Douglas MacArthur and the Inchon decision

Inchon

Described as being "the most brilliant and among the most flamboyant American generals of the twentieth century," General Douglas MacArthur would launch an amphibious offensive in Korea that proved a major turning point in the war ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 295). In spite of being forced to step down from his post not soon after he devised the Inchon invasion, MacArthur demonstrated a skillful command of military tactics and perhaps more importantly, of military communications and resource management. Even more notable than the scale and the sophistication of the Inchon landing itself, which relied on both sea and air forces, was MacArthur's managerial abilities before and during the operation. As Ballard (2001) points out, MacArthur was "not a micromanager," (p. 31). Instead, his strengths emerged while at the helm of joint military management, strategic planning, and execution.

The controversial general garnered support from Washington in the months immediately preceding the invasion by incessantly petitioning the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for their approval to launch the attack at Inchon and using every opportunity at his disposal to pitch his case. MacArthur, whose full title at his post in Tokyo was Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), was fully aware of his power to make decisions and delegate authority. However, General MacArthur also needed to woo the Marines and the Navy at the same time: no easy political task. After sending "message after message" to the reluctant JCS and eventually bypassing their authority by persuading joint miltiary generals to commit troops, General MacArthur proved his merit as a skillful politician and not just a military maven, ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 295).

His plans for the operation, dubbed "Chromite" as of July 23, 1950, met with lukewarm reception at best by the JCS and other Washington emissaries. In fact, two joint chiefs of staff were flown into MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo to outright oppose the initiative. Their reservations were understandable. MacArthur had chosen what has been called "the unlikeliest harbor" on the Korean peninsula, Inchon, ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 295). Geographic and logistical barriers to success made Operation Chromite seem foolhardy. A lack of beaches and raging tides made Inchon a textbook case of where not to plan an amphibious attack ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 296). Twelve hours would pass between the first and second installment of Marine troops because the tidal range at Inchon was a whopping thirty-two feet. Bottlenecked channels made maneuvering and landing difficult, not to mention the presence of mud flats and other geographic impediments.

MacArthur claimed that the illogical choice of Inchon made the harbor a perfect spot for a surprise amphibious attack. With skilled oratory and rhetoric, MacArthur persuaded a group of military commanders that Operation Chromite was the best course of action for accomplishing American objectives in Korea. MacArthur mentioned how the sudden, dramatic invasion at Inchon would prevent a long-drawn out presence in South Korea that could too easily discourage troops stationed in Pusan and possibly weaken morale if not support for the war effort. The bold septuagenerian general claimed that Operation Chromite would "save 100,000 lives," ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 298). MacArthur mentioned the low troop morale that followed from successful North Korean military campaigns as well as the high concentration of American army troops within the Pusan Permiter at the tip of the Korean peninsula. Pusan was surrounded by the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). Moreover, MacMarthur pointed out the proximity of Inchon to Seoul and predicated his argument on the fact that Inchon would mean direct and immediate access to the enemy's heart. MacArthur also invoked the words of Winston Churchill, forever linking himself to the celebrated British orator and statesman.

Ballard (2001) claims that with the Inchon decision, MacArthur "established the operational art that guides U.S. joint operations today," (p. 31). MacArthur urged, practically demanded joint efforts from Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines leaders. Operation Chromite therefore remains a stellar case study for military personnel and commanders as well as for students of the military. The incident illustrates several aspects of successful military operations and also key points in military politics, management, and communications. Although the Inchon incident was a major success, driving back communist troops far above the 38th parallel, the Korean conflict ended in a glorified stalemate. Communist forces retained full command of the regions north of the 38th parallel and the United Nations, spearheaded by the bold and brash Americans under MacArthur, would only be able to keep South Korea as an anti-communist stronghold in the ensuing Cold War.

Frustrated by years of relatively unfruitful fighting in the Korean peninsula and possibly more so by a palliative chain of command that "fed him only the intelligence and order-of-battle information he wanted to hear, General MacArthur turned to geo-political bravado and threats," (Beidler 2007, p. 66). By far the most brash move MacArthur made after the Inchon decision was to engage in "unilateral discussions" with Chiang Kai-shek about "bringing Nationalist Chinese forces into the fight," (Beidler 2007, p. 66). For his "insubordination," his "refusal to obey the constitutional authority of the civilian commander in chief," President Truman canned his military counterpart: Commander in Chief, Far East. Even before President Truman fired him, he called into question MacArthur's "mental stability," (Carpenter 2000, p. 2).

