Burglary Statute and Case

Burglary Case

Facts

Jimmy Stewart, a renowned Hollywood star, purchased a get-away cabin in western Virginia. Jimmy intended to use the cabin, which was located in the deep woods, at least once per month for long weekends. He assigned an interior designer to buy furniture for his ten rooms and equipped most of the rooms including the kitchen and bedroom. The kitchen had a table and chair as well as cooking and eating utensils while he had a mattress and blankets in one of the rooms. However, Jimmy lost his prestigious status in Hollywood, was broke, and ended up moving to Japan for a sit-com role. Following his move to Japan, Jimmy’s plan to use the cabin each month was never fully realized. After an initial three monthly visits, Jimmy did not use the cabin for two years. Nonetheless, the house still had electricity, water, and some foodstuff in the refrigerator.

Burglars broke into Jimmy’s cabin and stole everything in the basement storage area. The sheriff of the local county had arrested one of the burglars named Black Jack Smith. He was arrested when he attempted to sell some of the furniture stolen from the house at a local police bazaar. He was charged and convicted of burglary under Code Ann. § 18.2-89 (1950). Through his attorney, Swifty Lazaar, Black Jack appealed the court’s ruling grounds that Jimmy’s cabin was not a dwelling house.

Issue

Should Jimmy’s cabin, at the time of the burglary, be considered a dwelling house pursuant to Code § 18.2-89?

Analogous Case

In Giles v. Commonwealth (2009), the court held that a house is regarded as a dwelling house, under Code § 18.2-89, when it is used for habitation including periodic habitation. Moreover, the court argues that the burglary statute had no frequency requirement, which implies that a house does not need to be physically inhabited on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis in order to be considered a dwelling house under this statute.

In this case, Defendant Christopher Lee Giles was convicted of breaking and entering Mr. Thornton’s house to steal. Mr. Thornton used the house as a vacation home after inheriting it from his mother three months prior to the break-in. Upon appeal, the appellate court upheld the ruling of the circuit court, which found Giles guilty of burglary and sentenced him to 20 years in prison based on the burglary statute. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which upheld the Court of Appeals’ ruling. The Supreme Court of Virginia found that the Court of Appeals did not make a mistake in upholding the circuit court’s decision. The Supreme Court argued that the Commonwealth presented adequate evidence to prove the habitation of the house since Mr. Thornton intended to use it for habitation purposes albeit periodic habitation. The lack of a frequency requirement in the burglary statute was adequate enough to warrant the defendant’s burglary conviction.

Application

As evident in Giles v. Commonwealth (2009), the two components in the burglary statute used to determine whether a house is a dwelling place to determine a burglary case are habitation and burglary. These were the two factors used to examine and determine the legal issue in the case. Similarly, the issue under this case requires examining habitation purposes and burglary incident. In this case, the issue of the break-in is not in dispute similar to the analogous case. In the appeal, Black Jack does not challenge the break-in/burglary. This implies that it can be concluded that the burglary took place and Black Jack participated in it.

Secondly, habitation is a major factor under Code § 18.2-89 in the determination of what constitutes a dwelling house. Based on this statute, the first component in determining a dwelling house is when it is used for habitation. Jimmy bought the cabin with the intention of using it for habitation purposes. His intention for use for habitation is evident in the fact that he intended to visit it each month and equipped it fully. Jimmy’s intention was to use the cabin for periodic habitation. Under Code § 18.2-89, periodic habitation is sufficient for a house to be considered a dwelling house. In addition, the burglary statute does not have a frequency requirement for habitation in order for a house to be considered a dwelling house. So, it does not matter whether Jimmy used the house daily, weekly, or monthly. Therefore, the frequency of use is not a requirement to determine whether Jimmy’s cabin was a dwelling house.