Curtis LeMay's leadership across military and political contexts

¶ … Curtis LeMay:

Using Hersey-Blanchard leadership theory to analyze LeMay's strengths and weaknesses as a leader

Situational leadership theory and LeMay

The Japanese campaign

The Cold War

Vietnam

Contrasting military and civilian leadership

How first, personal successes influence leadership

Four-star General Curtis LeMay is one of the most controversial figures in the history of the modern U.S. Air Force. LeMay's philosophy can be summed up as follows: it is more advantageous and ultimately more compassionate to use massive levels of force against the enemy. This results in a quicker victory and ultimately preserves more civilian lives. However, LeMay's legacy as a military leader is complex. On one hand, he is credited with speeding the end of World War II, thanks to his superior leadership style, tactical ability and boldness. However, as a political leader and advocate of U.S. interests, his legacy is mixed. "When he retired in 1965, LeMay was widely regarded, and probably rightly so, as a great commander of SAC [Strategic Air Command] but as a poor chief."[footnoteRef:1] He served as Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force from 1957 and often clashed with more 'dovish' assessments of the Cold War's geopolitical landscape during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations.[footnoteRef:2] [1: "General Curtis E. LeMay," Arnold Air Squadron, http://aas.org.ohio-state.edu/info/lemay_bio.php (accessed 21 Aug 2013).] [2: Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson's War: America's Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968(Hill & Wang, 1997).]

This paper addresses this apparent paradox: how a man who was so successful in military positions was not so in others. It will argue that 1. LeMay's style was well-suited to the ruthless needs of the Japanese front 2. LeMay's uncompromising anti-communism made him an effective leader in the Cold War for his troops but that 3. Such an uncompromising and unbending vision is not equally well-suited to articulating political ideals within the American democratic context, particularly in light of the anti-war developments of the 1960s.

Situational leadership theory and LeMay

LeMay's career embodies one of the paradoxes of the philosophy of situational leadership, as delineated by theorists such as Hersey & Blanchard, who stressed that leadership objectives must be harmonized with leadership style. When quick, decisive action is needed as during a military campaign an autocratic style may be acceptable. However, in the realm of political leadership, the LeMay style was not nearly as effective. Hersey and Blanchard argue that leadership is a dynamic dialogue between followers and leaders. Leaders may need to be autocratic when there is a demand for swift action and the followers are not as well-versed in the situation on the ground as the leaders themselves.[footnoteRef:3] However, when followers have equal knowledge (or in the case of a democratic environment equal power as the leadership) as in the realm of politics, a more participatory style is demanded in which leaders coach followers by informing them rather than ordering them or delegating authority. [3: P. Hersey & K. Blanchard, Management of organizational behavior: Utilizing human resources (New Jersey/Prentice Hall, 1969).]

LeMay refused to bend his will to the demands of the American populace and make his views more palatable as support for the Vietnam War waned. Despite LeMay's leadership of the Pacific bombing of World War II and his subsequent leadership in Germany and the SAC, the public's negative view of his hawkishness when he served in an administrative and political capacity later in his career (he famously inspired a militaristic character in the film Dr. Strangelove) resulted in his political demise. It also proved to be ineffective in his negotiations with both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson when he demanded a more aggressive response to various administrative crises. One of LeMay's most famous quotes regarding the North Vietnamese was: "My solution to the problem would be to tell them frankly that they've got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age. And we would shove them back into the Stone Age with Air power or Naval power - not with ground forces."[footnoteRef:4] Deploying this type of autocratic style was not nearly as persuasive in the more nuanced realm of politics and civilian public relations. (Although LeMay later stated that his ghostwriter misquoted him and he merely stated that the U.S. had the capabilities to bomb the North Vietnamese into the Stone Age, yet lacked the political will to fight an effective campaign of any kind.)[footnoteRef:5] [4: Curtis LeMay, Mission with LeMay: My Story. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965.] [5: David Stubblebine, "Curtis LeMay," World War II Database, http://ww2db.com/person_bio.php?person_id=509 (accessed 7 Sept 2013).]

The Cold War

After World War II, LeMay continued his service, first in Germany, and then by assuming command of Strategic Air Command (SAC),which was responsible for orchestrating any future U.S. atomic attacks: LeMay's single-minded leadership transformed it from a relatively ragtag bunch of soldiers to one of the most elite and feared units in the world. Once again, the high stakes of the Cold War were served well by the LeMay style.