MacArthur had always fancied himself in positions of power: this was a man President Roosevelt called "American Caesar," and who "spent much of his legendary life nurturing such a vision of personal destiny," (Beidler 2007, p. 63). Beidler (2007) even claims that MacArthur believed himself to be a modern "incarnation" of George Washington (p. 63). This "self-anointed first consul" made waves way before the Inchon decision but it was in Korea that the aging MacArthur first started to reveal his tragic flaws (Beidler 2007, p. 64).

Most significant was keeping the Joint Chiefs of Staff "in the dark" about the details of Operation Chromite, which was in fact one of MacArthur's communications strategies while trying to persuade Washington emissaries and the JCS ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 298). Only six hours before the landing at Inchon, MacArthur dispatched a "young lieutenant colonel" to inform the JCS about the invasion that would take place the following morning ("The Politics of Getting an Idea Adopted: The Inchon Decision," p. 298). MacArthur's methods prove that politics and military strategy are inseparable especially when dealing with a heterogeneous military and political system. In hindsight, the operation's success alone leads most military historians to laud MacArthur. Yet the methods MacArthur used to convince his fellow military commanders and the JCS were questionable and pose some serious ethical dilemmas.

Even before the invasion at Inchon in September 1950, MacArthur showed signs of his hubris. He "quickly began to conduct the Korean War pretty much the way he felt necessary," notes Johnson (2000, p. 74). "Without consulting the JCS or President Truman," MacArthur issued an order to bomb North Korean airfields (Johnson 2000, p. 74). Again, "without consultation or approval from Washington," MacArthur acted as a diplomat by traveling to Chiang Kai-shek's island of exile, then known as Formosa, and persuading him to commit troops (Johnson 2000, p. 74). MacArthur went so far as to criticize President Truman openly in the media for his lack of support for Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese nationalists on Formosa (Taiwan), (Johnson 2000).

Yet MacArthur's plan for Inchon proved successful, leading to the capture of Seoul: "the hub of all movement in the South" and "the most critical node in the supply line of the communist attack," (Ballard 2001, p. 32). Strategists could easily argue in favor of MacArthur, pointing out that the CINCFE acted with full authority in the best interest of the troops under his command. MacArthur proposed the Inchon invasion as a key to fulfilling the political objectives that led to the American and United Nations presence in Korea: the destruction of communism.

June 25, 1950 marked the start of the Korean War given the massive and organized Communist offensive that took place that day. Taking American and United Nations allied troops completely by surprise, the invasion demanded rapid response and MacArthur delivered. About one week later, General MacArthur requested a Marine regimental combat team (RCT) and had already begun planning amphibious counterattacks ("Operation CHROMITE: The Concept and the Plan"). The general requested 1200 amphibious specialists from the Marines ("Operation CHROMITE: The Concept and the Plan"). Involving the Marines so thoroughly in what would become Operation Chromite might have actually saved the Marines as a military institution, justifying its very existence (Carpenter 2000).

Because it was a relatively "rapid response" to the surprise June 1950 North Korean offensive, the Inchon counterattack was "both bold and brilliant" according to Ballard (2001, p. 31). Before Operation Chromite was born, MacArthur crafted Operation Blueheart, which was the first incarnation of Chromite and was slated for commencement on July 22 but which was aborted July 10.

In spite of the setbacks of Operation Blueheart, MacArthur was admirable in his courageous "promptitude to act," in the words of Winston Churchill (cited by Starling 1998, p. 298). After Blueheart's execution proved inconceivable, MacArthur immediately proceeded to draft the plans for the similar Operation Chromite. Operation Chromite, like Operation Blueheart, would rally the support of various branches of the military in a sweeping amphibious counteroffensive. MacArthur hoped to achieve the primary objective of American and United Nations presence in the Korean Peninsula: to stymie the communists.

If nothing else, MacArthur wanted to revitalize the spirits of troops stationed throughout East Asia and especially those trapped behind the Pusan Perimeter. On a reconnaissance mission on June 29, 1950 General MacArthur observed lackluster troops and was quoted saying Nobody is fighting," (Ballard 2001, p. 32). The seasoned CINCFE pointed out during the reconnaissance mission that among American and allied South Korean troops "morale was not sufficient" (Ballard 2001, p. 32). In his memoir of Korea the Coldest War, James Brady (2000) refers to the "shabbiness of American forces as they existed at the beginning of the Korean War," (p. 3). Brady (2000) also recalls the "terrible, mountainous terrain" that characterized the Korean peninsula and notes that the Korean War disheartened American troops who viewed the Communist encroachment of 1950 as a sign that World War Two had never ended after all. MacArthur's observations during his reconnaissance mission spurned on the general to complete Operation Chromite as a marker of American victory. MacArthur was also undoubtedly fueled by his personal pride and ambition. He is quoted as saying, "We shall land at Inchon and I shall crush them," (quoted by Carpenter 2000, p. 3).

