Critical Analysis of Analogy Saving a Drowning Child vs Saving a Starving Population

Critical Analysis of the Drowning Child Analogy

As the Checklist (n.d.) makes clear, analysis of analogy should cover at least three aspects: significance and relevance of similarity, validity of comparison, and consistency of precedent. Barnet and Bedau (2011) also recommend assessing the assumptions used in the argument to establish validity. This can be done, too, by way of analysis of the analogy. Ultimately, Singer’s analogy crumbles under critical analysis as it can quickly be seen to be weak, overly simplistic, and inconsistent with precedent. Moreover, the assumption upon which it is based appears to be that individuals in a specific and unique time and place have the same deontological imperatives as nation-states do across multiple regions and much lengthier time frames. In short, there is too little differentiation built-in to the drowning child analogy, and this is why it does not stand up under critical analysis.

Significance and Relevance of Similarity

Singer’s (1972) analogy hinges on the moral imperative to act in situations where we can prevent harm at a minimal cost to ourselves. The similarity between rescuing a drowning child and aiding starving populations illustrates what at first sounds like an obvious universal moral duty. Indeed, the compelling nature of this analogy lies in its universal appeal to a shared sense of morality: if one sees a person in need, the Good Samaritan principle is to help the person out, i.e., be a good neighbor. It is a universal idea that appeals to everyone’s shared sense of community. The analogy emphasizes, too, that the cost of action is insignificant compared to the value of a human life.

However, differences in proximity, immediacy, and perceived responsibility weaken the analogy. To assume these two situations are alike is to place the same relevance and significance on each—but this is simply unfair. The drowning analogy is not strong enough in terms of closeness, visibility, and duty to be used in justifying interventionism on a grand scale without knowing more information about why the population is starving in the first place.

Validity of the Comparison

Additionally, Singer's comparison is profound and provocative, as it sets out to reframe one’s understanding of moral obligations on a global scale. The analogy certainly highlights the inconsistency in our moral intuitions, but it also oversimplifies complex issues surrounding global aid, such as political, economic, and cultural factors. Thus, it uses a reductionist view of moral responsibility. A child drowning before one’s eyes is not the same as a nation perishing hundreds or thousands of miles away due to various factors that are much more complex than a child going under water. A population that is starving could be starving for myriad reasons: government corruption, natural disaster, embargo, genocide, destroyed infrastructure, act of war, and on and on.

Consistency of Precedent

The precedent set by the analogy is based on a straightforward moral action—saving a life when it costs us little to do so. This principle is consistent and widely accepted in individual scenarios. However, its application to the broader context of global poverty and hunger encounters inconsistencies, particularly when considering the complexity of aid effectiveness and the potential for unintended consequences.