But later on in his career, when he entered the realm of politics, LeMay was not able to translate his military success into political capital. LeMay's personal views of politics were often criticized. He was noted for his politically conservative views and hatred of communism, sentiments which made him popular during the height of the Cold War in the 1950 but which he did not adapt to the changing needs of the 1960s. He was respected by his men even though he did little to ingrate himself into their favor or even the favor of his fellow generals and felt that compromising with others showed weakness.

LeMay's popularity in the military was rooted in his willingness to practice what he preached and to get his hands dirty when necessary. At his Air Force survival school, when pilots complained about having to sleep overnight in tents made of parachutes and asked who gave the orders to do so, LeMay popped out his head from a tent and saying "I did. Got any comments?"[footnoteRef:12] He was also a tireless advocate for providing better conditions for his men. However, "one story that circulated about him was that when a group of colonels invited him to dinner he replied with a scowl, 'a man should have dinner with his friends, and the commanding general has no friends.'"[footnoteRef:13] Yet he did demand to see all of his officers once a week, telling them they did not need an appointment, just to walk in the door. When he trusted men, allowed them to make decisions on their own, but only if he was sure that their views were consistent with his own. [12: Narvaez, 1990.] [13: Narvaez, 1990.]

Despite his hard exterior, LeMay's daughter recalled him often asking people to dinner when he was serving in Germany in 1947 and in charge of the Berlin Airlift. "He has the reputation for being gruff and a disciplinarian and a perfectionist, and I think he probably was in the business environment, but when he was out for a personal evening with friends, he was just one of the people."[footnoteRef:14] His stern attitude was acceptable in the context of the military, but once LeMay stove to enter the fray of political life, his narrow views and lack of ability to ingrate himself with others shoved him to the periphery. [14: Jane LeMay Lode, "The Cold War Comes to Nebraska," Oral History Interview Form, 10 Sept 1998. http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0900/frameset_reset.html?http://www.nebraskastudies.org/0900/stories/0901_0122.html (accessed 21 Aug 2013).]

Vietnam

LeMay's popularity began to dwindle as antiwar sentiment escalated in the United States during the 60s. LeMay "found himself constantly in conflict with the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Maxwell Taylor. He lost most of those battles, many of them waged in favor of new air weapons, including a bomber to replace the B-52" and in the popular media was mocked as type of crazed Dr. Strangelove-like character for his advocacy of a more aggressive campaign in Vietnam to assure a quick victory. [footnoteRef:15] LeMay's political views not strictly pertinent to military endeavors also began to harden.[footnoteRef:16]When conservative candidate George Wallace ran as an independent for president on a position of segregation and expansion of the Vietnam campaign, LeMay was his vice-presidential running mate. [15: "General Curtis LeMay," The American Experience, 2009. ] [16: Narvaez, 1990.]

After his retirement, LeMay's daughter remembered her father as having a relatively modest lifestyle. "I suppose, when he retired, like so many of them do, they get so much for a speech or they...he was never interested in that. He just didn't do that. If he felt it was something he wanted to do, he went and did it. He never asked for any remuneration. Probably, looking back, that wasn't all that bright. But that is just what he did. He never really demanded the things that, probably, would have been due his station."[footnoteRef:17] LeMay was thus far less astute in terms of the needs of public relations, even to promote himself, versus his acute understanding of the narrow leadership demands placed upon military leaders. In reference to his legacy, it has been said "The country needed a man like Curtis LeMay in World War II and the Cold War. But generations after those conflicts it is hard to remember why."[footnoteRef:18] [17: Lode, 1998] [18: Warren Kozak, LeMay: The life and wars of General LeMay, (Regnery History, 2011).]

Contrasting military and civilian leadership

Figure 1

Image source: Project management skills

LeMay's life in the military was highly successful but his life in politics was not. Was LeMay's hawkishness so politically unpalatable that this resulted in his demise? Or was it his interpersonal style, which is regarded in a mixed fashion by friends and associates? Hersey and Blanchard, authors of a pioneering approach to situational leadership theory (Figure 1) would suggest that there is an inherent problem in transferring the leadership code of the military to that of civilian life. Although LeMay regarded the President as Commander-in-Chief during wartime, when it came to what he saw as the interference of politics in military strategy, he was uncompromising in his opposition. The decision to go to war may be political but the fighting of the war itself could not be so.

