Only the Eighth Amendment truly applies to the post-conviction treatment of a criminal defendant, by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. There is nothing about being confronted with victim impact statements that is either cruel or unusual. When committing a crime, it is certainly reasonable for society to expect a criminal to understand that their actions will impact people. In addition, there is nothing in this provision of the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment that infringes upon a defendant's right to confront his accuser; these hearings occur post-conviction and are all related to some form of early release, which would relieve a defendant of some portion of his sentence. The fourth element of the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment provides that decisions in criminal cases duly consider the victims' safety, right to restitution, and interest in avoiding an unreasonable delay in the criminal proceedings. This provision does not threaten a defendant's constitutional rights; in fact, it is merely a codification of the procedures currently applied by most criminal court judges. Judges already consider a victim's safety, from early decisions regarding bail, to sentencing decisions, and when imposing conditions on probation or parole. Furthermore, defendants are not entitled to unlimited delay in their criminal prosecutions; in fact, there are numerous decisions providing that the State has an interest in avoiding unreasonable delay. The only difference in giving the victims' an interest in avoiding unreasonable delay would be that it might permit victims to approach a judge, with due notice to a defendant and the prosecution, if they felt that the defense and the prosecution were permitting unreasonable delay.

Of all the provisions, the second provision, requiring that victims are not to be excluded from public proceedings involving...

Currently, defendants have the right to have witnesses excluded from a criminal trial. The plain fact is that victims are frequently witnesses. However, looking again at the provisions of the Constitution, one can see that the right to have witnesses excluded from the trial is the result of rules of evidence, not of Constitutional protections. There is nothing in the Constitution that grants a criminal defendant the right to have victims or any other potential witnesses excluded from their trials. In fact, this evidentiary rule is opt-in. Should a defendant fail to request that potential witnesses be excluded from the courtroom, their presence during the testimony of prior witnesses does not provide grounds for reversal or appeal. Therefore, because this right is not constitutional in nature, it should not prevent the adoption of the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment.
As has been demonstrated above, there is nothing in the proposed Crime Victims' Rights Amendment that threatens the guarantees given to accused criminals by the United States Constitution. On the contrary, all that the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment attempts to do is give the same sort of rights and protections to the victims of crime. It does nothing to increase the likelihood that a defendant will be convicted or to suggest that defendants be subjected to different punishments than would have otherwise been applicable. Therefore, the United States should adopt the Crime Victims' Rights Amendment.