Closing GITMO Can It Be Done

Analysis of Selected Guantanamo Bay Case Studies

Question 1 (CLOs 5-6 and 10-14):

Although multiple factors were involved, President Obama’s inability to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility (GITMO) despite signing an executive order to do so on his first day in office can be attributed to a confluence of key factors. For instance, while there was initially bipartisan support for closing GITMO, Congress soon became a major obstacle, raising concerns about the security risks of transferring detainees to the United States and the potential for their release. Indeed, the foundational purpose of GITMO was to provide a secure location outside the borders “under complete U.S. control to hold, interrogate, and assess suspected terror suspects without any interference from a host government” (p. 401). Moreover, legislation was subsequently passed prohibiting the transfer of detainees to U.S. soil, effectively blocking Obama’s plan to relocate them to domestic prisons (Gvosdev, 2009).

Furthermore, finding countries willing to accept the transfer of detainees proved extremely challenging. Many nations were reluctant to take in individuals deemed high-risk or faced domestic political opposition to doing so. This made it difficult to find suitable locations to send the detainees, leaving them essentially stranded at GITMO. Compounding the issue was the continued active involvement of the United States military in Afghanistan and other counterterrorism operations, which led to the capture of new detainees, thereby further complicating efforts to wind down operations at the facility.

The legal status of detainees and the rules governing their detention were also highly complex and contested, with disagreements over whether they should be tried in civilian or military courts and concerns about the admissibility of evidence obtained through enhanced interrogation techniques. These legal hurdles continue to represent significant obstacles to the closure process.

As the efforts to achieve the closure of GITMO dragged on, Obama faced increasing political opposition from Republicans and some Democrats concerned about the security implications of closing GITMO. This opposition made it harder to garner the necessary support for alternative detention plans. Ultimately, the combination of congressional opposition, difficulty in relocating detainees, ongoing military operations, legal complexities, and mounting political resistance created a perfect storm of obstacles that derailed Obama’s efforts to close GITMO despite his initial determination to do so (Gvosdev, 2009). In sum, the most influential factors were the Congressional opposition and the difficulty in relocating detainees. This constraint, combined with the ongoing military operations and legal complexities, created a perfect storm of obstacles that ultimately derailed President Obama’s efforts to close GITMO despite his executive order to this effect.

Question 2 (CLOs 5-6 and 15-18):

As the commanding officer of Guantanamo Bay and Deputy Commander of JTF-160, my highest priority is ensuring the safe, secure, and humane detention of detainees brought to this facility, the oldest overseas U.S. military base commonly known today as “GITMO.” In addition, it was also my core responsibility as command officer to ensure that everyone at GITMO supported this command philosophy (Navigating a new course to command excellence, n.d.). When I assumed command, these issues were among my highest priorities since they required resolution swiftly yet thoroughly, since America’s counterterrorism actions are under strict scrutiny by the international community. The desired outcome of my command was an organized, properly resourced, legally compliant facility upholding U.S. values while respecting detainee rights.

Addressing this gap, it was anticipated that multiple logistical challenges were involved in rapidly transforming existing infrastructure into a suitable detention facility for high-profile suspects. Resources such as personnel, supplies and upgraded structures were invariably limited at first. As Buehn and Shimkus (2023) emphasize, “There was no money for any extras at ‘GTMO’ [w]hen CAPT Boone took command in the spring of 2000 [and] it looked like the next phase in the life of US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay would be a modest one indeed” (pp. 1-2).

Likewise, resistance from stakeholders such as human rights groups, legal experts, and some within government will likely surface regarding detainee treatment and operation legalities. In addition, profound cultural differences, language barriers and detainee psychological states pose further challenges to achieving the above-stated outcome. In order to mitigate friction, I inculcated an organizational culture throughout the command that prioritized open communication with all stakeholders while also maintaining operational security. This focus on organizational culture required a sustained top-down approach to prevent complacency or assumptions from derailing our progress towards achieving this outcome (Schein, 2017). This approach is also congruent with the guidance provided by Hoar et al. (2022) who advise, “The U.S. government should align peacetime responsibilities across agencies [to] enable the rapid coordination of all relevant instruments of national power to achieve a desired effect” (para. 7).

Indeed, notwithstanding the constant need for vigilance and security, it is reasonable to suggest that the extent to which operations at GITMO lack transparency will be the extent to which already close scrutiny by the international community is further intensified. Likewise, fully engaging legal experts and human rights groups will help to ensure strict adherence to ethical and legal standards. In addition, coordinating with DOD and agencies can help secure needed resources and support, but the ongoing provision of comprehensive training for all personnel on cultural awareness, detainee rights and protocols is essential.