LeMay's refusal to play the political 'game' can be seen in his response to Lyndon Johnson. Johnson, an astute politician, knew that LeMay agreed with his rival for the presidency Barry Goldwater that a no-holds war should be waged against Vietnam, rather than half-measures. To ensure he did not throw his support to Goldwater, Johnson offered LeMay an ambassadorship, to which LeMay replied that it made little sense to take him out of a position he knew something about (the military) and to give him a position he knew nothing about.[footnoteRef:19] He continued to fight with Johnson, demanding a more aggressive air-based bombing campaign vs. A cautious ground war against the guerrilla forces. [19: Kozak, 357.]

Even if there may be merit in the argument that a clear goal and a hard-fought war is superior than the methods used in the Vietnam War, neither Goldwater nor LeMay were able to convince the public because of their hawkish style. When talking about the issue with others, rather than attempting to sell his position or to nuance his point-of-view to gain power (as Johnson was so effectively able to do so in his political career), LeMay did not. This garnered him a reputation for being cruel and merciless, while LeMay saw himself as pragmatic. "If only somebody could keep them from doing the goddam thing piecemeal," a general confided to LeMay regarding the Vietnam War. LeMay voiced these thoughts aloud in public and was unable to articulate his concept that being 'cruel' only to be kind was necessary in wartime.[footnoteRef:20] Ironically, there was some ideological overlap between LeMay and the antiwar demonstrators whom he despised: both agreed that war was unadulterated hell and should be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible. The only difference was that LeMay believed that victory in Vietnam was indeed a worthwhile objective and thus demanded an aggressive bombing campaign. [20: Kozak, 351.]

When followers -- soldier or civilian -- lack confidence, they are often willing to place their trust in a leader as was the case during World War II and the uncertain and turbulent period after the Cold War. As Hersey and Blanchard note in reference to their situational leadership theory, an acceptance of directive behavior comes when people are willing to be told "what and how. It involves telling and showing people what to do, how to do it, when to do it; monitoring performance; and providing frequent feedback on results. Directive Behavior develops competence in others." [footnoteRef:21] LeMay was willing to bolster his troop's confidence by sharing in their physical struggles, even when he did not have to do so and had frequent contact with his immediate subordinates regarding military matters. But when followers are emboldened (as they were after a string of evident failures of politicians to lead effectively in Vietnam), a different style of leadership is called for, which LeMay discounted. [21: Ken Blanchard, "Situational leadership II: The article," available http://wed.siu.edu/faculty/BPutnam/566/Situational_Leadership_Article.pdf (accessed 7 Sept 2013).]

LeMay was not interested in acting in the manner of a coaching type of leader who was willing to change his tactics to render his directives more palatable -- he was not even willing to personally ingrate himself through social meetings, given that he frowned upon mixing business with pleasure or tainting the decisions he might make with irrelevant considerations (although his friends and family had nothing but high praise for his interpersonal manner). Nor was he willing to take the approach of a 'supportive' leader who allowed his followers to exercise discretion: he felt he knew what was right and how things should be done, based upon his experience. Subsequent failures to achieve success in Vietnam only bolstered this belief. He was angry and frustrated at what he saw was tolerance for different points-of-view, leading to an unwinnable war. "If a war is worth winning LeMay's answer was simple: do not get involved in the first place."[footnoteRef:22] [22: Kozak, 342.]

It should be noted he was willing to give the authority to make decisions to some of his followers. During his leadership of the SEC, he noted: "If I'm busy, I'll tell you to get out. I want men of action in my organization who can make their own decisions…If you make an occasional wrong one, I'll back you up."[footnoteRef:23] But that was only when he trusted his men to conform to his basic vision of what the service should resemble. [23: Narvaez, 1990.]

Conclusion

Regardless of what one thinks of whether America should have entered Vietnam or not, LeMay's idea that all military maneuvers should have a clear goal of winning and a lack of clarity is likely to bring defeat and ultimately more death and destruction seems borne out by a number of examples. But LeMay was unable to change his interpersonal style to suit the times to communicate his beliefs effectively. When the American public craved directive leadership and he had enough clout to shape his strategy in a single-minded fashion, LeMay was a success. That was not the case, however, when he began to find his decision-making and advice influenced the world of politics which demands more consideration for diverse viewpoints -- even if they are based more on political necessities than military needs.