the U.S. Armed Forces opened up opportunities for women to occupy specific positions in counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) discipline. However, women still remain underrepresented in the same, and researchers remain largely divided on whether their participation in the same ought to be increased. Researchers have raised concern that the decision to integrate women into HUMINT units could cost the country dearly in the long-term as it is likely to ruin unit cohesion and impede on overall effectiveness. Proponents of the whole idea of integration have, however, argued that the inclusion of women in HUMINT units will actually enhance the units' strength and internal cohesion. In the wake of all this controversy, however, studies examining the role of women in CI/HUMINT collection remain severely limited. Moreover, studies seeking to determine best practices for effective integration are almost non-existent. This thesis seeks to demonstrate why integration in the CI/HUMINT community was a well-calculated idea. It examines how the integration of women in the CI/HUMINT service area facilitates the process of intelligence gathering from human subjects, and identifies the specific strategies that could be used to ensure that maximum benefits of integration are realized.

Table of Contents

Abstract

Introduction

Background

Rationale

Statement of Purpose

Assumptions

Limitations

Literature Review

The Nature of War

Public Perceptions about Integration

Operational Concerns

Social Concerns

Benefits of Integration

Means of Integrating without Compromising Effectiveness

Summary

Research Methodology

Why a Qualitative Approach

Data Collection

Resource Selection

Procedures

Data Analysis

Results

Analysis and Policy Implications

Implications for Future Research

Conclusion

References

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Proportions of Medical Evacuations, by Major Categories of Illness/Injury by Gender, U.S. Armed Forces, January 2001 to December 2011

List of Acronyms

CI Counterinsurgency

HUMINT Human Intelligence

MOS Military Occupational Specialty

An Analysis of the Benefits of Integration in the CI/HUMINT Community and Strategies for Effective Implementation

Chapter 1: Introduction

The success of any counterinsurgency operation depends partly on the effectiveness of the intelligence function driving the operation (Goh, Hao & Tay, 2008). Simply stated, intelligence is foreknowledge that assists military forces in organizing themselves for optimal employment (Goh et al., 2008). As Goh and his colleagues (2008) point out, having accurate intelligence information increases the chances of combat success at all levels of operations - the strategic level, the tactical level and the operational level. On the tactical front, intelligence can provide forces with crucial insight on the performance envelopes of missiles, thereby aiding them in planning how to refine fighter tactics to out-maneuver the same (Goh et al., 2008). At the operational level, intelligence could help forces understand and engage enemy command elements or other operationally significant targets, thereby incapacitating rebel forces (Goh, et al., 2008). Moreover, intelligence could assist forces make strategic deployment decisions such as how to hit the enemy's center of gravity, thereby weakening their will to fight back (Goh et al., 2008). Basically, therefore, intelligence is integral to mission success, influencing forces' activities significantly, right from operational planning and daily training to force restructuring (Goh et al., 2008).

As the field of warfare has evolved, the human intelligence collection function has also grown to be more and more crucial for effective humanitarian assistance efforts and stable combat operations. That, however, seems to be more theoretical than practical, particularly in the context of the U.S. military -- our assignments are taking longer than usual, and our CI/HUMINT intelligence function seems far from perfect. This manifested clearly during the Iraqi war, when the intelligence community found itself relying on old and outdated information, and thereby landing conclusions that were largely inaccurate and misleading (Walter, 2005; Kerr, Wolfe, Donegan & Pappas, 2008). Moreover, despite the fact that the intelligence community was able to gather accurate and crucial information on a range of issues including how the Iraqi forces would fight, how the war would develop over time, how tribal...

Towards this end, there was no comprehensive sense of understanding of the Iraqi target among camp members by the time of deployment (Kerr et al., 2008).
An even greater problem was that once the war had begun, and with a male-saturated force, it was difficult to obtain more accurate intelligence owing to cultural provisions that bar Islamic women from interacting physically with men unrelated to them (Kerr et al., 2008). This left the female population an underdeveloped and underutilized source of human intelligence (Kerr et al., 2008).

The Iraqi situation was not even the first of its kind -- back in the 1990s, the intelligence community faced a number of tests for intelligence including emerging threats from Iran and North Korea, the Yugoslavia break-up, and the First Gulf War, and still, its collection and analysis performance was far from perfect (Kerr et al., 2008). These instances only imply that there is need to urgently streamline the military's intelligence function both in the pre-war situation and during the war. There is need to improve the military's intelligence gathering techniques on the ground so that the force is able to put up effective combat operations and to avoid placing an unnecessary burden on the taxpayer.

Very few researches have sought to examine the role played by female operatives in the collection of intelligence, particularly human intelligence. This is perhaps why women still remain largely underrepresented in this particular area, years after the Armed Forces began to open up opportunities for them in the CI/HUMINT community. This thesis seeks to examine how the integration of women into the CI/HUMINT community facilitates intelligence gathering from human subjects, and what needs to be done to ensure that the maximum benefits of such integration are realized. In other words, it seeks to establish how the integration of women into the HUMINT community has helped to streamline the intelligence gathering function, and what needs to be done to ensure that the maximum potential of female operatives is realized.

Background to the Study

There is no doubt that women have served in the American military for a long time, typically playing the role of spies, cooks, and nurses (McSally, 2007). However, their role in frontline combat as well as in the HUMINT service area has been severely limited (Obradovic, 2014). One of the primary reasons for this is the perception that women are biologically meek and too 'soft' to handle the challenges of the war environment (Frum, 2013; McSally, 2007; Alderman, 1992). This perception gives rise to the belief that women may not be able to handle the challenges inherent on the ground to the same degree as men (Frum, 2013). Other concerns raised against the inclusion of women in war-torn zones have to do with issues of unit cohesion and esprit-de-corps. These are all valid concerns discussed in the 'literature review' section of this thesis.

The transition of women into professional roles in the military began in 1948, when President Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act into law (McSally, 2007). The Act made it mandatory for women to constitute at least 2% of the total force (McSally, 2007). One controversial issue with the Act, however, is the fact that it excluded women from combat units (McSally, 2007). This spurred numerous amendments over the subsequent years, the most prominent being the authorization of female soldiers to act as pilots for combat aircrafts (McSally, 2007). The inclusion of women in more professional roles in the military increased rapidly with the Women Army Corps' elimination in the 1970s, and during Bill Clinton's reign as president (McSally, 2007).

The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1992 marked a crucial step in the participation of women in the U.S. military (McSally, 2007). The Act repealed the rules that previously excluded women from taking part in combat operations, opening up opportunities for women to occupy a variety of specialties in the force, most of which could essentially be categorized as combat jobs (McSally, 2007). Although women could still not serve in the traditional combat-specific roles of artilleryman, tank operator or infantryman, they could potentially work in combat aviation roles and a number of other dangerous occupations (McSally, 2007). This was because of the same ideology that their female biological constructs make them unable to deal effectively with the primary challenges in the field of war (Frum, 2013; McSally, 2007; Alderman, 1992). Two decades have lapsed since the passage of the Defense Authorization Act, yet both the Marine Corps and the Army still exclude women from combat roles in their forces. History has shown that women engaged in combat successfully in many historic wars including the Vietnam War, the Korean War, WW2, WW1, and the Civil War; and made immense contributions to the military's aerial operations during the Gulf War (McSally, 2007). The question of whether this is enough to have…