The Fourteenth Amendment and substantive due process in Lochner and Nebbia

Slaughterhouse Cases, Takings Clause

PART I Slaughterhouse Cases

198 U.S. 45 Lochner v New York 1904 (Oyez, 2013)

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Joseph Lochner

The People of the State of New York

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FACTS -- Lochner was convicted but he appealed to the Supreme Court and argued that the bakery labor law interfered with an employee's liberty to contract as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.. The employee has the right to substantive due process of law.

A state law did not allow workers in the bakery business to work longer than 60 hours a week, willingly or not. Is this law consistent with the 14th Amendment? If so, which should prevail -- the citizens' right to contract the length of work hours or the state's right to control work hours?

ARGUMENT -- In a 5-4 decision, Justice Rufus Peckham ruled the Bakeshop Act was unconstitutional and reversed Lochner's conviction. The Bakeshop Act was an absolute interference t the employee and employer's right to contract. Justice Peckham declared the right to contract as part of the liberty of the individual, which is guaranteed and protected by the 14th Amendment. The Amendment's Due Process Clause prevents the State from depriving an individual of life, liberty or property without due process. The individual right to sell or buy labor is protected by the Amendment. In addition, the bakery industry, unlike the mining industry, was not an unhealthy trade that must be subjected to the state's police powers (Oyez).

291 U.S. 502 1934

HUGHES COURT

Nebbia v New York (LII, 2013; Oyez, 2013)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FACTS -- Nebbia, a store owner, was convicted for selling milk below the set minimum retail price of 9 cents. New York legislators perceived the critical state of milk at that time as leading farmers to cut the prices of milk among distributors. The legislators thus passed the Act to regulate milk prices.

ISSUE -- Was this Act constitutional? Did it violate the 14th Amendment, as in the Lochner's case?

ARGUMENT -- . The objective of the Act is to prevent competition from destroying the wholesale price structure of a product on which farmers depended for their livelihood as well assuring the community's continued supply of milk. The Court determined that the guarantee of due process requires that the law is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and that the means to attain it shall be genuinely and substantially related to the object. The State's police power is intended to assure the public good. But the public good does not seem at risk in this particular case. Lochner's case would not allow the government to interfere with the private contract between employer and employee. But that interference was warranted if the contract affected public interest. The Court ruled that the Act was not a regulation and price controls were not "arbitrary, discriminatory" r clearly irrelevant in affecting general welfare. As such, it was consistent with the Constitution (Oyez, LII).

372 U.S. 726 1963

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

Ferguson v Skrupa (Oyez, 2013)

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

FACTS -- Under a Kansas statute, engaging in the business of debt adjusting was a misdemeanor, except when it was incident to the lawful practice of law. This statute was challenged as a violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14h Amendment. Debt adjusting means coming to an agreement with a debtor who pays a person engaged in credit adjusting to distribute the money to creditors according to a set plan. States have the power to legislate against what it considers injurious practices in the commercial and business affairs of their jurisdiction, as long as there is no conflict between specific federal constitutional prohibits or some other valid federal law.

ISSUE -- Did the Kansas status violate the Due Process Clause of the Constitution?

ARGUMENT -- A state legislature can do what it sees fit unless restrained by an express provision in the Constitution or the State itself. The Courts should not extend the prohibition beyond their intended and obvious meaning. The doctrine applied to Lochner and other similar cases has been superseded by a return to the original Constitutional proposition. This was that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment reached by legislative bodies the people elect to pass laws. Legislative bodies possess the broad scope over economic problems. States have the power to legislate against whatever they find injurious to their internal commercial and business affairs as long as their laws do not violate specific Constitutional provision (Oyez).

