Policy Recommendation in Combating Terrorism Policy Project Part 1: Project outline

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government and the international community reviewed typologies for the financing of transnational terrorism and examined ways to combat such financing. Unfortunately, evidence indicates that al Qaeda and other terrorist groups apparently affiliated with or inspired by al Qaeda have worked quite economically, using low-budget methods to operate. After reviewing two typologies, this part of the paper discusses applicable legal mechanisms for preventing and prosecuting the financing of transnational terrorist networks and considers proposals for improving the effectiveness of efforts to combat foreign-affinity terrorist financing (Reuter & Truman, 2004; Carter, 2008).

Typologies

The evolving effects of globalization and the transnational nature of terrorism have combined to create almost limitless possibilities for terrorists looking to finance operations (Sheppard, 2008). One problem with combating terrorist financing is that many forms of terrorism -- such as suicide bombings (Cesari, 2009) require minimal financial resources. Terrorists often self-finance such attacks by working and/or borrowing from their immediate families. In addition, the bulk of the money may come from legitimate or quasi-legitimate sources. Anti-money-laundering laws have a negligible chance of detecting terrorist financing activities under a regulatory framework built for different purposes (Neal, 2008). Hence, the first typology describes a legal income source, a relief organization in the Middle East. In the second typology, foreign-affinity terrorist groups perpetrate crimes in order to generate money (Weisman, 2015).

Enforcement authorities working to deny potential terrorists access to financial resources must contend with the problem of "fresh faces," especially ones without criminal records or with legitimate academic credentials. Intelligence agencies often have no information linking these "fresh faces" (Gupta, 2011). to terrorist organizations or other criminal connections. Considering the dynamic efforts surrounding terrorist groups, the number of new and unknown faces may be very large (Viles, 2011). The absence of knowledge about potential new terrorists, the extremely small amount of resources they use, and the self-generation of funds, including legitimate funds to conduct their activities, impose severe limitations on potential legal means to deny such groups or individuals financing (Negroponte, 2010; Cesari, 2009).

3. Legal Income Typology -- Relief Organization in the Middle East

According to a state department report, the Financial Crimes Center (FinCEN) of the U.S. Department of Treasury identified 649 suspicious activity reports (SARs) that seven U.S. depository institutions filed during a three and-a-half-year period (Sheppard, 2008). These reports involved transactions worth $9 million involving structured cash deposits and deposits of business, payroll, and Social Security benefit checks. Within one or two days of deposits, the funds were transmitted to a company in the Middle East. Thirty-seven individuals were involved in the deposit and wire transfer activity, conducting transactions through 44 accounts on behalf of four businesses (Reuter & Truman, 2004). Two of the businesses were wire remittance companies. One was described as a relief organization at the same location as one of the wire remittance businesses. The fourth undescribed business, located in the Middle East, was the beneficiary of the wire transfer activity. The majority of the wire transfers went to two accounts in the Middle East. Other wire transfers were made to accounts at three different banks in foreign locations (Andreas, 2013; Alexander & Musch, 2012). The majority of the transactions (83%) were structured; that is, they were arranged to fall below the $10,000 threshold that triggers reporting requirements. The deposit amounts ranged from $350 to $636,790. Most deposits were between $2,000 and $8,000 (Viles, 2011; Cole, 2015).

3. Illegal Income Typology -- Cigarette Smuggling

Individuals or groups often engage in common criminal activities, using the proceeds to fund terrorist groups. In May 2002, two men were convicted in Charlotte, North Carolina, of providing, and conspiring to provide, material support to the Palestinian group Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization (Sheppard, 2008). The criminal group engineered an interstate cigarette tax evasion scheme whereby inexpensive cigarettes from North Carolina were transported to and then sold in Michigan to avoid the latter state's higher taxes. Profits from the operation were sent to Hezbollah. International law enforcement authorities have discovered that cigarette smuggling networks can produce enormous profits. Additionally, cigarette trafficking is often the precursor to other types of contraband smuggling, including weapons and narcotics smuggling (Weinberg, et al. 2015).