General MacArthur was no novice at military strategy. First in his class at West Point, MacArthur would become the academy's superintendent. A star-studded post in World War One led to his later becoming Army Chief of Staff and he "surely helped save the U.S. military from disintegration between the wars," (Beidler 2007, p. 64). MacArthur's performance during World War Two presaged his position in the Korean conflict. MacArthur combined Army, Navy, and Marines forces and was awarded the Medal of Honor for his "strategic genius" during the Second World War (Beidler 2007, p. xx). His role in the reconstruction of Japan after the war also earned him accolades; his expertise in the affairs of the Far East ensured his continued posting and his eventual command of the Korean United Nations presence.

His combat experiences and triumphs in World War Two bolstered his efforts in Korea with regards to strategic issues and logistics. For example, MacArthur understood how supply shortages affected "operational reach" and knew how to read "enemy vulnerabilities," (Ballard 2007, p. 32). MacArthur also had exhibited a "keen sense of timing" during the Second World War that made his assessment of when to invade at Inchon reliable ("Operation CHROMITE: The Concept and the Plan"). Yet Inchon presented a whole different set of circumstances for the military commander in chief. MacArthur, emboldened by his already star-studded career, was faced with the challenge of convincing Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, and the Far East expert on amphibious operations, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle that an amphibious offensive at Inchon was feasible. MacArthur needed to show that Operation Chromite would succeed and that the decision to launch a tricky surprise invasion was the correct one. Rear Admirable James Doyle offered the most diplomatic and -- in MacArthur's eyes -- the most affirmative response to the proposition of an amphibious invasion at Inchon in September 1950: Doyle hesitated to stand in the general's way and simply stated, "Inchon is not impossible," (Carpenter 2000, p. 2). Doyle was also "the most experienced amphibious officer in the Far East," (Ballard 2007, p. 33). Although Doyle had thoroughly evaluated Inchon's territory and "attempted to dissuade" MacArthur from invading there, Operation Chromite was ultimately approved by a "concerned" JCS (Ballard 2007, p. 33-34).

MacArthur selected September as an ideal month for the amphibious attack for several reasons. First, September was not too long after the June Communist invasion and so sent a powerful message about the United States and its determination to squelch communism. Second, tidal, terrain and weather conditions "were suitable for landing troops and equipment under fire" in September whereas waiting any longer would render the tides too unpredictable or treacherous ("Operation CHROMITE: The Concept and the Plan"). September 15, the invasion commenced. The immediate goals of Operation Chromite were to cut off Communist supply lines from the North by seizing Seoul and to destroy the Communist stranglehold on Pusan. Both objectives were met within days; MacArthur triumphed.

The media seized the opportunity to champion the quick victory. An October 2, 1950 edition of Life magazine praises the Inchon invasion, almost sterilizing the event. "It took the Marines less than a day to capture the city from a battalion of Reds, who were all but mummified by naval and air bombardment," (Sygmington 1950, p. 23). Sygmington (1950) also claims that American troops were "virtually unopposed," (p. 23). The Life report, although written for a hopeful American public and not for a military audience, was not far off in its description of the Inchon attack. Starling (1998) describes the invasion in similar terms, calling the surprise "total," describing the North Korean army as "demoralized remnants," and also by claiming that MacArthur's "bold stroke paid off" with a Communist retreat (p. 298).

In October of 1950, General Douglas a. MacArthur was an American hero. Yet what the Life magazine article does not address in relation to the Inchon invasion is General MacArthur's willful subordination of his civilian Commander in Chief, President Harry S. Truman. As Johnson (2004) states in an article for Military History magazine, no general in American military history "ever so blatantly and repeatedly challenged the authority of the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff as General of the Army Douglas a. MacArthur," (p. 74). Johnson calls MacArthur's actions a "flat refusal to follow orders" and claims the insubordination a "historic first," (p. 74). "It was believed," notes James Brady (2000) that "the only orders Douglas MacArthur had ever followed...were his own," (p. 12). Johnson (2004) further lambastes MacArthur by claiming that "his power and status made him a head of state in all but name, virtually free from accountability for his actions," (p. 74).

