Bioterrorism threats and U.S. defense policy assessment

Bioagent Attacks

Biodefense in America

Bioterrorism specifically refers to the use of biological agents such as bacteria, germs, or viruses to cause sickness or death in a population. A bioterrorist can contaminate the food, air, or water supply with infectious agents designed to cause illness. Bioterrorism presents difficulties in tracing the source of the terrorist act because symptoms may not appear for days. It is difficult to know when, where, and how a person was infected. Anyone can be at risk for bioterrorism at any time. Bioterrorism does not only affect combatants or enemy military personnel, it affects innocent people in the general population. Biodefense refers to measures taken to help eliminate or reduce the possibility of a bioterrorist attack on the population. Biodefense in the United States became an important issue in the public eye after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Towers. This research will examine U.S. policies on bioterrorism, focusing on an assessment of the real risks of an attack on the United States.

History of Biological Warfare

They idea of using infectious agents is not a new one. One of the earliest reported cases of bioterrorism involved the use of rye infected with ergot. It was used in the sixth century BCE by the Assyrians in an attack against the Israelites (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.). In 190 BCE, Hannibal placed venomous snakes on an enemy ship and won a victory over King Pergamon as a result (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.). Vvenomous snakes are a biological agent, therefore would be considered Bioterrorism.

Rotting dead bodies have been used commonly as a source of bioterrorism since around 300 BCE. The Greeks and Romans would place dead bodies in the wells of their enemies to contaminate their water supply. Often the bodies of dead soldiers were used. To increase the effects of arrow wounds, the tips of the arrows would be dipped into rotting flesh before firing them at the enemy (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d). If they did not die immediately from the arrow wound, they had a greater chance of dying from an infection later. In this way Bioterrorism was used to enhance the effects of conventional warfare.

Since these early incidents, bubonic plague, smallpox, and anthrax have been used as bioterrorism agents. The method of delivery of these agents has varied, but the intention has been the same. Methods of delivery have included catapulting plague infected bodies and heads over city walls and giving smallpox infected blankets as gifts (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.).

Prior to 1870, biological agents were suspected of causing disease, but this theory had not yet been proven. In 1870, Robert Koch proved that biological agents spread disease. He injected anthrax spores into mice and proved that microorganisms for the source of disease. This led to the development of vaccines by Louis Pasteur. In 1882, the first anthrax vaccine was developed and given to farm animals in France to prevent the spread of disease among livestock (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.). The first biological attack of the 20th century involved an incident where German agents infected the horses and mules of Allied troops on the Eastern front. The disease caused several human fatalities before an eradication program could stop the spread of the disease (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.).

In 1940, Japanese planes dropped plague infected fleas in China causing plague epidemics to follow. In 1942, an experiment was carried out by the British military where anthrax spores were dropped into a sheep population on a small island off the coast of Scotland. All of the sheep were dead within 72 hours. The island remained contaminated until 1986. Water and formaldehyde were used to decontaminate the island (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.). Prior to that it was considered uninhabitable, demonstrating the bioterrorism has immediate and long-term effects on the population. In 1942 the U.S. military made 5000 bombs filled with anthrax spores (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.). We do know that the Japanese had plans to drop biological agents on the U.S., but they were unable to develop long-range balloons for the deployment. They planned to use the same methods used against the Chinese to drop plague infected fleas in San Diego (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.).

In 1953, the U.S. began the development of countermeasures against bioterrorism. Vaccines were developed to protect U.S. troops from biological attacks. Since that time, the U.S. has increased efforts to develop countermeasures, should an attack occur. Political measures and diplomacy have attempted to end the threat of the use of biological agents against U.S. citizens. In 1969, President Richard Nixon signed an executive order to cease production and research on biological agents in the United States. This led to the destruction of all biological weapons in the United States in 1972. A Convention on Biological Weapons was held the same year, with signatories from over 140 nations (Dennis, Wang & Suppes, et al., n.d.).

Are We Being Overzealous?