The investigation started when a deputy sheriff working part-time at a large tobacco wholesaler in North Carolina noticed the same individuals buying...

These individuals drove vehicles with out-of-state license plates. Federal, state, and local authorities began a joint investigation. Surveillance of the suspects revealed a large-scale cigarette smuggling ring involving the use of tobacco storefront operations in North Carolina to justify the large purchases and bulk sale of cigarettes. Based on the surveillance, authorities obtained search warrants for the subjects' businesses and residences (Negroponte, 2010). Utilizing the warrants, law enforcement officials seized photos of the subjects counting large amounts of cash, a Hezbollah banner, a Hezbollah propaganda video of suicide bombers, and materials showing the involvement of some of the suspects with military training and/or operations. During the searches, law enforcement found a receipt from a Hezbollah leader for money received from the smuggling ring (Cole, 2015). The search turned up a number of false identification documents for the subjects. Additional evidence showed that the criminal group intended to buy a variety of items for Hezbollah, including night vision devices, radios and receivers, and metal detection devices (Alexander & Musch, 2012). In the end, 25 individuals were charged with various offenses, including material support to a terrorist organization, money laundering, conspiracy, bank fraud, credit card fraud, and visa entry fraud. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms played a large role during the initial stages of the investigation. The FBI contributed during the later stages by helping to develop the link to a terrorist organization (Weinberg, et al. 2015).
Executive Order 13224

Bush issued Executive Order 13224 under the IEEPA, section 5 of the UN Participation Act of 1945, as amended, (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003) and section 301 of title 3, U.S. Code. Bush also cited as legal bases UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1214 of December 8, 1998, UNSCR 1267 of October 15, 1999, UNSCR 1333 of December 19, 2000, and multilateral sanctions contained therein, and UNSCR 1363 of July 30, 2001, establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1333 (Zagaris, December 2002; Carter, 2008).

Because many of the groups and individuals operate primarily overseas and have little money in the United States, the United States has been notifying foreign governments that do not freeze or block terrorists' ability to access funds in foreign accounts and share information that the U.S. government has the authority to freeze their bank's assets and transactions in the United States (Zagaris, December 2002). Legally the executive order authorizes this action by empowering "persons determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General," and "after such consultation, if any, with foreign authorities as the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, deems appropriate, in the exercise of his discretion" (Reuter & Truman, 2004). The following persons are subject to the blocking order:

1. foreign persons determined by the Secretary of State to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;

2. persons determined by the Secretary of Treasury to be owned or controlled by, or to act for or on behalf of any persons listed under the Order or any other persons determined to be subject to it (Andreas, 2013; Alexander & Musch, 2012);

3. persons determined by the Secretary of Treasury to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or technological support for, or financial or other services to or in support of, such acts of terrorism or those persons listed under the Order or determined to be subject to it (Zagaris, December 2002);

4. persons determined by the Secretary of Treasury to be otherwise associated with those persons listed under the Order or determined to be subject to it. (Negroponte, 2010)

The executive order's other principal prohibitions include

1. no transaction or dealing by U.S. persons (including their overseas branches, but not their foreign subsidiaries) or within the United States in blocked property (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013);

2. prohibition against U.S. persons or persons in the United States from evading or avoiding, or attempting to evade or avoid any of the Order's prohibitions (Negroponte, 2010);

3. prohibition against any conspiracy to violate any of the Order's prohibitions;

4. prohibition against donations intended to relieve human suffering to persons listed under the Order or determined to be subject to it (Viles, 2011; Cole, 2015).

Practically speaking, the new terrorist sanctions largely overlap existing U.S. terrorist sanctions administered by OFAC, i.e., the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (31 CFR Part 595) and the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Regulations (31 CFR Part 597) (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003). Under the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, OFAC has…