Boot Camp's Program Claim of a 0%

¶ … Boot Camp's Program Claim of a 0% Recidivism Rate Addressing a Boot Camp's Program's Claim of a 0% Recidivism Rate The Claim: A Boot Camp Program Run by a Local Sheriff's Department Claims a Recidivism Rate of 0% My assessment on the accuracy of the above statement and this discussion in general, will make use of a number of fundamental terms: corrective boot camp program, recidivism and shock incarceration.

A corrective boot camp program, to begin with, refers to a facility that makes use of the techniques applied during military training sessions, to instill a culture of 'doing what is right' in youthful first-time offenders. Recidivism, according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2013), is the tendency to repeat criminal activities, leading to re-arrest, during the three-year duration following release from a correctional facility. Finally, shock incarceration, like the name suggests, is a program used on first time offenders, to 'shock' them from recidivism (Cole & Smith, 2007).

In order to assess the accuracy of the statement under evaluation, we need to examine the efficiency of boot camp programs vis-a-vis other correctional sanctions, such as prison sentences. Boot camps, like all other intermediate programs in the system of justice, are formed with the objectives of reducing both the rates of recidivism, and the population in prisons (Jones, 2012). As the author further points out, a number of studies have been conducted to evaluate the efficiency of boot camp programs in meeting these objectives.

Bottcher and Ezell (as cited in Jones, 2012) note that results have since depicted that these programs have been unsuccessful in reducing recidivism, with some facing incidents of participants' abuse. To lay more emphasis on this, Miler, Klas, and Fineout (as cited in Cole, Smith & Dejong, 2012) further point out that there was an uproar from the public following the death of a teenager in the hands of the guards at a juvenile boot camp in Panama.

In addition, Parent (as cited in Cole et al., 2012) notes that the National Institute of Justice carried out an experiment on boot camps, which revealed that they had " failed to reduce recidivism" (p.596). There has not been a notable difference between the participants who graduate from boot camps, and their cohorts who serve their full-time prison sentences (the control group).

Taking the example of the famous LEAD boot camp in California, Jones (2012) points out that 44% of the participant graduates from LEAD got re-arrested within the year following their release, against the control group's 50%. Considering other factors, such as the extra effort and time put into the boot camp program, "the re-arrest and serious crime rates among both groups were hardly distinguishable" (Jones, 2012, p.1). In the light of these past studies, I am of the opinion that the information depicted in the statement above is inaccurate.

In my view, such information could be used to portray a not-so-true image of success, so as to consequently maintain the boot camp's eligibility for government funding. The changes in the behavior of boot camp graduates cannot be fully attributed to their participation in the program, mainly due to the reasons I have discussed in the previous part. Empirical studies have since raised a number of concerns in relation to the failure of boot camp programs to meet their intended objectives.

This next section outlines some of those concerns, which if properly addressed, could see the levels of public confidence rise. The Selection Criteria (Creaming) According to Cole, Smith & Dejong (2012), boot camps have, in the past, been accused of only accepting those offenders that they feel will be successful. The criteria for eligibility for the California LEAD program, for instance, required "non- serious non-violent juvenile court commitment, minimum of age 16 (later reduced to 14), history or risk of substance abuse" (Jones, 2012, p.1).

This technique ultimately results in creaming, as it absorbs those participants that are considered 'receptive', eliminating those with more serious offences (Cole et al., 2012). It may be much easier to change the behavior of these types of offenders, than it would be, to change those convicted of more serious offences. This discriminative selection has hugely contributed to the high levels of public disappointment in boot camp programs, which have been viewed as being more concerned about "their success ratio" (Cole et al., 2012, p.597).

The Program Design The approach adopted in formulating the boot camp program design would, to a large extent, determine the effectiveness of its operations. Lutze (as cited in Travis 2011), is of the view that boot camp programs are mainly designed to exert control and excessive supervision on their participants, which limits their self-development. Cole, Smith & Dejong (2012) further argue that, boot camp programs largely increase, rather than "reduce the control over offenders' lives" (p.597).

LEAD's poorly- produced design, in the opinion of Jones (2012), resulted in the development of contradicting objectives, and, consequently, led to its eventual closure The General Assessment of Risk Technique Assessing the risk factors on a general platform has its share of disadvantages. There need to be policies that ensure different boot camp participants are placed on different effects (Travis, 2011). In Travis' opinion, the application of general strategies to a diverse- participant population could be helpful to a proportion of the population, and harmful to another. There.