Combat supply support communications and information systems requirements for logisticians

Combat Supply Support Communications and Information Systems Requirements for Future Logisticians

The only thing worse in war other than "having to fight with allies is having to fight without allies."

Winston Churchill during World War II)

The purpose of this study is to examine the coalition partnership between Australia and the United States in regards to the requirements of combat supply communications and information systems requirements for future logisticians.

The work of Colonel Patrick J. Dulin states that it is stated that a commented made by Winston Churchill during World War II was that the only thing worse in war other than "having to fight with allies is having to fight without allies." (2002) Furthermore, it is also stated that General Omar Bradley, during the very same conflict stated: "Logistics were the lifeblood of the allied armies." (Dulin, 2002) Coalition forces are of integral importance to U.S. operations that are based in other countries and other areas of the world. This work explores the coalition forces agreement as it presently exists between the United States and the government of Australia.

LIMITATIONS

The limitations of this study are the short time allotted for research and the availability of materials which to review for this study.

I. TECHNOLOGICAL/CAPABILITY GAP

There is a technological and capability gap existing between the United States and its coalition forces. The work of Engler, Gladowski and Lee entitled: "Coalition Operations: Politically Necessary Yet Operationally Challenging" states: "The fact that the United States will continue to conduct military operations with collation partners is a given. What makes this endeavor operationally challenging is the fact that the United States has a significant technological military capability and an overwhelming defense budget by international standards." (2004) This work relates that spending is known to be short in terms of technology and information systems on the part of coalition forces and that the issues of interoperability and capability will continue to present challenges for "quite some time." (Engler, Gladowswki and Lee, 2004) Engler, Gladowski and Lee note the technology gap that exists operationally between the capability of the U.S. forces and coalition forces. The gap is in actuality one described as "more a capabilities gap than a technological one" in the work entitled: "Transatlantic Interoperability in Defense Industries: How the U.S. And Europe Could Better Cooperate in Coalition Military Operations" (2003) However, it is held in other reports that the gap is in technology is one of the nature that "even the most advanced NATO allies have not been able to keep up with the multiple U.S. Army digitization plans." (Zaninni and Morrison, 2000) Evidence for the impact this gap has on the operations of U.S. forces was demonstrated in the Gulf War which, according to Engler, Gladowski and Lee a geographic separation of the smallest of coalitions with the British taking the southeastern sector of Iraq and U.S. forces concentrating on the remainder. The reasons for that arrangement have yet to emerge from the classified reports, but capability gaps due to technological differences in communication equipment, inter alia, are likely to be one of the major aspects. If the United States can't operate effectively in a coalition with its NATO allies, working closely with other nations will only become even more challenging." (2004) the gap has only grown since September 11, 2001.

Zannini and Morrison (2000) hold that the gap in technology that "characterized past operations will continue to grow." The gap began with differences in spending that took place in the 1980s. The following chart illustrates the defense budget spending patterns of the U.S. And NATO Europe between 1980 and 2001.

NATO Europe Defense Budget Spending vs. U.S. Defense Budget Spending

Source: Engler, Gladowski and Lee (2004)

Engler, Gladowski and Lee state: "Some huge differences in defense spending and technological advances of U.S. historical coalition partners have been noted; these differences have manifested themselves several ways both during preconflict planning and during the fray. Without going into each coalition-involved operation, some lessons can be proven to be cross-cutting in nature." (2004) Stated as the 'key shortfalls' that were identified on a repeated basis for Desert Storm, Bosnia and Kosovo operations were those of:

communications;

command and control;

precision strike;

intelligence;

surveillance and reconnaissance; and logistic/life capabilities. (Engler, Gladowski and Lee, 2004)

Engler, Gladowski and Lee relate that used in the endeavor of force planning and execution monitoring for U.S. air operations is done using the Contingency Theater Air Planning System (CTAPS) and the follow-on Theater Battle Management Core System (TBMCS). NATO has developed the Interim CAOC Capability (ICC) for force-level planning, with a planned follow-on to the Air Command and Control System. Neither of the NATO systems was developed with interoperability with U.S. systems in mind, and the current ICC was built to control from 200 to 1,000 sorties per day, compared to CTAP's 3,000 sorties per day. " (2004)