Brady (2000) defends MacArthur's willfulness, proving that the methods the general used to secure success at Inchon and thereafter might not have represented subordination at all but rather, skill and enviable genius. Ballard (2007) also lauds MacArthur for what the author calls promoting "a vision for staff and competent action," (p. 36). Not all of MacArthur's actions can be blamed on his being uppity. While admitting the general was "stretching his orders," Brady (2000) claims that those orders were in fact "fuzzier than they should have been," (p. 11). Even after the successful invasion, "Washington had been watching somewhat passively from the sidelines," (Brady 2000, p. 15). Dorschner (2005) notes that after the June 1950 surprise Communist attack, Washington had "no clear war aims" and that "little thought was given to larger strategic goals and objectives" other than to focus on the immediate needs of troops in south Korea (p. 32). Indecision and hesitancy in Washington had a strong bearing on MacArthur's decision-making.

In fact, MacArthur's incomplete briefings to the JCS might have been due to their lack of involvement in what the General was trying to accomplish with Operation Chromite. Referring to the outright "prohibition issued by the Joint Chiefs themselves against sending American troops to any province bordering China," Brady (2000) implies that the JCS were actually "afraid," (p. 11-12). It seemed as if Washington had lost interest in winning the Cold War. Moreover, MacArthur was sometimes harangued for insubordination when his actions were carried out in frustration over an indecisive, hesitant JCS. Mixed messages were running rampant across the Pacific. For example, MacArthur issued orders to bomb North Korean airfields less than twenty-four hours before the general received an official request from Truman to do so (p. 74). It is highly likely that MacArthur issued his orders after receiving an informal nod, and was therefore acting sensibly and not out of arrogant insubordination.

However, MacArthur's tendency toward emotionalism in his communications reflects one of his most tragic flaws: hubris. His victory at Inchon would ironically predicate his demise as a successful Army general and politician. As Brady (2000) puts it, "the more cavalier the Americans were, the greater the Chinese would be sure they were going to reap," (p. 15). What took place after Inchon would also demonstrate how MacArthur's character and his approach to leadership are integral to any study of the Korean War. MacArthur's personality and his relationships with the JCS and Truman cannot be separated from his strategic and operational genius. Soon after the Inchon victory, it seemed General MacArthur had grown smug. He acted as if he were the Supreme Commander in Chief and not just the Far East Army Commander in Chief. Brady (2000) describes a "very dangerous kind of euphoria" reflected throughout the highest ranks of the army and especially in MacArthur (p. 16). MacArthur and his colleagues believed the war was all but over, and even started diverting supplies and ammunition from Korea to Japan and Hawaii. Overconfidence -- not just MacArthur's -- led to an unfortunate American retreat so deep it almost reversed the spoils of war gained by success at Inchon. The massive, demoralizing retreat a few months after the high point at Inchon can be traced both to overconfidence and to a lack of strategic planning in Washington that stymied the ambitious MacArthur. The JCS and President Truman lacked a cohesive vision for Korea and of the Far East as a whole. As Dorschner (2005) and Brady (2000) both point out, Washington often issued orders "after the fact" and frustrated MacArthur with unclear motives.

As a result of a lack of strong, cohesive centralized leadership the geo-political face of the Korean Peninsula after the war was exactly the same as it was before the Communist invasion of 1950 and the Inchon attack: the country was divided along the 38th parallel. Korea became one of the hallmarks of the Cold War, a symbol that freedom-loving nations like America still had battles to fight on the Asian front. In some ways Korea was a harbinger of Vietnam (Brady 1990). The Korean War transformed America's "strategic vision of Asia" and also changed America's "domestic political equation," (Brady2000, p. 4).

MacArthur could likely have secured an American victory in Korea by carrying out what he believed was the ideal method of pushing the Communists north of the 38th parallel: joining forces with Chiang Kai-shek and securing a commitment of troops and supplies from Formosa. Proving that he had the charisma and rhetorical skills to win over military and political leaders, MacArthur could well have garnered resources from allied armies in the fight against Communist China during the Korean War. The victory at Inchon could have been expanded to allow for greater gains for the United States and its allies. President Truman could have reprimanded MacArthur for insubordinate behavior while at the same time capitalizing on his genius by ensuring his command of the region. Instead, out of injured pride Truman fired one of the most competent army generals the country would ever see.

President Truman defended his position and his decision to fire MacArthur in a public statement on "Our Aims in Korea." The President stated "We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war -- not to start one." Claiming that MacArthur's view of how the war should proceed was far different from his own, the President called MacArthur "one of our greatest military commanders" but one whose aims differed from those held by Washington.