Importance of the Cases and Evolution of the Case Law

Dissent in Lochner v New York reasoned that it used its best judgment in protecting bakers' health and safety hazards and that the U.S. Supreme Court may not overturn the State's decision on its police power (Oyez, 2013; Mellor & Bullock, 2013; Lurie, 2003). In reversing the verdict, the Supreme Court ruled that the law does not involve the safety of the baker and no causal link existed between work hours and the quality of the product. This case inaugurated the Lochner era, during which the Supreme Court rendered many other decisions invalidating federal and State statutes on work hours during the Progressive Era and the Great Depression. It ended with the West Coast Hotel v Parrish when it rejected the Lochner position and adopted a rational basis for State and federal commerce (Oyez, Mellor & Bullock, Lurie).

In Nebbia v New York, the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict of the Hughes Court and ruled that neither property nor contract rights were absolute and that the decision did not violate due process (Oyez, 2013; Mellor & Bullock, 2013; Lurie, 2003). Dissenting justices reasoned that fixing the price of milk was not within legislative power. Since the Munn v Illinois decision in 1877, the Supreme Court consistently ruled against State control of private enterprise. But this present case removed that distinction for good (Oyez, Mellor & Bullock, Lurie)

And the Supreme Court as a body was unanimous in reversing the conviction in Ferguson v Skrupa (Oyez, 2013; Mellor & Bullock, 2013; Lurie, 2003). It decided that the statute did not violate the due process of law. Kansas had the right to regulate debt adjusting. The wisdom of the law was legislative rather than judicial (Oyez, Lurie, Mellor & Bullock).

Pennsylvania Coal

This involved a regulation by the Pennsylvania legislature to prohibit coal mining under streets, houses and places of public assembly (UMKC, 2005). The coal company held many mineral rights to properties in northeast Pennsylvania and had sold rights to others. The company said that a taking had occurred as it could no longer mine the coal. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that, while property may be regulated, regulation is subject to compensation when regulation went too far. However, no compensation was order and the law was viewed as invalid. The Court analyzed the principle of substantive due process as applicable to the case (UMCK).

First Zoning Cases

Two of the four cases, which were filed around the time of Pennsylvania Coal, were significant as they involved the new land use regulatory technique, called "zoning (UMKC, 2005)." In Village Euclid v Amber Reality Company 272 U.S. 365 in 1926, the Court favored the general zoning ordinance against substantive due process challenges. But it found the zoning ordinance invalid in the case of Nectow v City of Cambridge 277 U.S. 183 in 1928. Both were considered substantive due process cases, as substantive due process analysis was applied. For almost five decades, the U.S. Supreme Court did not take a land regulatory case but left out its substantive due process analysis. Yet all the four land use cases decided between 1926 and 1928 undertook a substantive due process analysis, not a Takings Clause (UMKC).

The Penn Central Transportation Factors

The U.S. Supreme Court applied the Takings analysis used on Pennsylvania Coal on the Penn Central Transportation Co. v New York City 438 U.S. 104 in 1978 in determining if the local government exceeded its power in the case (UMC, 2005). It enumerated three factors by which this could be done. The most important of these factors was the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant, in particular, the extent to which the regulation interfered with "distinct investment-backed expectations." Furthermore, the factor of the "character of government action" was significant. It had to be decided if that action amounted to a physical invasion or only affects property interests through some kind of public program, which adjusted economic benefits and burdens in promoting common good. These were viewed as relevant in determining whether a taking had indeed occurred (UMKC).

Kelo's Case and Public Use

The power of eminent domain empowers the government to seize private property for "public use" if that displaced property compensates the owner according to fair market value (UMKC, 2005). The Courts' common perception on public use pertained to broad public ownership, use by the public or for public benefit or advantage. In Kelo v City of New London 125 S. Ct 2655 on June 23, 2005, the issue was whether the use of eminent domain only for the economic development was a valid public use. The City created an economic development corporation to redevelop a former military facility in the area. As a result, the location turned into a research facility used by private entities. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the State Supreme Court as both constitutional and consistent with State law. The Supreme Court carefully emphasized the importance of connecting the power of eminent domain with a community's comprehensive plan. The determining factors in the verdict were then, the comprehensive character of the plan and the thorough deliberation before its adoption (UMKC).