Chain of Command
In Vietnam, the rules of engagement were designed to limit the impact of operations in select areas (most notably: North Vietnam). This is because there were concerns that the conflict could escalate. If this were to happen, it was believed that the Soviet Union or China could be drawn into the war. To prevent this and destroy the North's ability to fight, the policy concentrated on: annihilating their supply lines, command / control centers and training South Vietnamese forces to defend themselves. To fully understand how this took place, there will be an emphasis on the limited war ideology and its various assumptions for the six levels of command. Together, these elements will highlight the impact of this policy and its long-term effects. ("Effects of Restrictive Rules," 1995) (Lewy, 1978)
Soldiers in the field: In the field, the ROE became more restrictive as the war continued. This is because there were concerns about civilian casualties. As time went by these directives were continually changing to reflect...
For soldiers, this made it difficult for them to engage the enemy offensively. At the same time, the South Vietnamese did not have to follow these guidelines. When this happens, it resulted in a decrease in morale and the kinds of operations that U.S. forces were involved in. ("Effects of Restrictive Rules," 1995) (Lewy, 1978)
Battalion commanders: In the case of battalion commanders, these policies meant that they were seeing greater casualties. Moreover, different operations were sent into areas where there was no strategic military value. Instead, battles were taking place that were costing considerable amounts of lives (with no clear objectives that were achieved). This made it difficult to command forces and protect personnel. ("Effects of Restrictive Rules," 1995) (Lewy, 1978)
Division commanders: The division commanders were facing substantial challenges in determining how to engage and peruse the enemy. This is because the ROE prohibited forces from entering critical areas (such…