Reported in the work of Engler, Gladowski and Lee (2004) are two partnership projects between the United States and Australia. The first of these is the Joint Training Facility which is planned to be established in Australia with the goals of refining operational aspects and interoperability between their armed forces." This initiative is stated to include "pre-positioning of stores and equipment in Australia to aid the U.S. strategic intention of rapid force projection capability." (Bostock, 2004) the second joint initiative was reported by the Australian Minister of Defense who stated that a memorandum of understanding (MOU) will be signed in the United States establishing a framework for cooperation. Engler, Gladowski and Lee (2004) report: "Expected within the initiative is the construction of three air warfare destroyers (AWDs) for the Royal Australian Navy. The initial capability for these ships will be initial identification and tracking of ballistic missiles. This information would be transmitted to U.S. Navy ships able to intercept and destroy missiles in flight. Future enhancements would give Royal Australian Navy ships identification, tracking, and engagement capability through the long-range Standard SM-3 ship-based theater defense missile. Capabilities of the Missile Defense System are inclusive of the following capabilities:

intelligence systems to detect preparations for missile launches;

sensors to detect missile launches;

tracking systems and sensors to discriminate decoys from warheads;

mobile launchers for short-range or boost phase interceptors;

space, sea or land-based launchers for mid-course interceptors;

home-based launchers for terminal interceptors;

range of weapons, such as explosive, kinetic (high speed) and laser weapons; and command and control systems. (Australian Department of Defense, 2004)

II. IMPROVING COALITION LOGISTICS

In order to improve coalition logistics there are several areas of logistics that must be factored into that which must be improved. According to Dulin (2002) improvement of coalition logistics begins with: (1) acquisition logistics; and (2) Tactical and operational logistics. Specifically stated by Dulin (2002) is the following: "Coalition partners' requirements most often are reflected in a narrow, regional interoperability focus; for example, potential coalition partners from a tropical area will have little need for interoperability with equipment under development for cold weather operations. Furthermore, even for a single region, a program cannot accommodate every potential coalition partner. There simply is not that much discretionary funding available in any program. Thus, the managers of an acquisition program require even greater discernment to identify those countries that are the most likely future coalition partners within any one region (in other words, a regional priority scheme). In short, the present acquisition logistics process simply does not provide a coalition advocate to identify an intraregional priority of potential coalition partners and to identify interoperability standards for poorer coalition partners" (Dulin, 2002) Presently the countries of Thailand, Australia, and the United States are participating in the "CTL ACTD. PACOM's staunch advocacy role for potential coalition partners as a regional CINC is critical to the success of CTL ACTD. By developing a mechanism that enables potential but less sophisticated partners to participate in coalition operations, PACOM enables formerly disenfranchised countries to effectively lend support. Essentially, PACOM's example constitutes my recommendation to alleviate the command and control friction point by exploiting lessons learned from the CTL ACTD and by further expanding the CINCs' roles as advocates for potential coalition partners in their regions." (Dulin, 2002) Recommendations stated by Dulin include the following three recommendations which are focused on elimination of the three major points of friction identified by Dulin as the following: (1) lack of an advocate to push coalition interoperability; (2) Lack of a uniform exportable set of command and control procedures; and (3) Lack of a mechanism for allocation of burden-sharing liabilities for funding.

These three all are stated by Dulin (2002) to revolves around two primary and central themes of: (1) increasing the involvement of the regional CINCs; and (2) obtaining additional funding and burden-sharing. Finally, Dulin (2002) ultimately recommends enhancement of both time and money in terms of the commitments made toward building of coalitions.

III. MODERNIZATION, INTEGRATION and STANDARDIZATION

Of primary importance, regarding coalition forces information systems and technology standardization and integration is the modernization of intelligence processes, security, information operations and assurance and critical infrastructure protection. In the 1999 report of William Cohen to the U.S. President and U.S. Congress reveals that the strategic vision sets out what the United States has on its agenda to accomplish in relation to technological and logistical strategies. Included in these strategies are modernization of intelligence processes as well as security, information operations, information assurance, and critical infrastructure protection. In a 2004 Department of Defense Submission - Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Inquiry into Australian-United States Defense Relations' report, it is stated that the alliance, now ongoing for approximately fifty-three years between the United States and Australia "has never been closer." (2004) it is stated that the ANZUS Treaty provides "shape, depth and weight to the Australia-U.S. alliance and remains today the foundation of a relationship that is one of our greatest national assets." (Cohen, 2004) the continued commitment of the United States to the Asia Pacific is stated to be strongly supported by Australia.