Monitoring for biological agents can only go so far. In light of that, efforts to protect the public have focused on developing a response, should a mass attack occur. The office of homeland security is responsible for developing a warning system and responses, should an attack occur. Unfortunately, the best that we can do is to prepare for a hypothetical scenario, as we do not know what the real scenario might look like. Our best preparation efforts are only as good as our best guess.

Preparation efforts have ranged from public service announcements that instruct the public health how to survive a mass quarantine, a program to distribute vaccines, to other efforts designed to develop a response to a bioagent attack. The threat of an attack using biological agents has created quite a bit of hype in the media and in the public. Like any terrorist attack, it is designed to create the greatest amount of damage, and more importantly, instill the greatest amount of fear and mass hysteria in the remainder the population (Valdes, 2005).

There are some that claim the hysteria caused by the possibility of a biological attack is much more damaging than the attack itself. Like other terrorist attacks, it would be difficult to harm a major portion of the U.S. population with a single attack. A response through vaccines would quickly be initiated, as well as any other means necessary to control the spread of the disease caused by the agent, up to and including quarantine. It is unlikely that the biological agent would spread through the entire population unchecked.

However, the hysteria and fear generated by the attack would spread through the entire population quickly (Valdes, 2005). There are some that say U.S. efforts towards the mitigation of the threat or effects of an attack of a biological agent are a waste of money. They claim that the methods of delivering such an agent are difficult to pull off and that our response to such an attack is so efficient that the threat is greatly reduced. In addition, they claim that are methods of detection are advanced enough that we should be considered paranoid in our efforts to mitigate the threat. The question is if they are right, or if our efforts are not enough in reality, and we need to increase our efforts in the detection and mitigation of the effects of a biological attack on the population.

Biological weapons may be difficult to produce and even more difficult do develop into a form that can be easily dispersed throughout the population. Dumping bacteria into a salad bar will only affect a very small segment of the population. Casualties could range in the 100s or 1000s locally, but as we found out from the SARS epidemic, diseases can quickly spread through vectors that are results of the world in which we live. It is possible for a disease to enter another country through airports from a person that does not yet appear to be ill. Therefore, it is possible for a disease to quickly become out of hand through the vectors of public transportation and public places. The question should not be if we are wasting our money to mitigate a threat that is not real, but rather if we are doing enough to protect the public and possibly the entire global population.

The question is whether preparedness is ever a waste of money. To answer this question, one must refer to the historical record. Bioagents have successfully been used to win wars in the past. The use of bioagents has strong historical precedent, even into recent times. The mass hysteria caused by the use of bioagents is difficult to argue. Even if a small attack were to occur, the impact on the general population would be great. The bombings of the World Trade Towers taught us at least that much. People were affected who are not even involved or near the incident.

Fear and hysteria are the result of a lack of knowledge, or a feeling that one cannot control the situation. From this standpoint, research and development in detection and education regarding what to do in the case of an attack are some of the most valuable defenses. In elementary school we did drills just in case of a fire or other natural disaster. This had the effect of calming the students so that they would proceed in an orderly fashion if the real event were to ever occur. For many, the possibility of a fire was remote in their mindset and many considered it silly. However, in the cases where a fire actually occurred in a school, lives were saved because the students had a plan and did not panic. The same can be said for the U.S. And its intensive effort for preparation in the event of a bioagent attack. If the people are prepared and know what steps will be taken, should it ever occur, the terrorist will not be as likely to succeed in their intended goal of producing panic.

Should a bioagent be used in the United States, as it already was once in the past, the situation can be controlled much more effectively through emergency planning and preparation efforts. If the population knows steps they can take to prevent the spread of the agent and how to protect themselves and their family, the more quickly the situation can be brought under control. This reduces the likelihood of having to use drastic measures like quarantines or shutting down the infrastructure. From this standpoint, any efforts that are undertaken by the government to mitigate the effects of a bioagent attack cannot be considered unreasonable, even under the most liberal of viewpoints. Preparation is the key to the ability to act properly and mitigate risk in the event of any emergency situation, regardless of the cause.