Prior to the United States' entry into World War II, the "window to the west" was closed due to American isolationism and economic crisis during the Depression.[footnoteRef:1] There were two competing forces in pre-war America: those who believed America should intervene in the European war vs. The "America First Committee" that believed America's best pre-War interests were served by doing precisely nothing and that Germany's victory would be advantageous or, at worst, have little effect on the United States.[footnoteRef:2] Despite America's pre-war isolationism, President Roosevelt attempted a nonpartisan reversal of America's neutrality and engagement in meaningful logistics.[footnoteRef:3] By Roosevelt's promise in December 1940, America became the "arsenal of democracy" for Allied forces through uncoordinated, temporary contracts, eventually leading to the "Lend Lease Act," devoting a large portion of America's industry to Great Britain's war effort.[footnoteRef:4] Meanwhile, America itself was woefully unprepared for War: in 1941, the country's entire military expenditure totaled only 4% of the amount spent from 1942 -- 1945.[footnoteRef:5] In addition, at the start of the War, America had essentially no air force and only 190,000 men in the army, with no armies, corps or divisions.[footnoteRef:6] [1: Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, NY W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), p. 329.] [2: Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.85.] [3: Ibid., pp. 84-5.] [4: John Keegan, The Battle for History: Re-Fighting World War II (New York, NY: First Vintage Books Edition, 1996), p. 54.] [5: Overy, p. 191.] [6: Weinberg, p. 87.]

America's War Department handled logistics[footnoteRef:7] and President Roosevelt's Army Chief-of-Staff, General George Marshall, devoted a great deal of his energy to logistics, both before and during the War.[footnoteRef:8] Excelling at quiet and precise logistics, Marshall was determined to avoid the logistical failures of World War I, became "indispensable" to Roosevelt and was deemed a "manager in uniform."[footnoteRef:9] This proved to be the optimal appointment, as World War II was essentially a global war of logistics for the United States, requiring complex, painstaking preparation and coordination with allied forces in both the Pacific and European Theaters to supply and otherwise support American and Allied forces. In addition, at times there were competing demands for landing craft, shipping and support in both Theaters. Entering the War at a relatively late date, America conducted logistics in coordination with Allies rather than by a lone committee.[footnoteRef:10] [7: Ibid., p. 925.] [8: Overy, p. 273.] [9: Ibid., pp. 273-4.] [10: Overy, p. 273.]

In the Pacific Theater, the United States had to manufacture and effectively transfer supplies for naval warfare, air warfare and amphibious warfare.[footnoteRef:11] Admiral Chester Nimitz was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area[footnoteRef:12] and General Douglas MacArthur was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific.[footnoteRef:13] America did possess an "Orange Plan" prior to WWII for a Pacific Ocean war with the Japanese[footnoteRef:14]; however, actual war in Pacific Theater war was complicated by initial ignorance about logistics