In terms of issues of 'interoperability', two centric themes are "shaping the way forward for U.S. -Australia interoperability: (1) experience of recent military operations; and (2) transformation - reshaping warfighting concepts and capabilities. (Cohen, 2004) it is held in this work that the U.S. And Australian forces "work especially well together." (Cohen, 2004) Additionally stated by Cohen is: "Bilateral exercises with the U.S. provide excellent training opportunities for both the ADF and U.S. forces in high-intensity coalition operations. Exercise participation helps establish the fundamentals of interoperability such as the connectivity of our communication and data systems, and an appreciation of our approach to issues such as rules of engagement. Importantly, our performance in major joint exercises builds confidence within the U.S. that we are a capable coalition partner. The strong relationship built by these activities has permitted Australia to integrate effectively and efficiently with U.S. forces in coalition operations." (2004)

Cohen additionally related in the 2004 report that the sharing defense intelligence relationship that exists between the U.S. And Australia is "critical to our defense and security and further serves to considerably enhance the Defense ability in meeting the needs of decision-makers in government and customers who are operational. Cohen states: "At the strategic level, as well as at the operational and tactical levels, Australia and the U.S. have engaged in intelligence sharing activities, to mutual benefit. This has most recently been demonstrated during military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where intelligence sharing between Australia and the U.S. directly contributed to the success of those operations, and during which the U.S. provided Australia unprecedented access to intelligence and intelligence systems. The same level of intelligence cooperation has also underpinned our shared efforts in the global war against terrorism." (2004) Cohen states that while Australia is a major consumers of services there is in reality no 'indigenous space capabilities as the investment needed to support an indigenous capability can not be justified. As space systems are critical to civilian and military functions, Australian dependence upon foreign systems and particularly U.S. systems is therefore inevitable." (2004) Cohen relates that it is top priority among Australian government leaders to adhere to the standards of interoperability between the U.S. And Australian forces.

The Australian government is "vigorously pursuing initiatives" that will enable Australian industries to work cooperatively and competitively with the defense industry in the United States. Cohen states: "In a changed strategic environment where the threats of terrorism and WMD have added a new dimension to the security challenges that we face, the importance of our alliance with the United States to our defense and security cannot be over stated. For Australia, continued engagement with the U.S. will support our defense capabilities and play a critical role in maintaining strategic stability in the region as a whole. For the U.S., Australia will remain a key ally with many shared values and interests, a close partner in regional security efforts and a significant potential contributor to coalitions." (2004)

The United States is held to be the largest developer and manufacturer in the world of high technology defense capabilities." This causes the cooperation between defense industries of every country a matter of critical importance for Australia and specifically in the industrial cooperation of defense sector supports as follows:

interoperability between Australian and U.S. forces;

Strategic sourcing for Australian and U.S. forces;

Industrial efficiency and innovation in the respective defense industry sectors; and the scale and leverage essential to supporting self-reliance in Australian defense industries, which, in global terms are relatively small and concentrated in specialized capabilities. (Australian Department of Defense, 2004)

Recent gains made in the Australian defense industry due to participation in the multilateral Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program and in the bilateral programs associated with the Nulka Anti-Ship Missile Decoy, the Metal Strom electronic ballistics technology, Heavy Weight Torpedoes, the Wundurra future soldier program, and the Collins combat system." (Australian Department of Defense, 2004) Impediments that stand as barriers to the participation of Australia in the U.S. defense market are stated to include commercial aspects that "reflect the different size and structures of the respective defense sectors." (Australian Department of Defense, 2004) Stated as a key set of initiatives that Australia is, concentrating on presently includes those, which will "open the way for more effective communications and logistics, training and education." (Australian Department of Defense, 2004)

The country of Australia is heavily reliant on the collaboration of science between the United States and Australia in leveraging resources, accessing technology and in assessing unique facilities and to enable scientific development and exploitation.. It is stated that the total value derived by Australia "from these arrangements is: "... that the Australian Defense Organization, derives from these arrangements is very substantial, and is probably worth several hundred million dollars per year. Because collaboration is conducted on a reciprocal basis, the U.S. would derive a similar return from these arrangements." (Australian Department of Defense, 2004)

It is related that the primary bilateral agreement of collaboration that Australia and the U.S. have entered into is the R&D defense "Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Australia concerning Co-operative and Collaborative Research, Development and Engineering which is also known as the Deutch -Ayers Agreement. " (Australian Department of Defense, 2004) There are many projects under this agreement and it is stated in 2004, when this report was written that nineteen projects were under the agreement at that time which included the 'Electronic Warfare Self-Protection Equipment' research and development initiative and the 'Mutual Weapons Development Data Exchange Agreement' covering the exchange of technical information between Australia and the United States. Stated to be the most significant of all multilateral defense scientific international arrangements between Australia and the United States is 'The Technical Cooperation Program' (TTCP) which is an international program involving collaborative exchange of defense and scientific information as well as "harmonization and alignment, and shared research activities between the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand." (Australian Department of Defense, 2004)