Elsie Dennis Maynard, Deceased. Ralph

¶ … Elsie Dennis MAYNARD, Deceased. Ralph BRITTINGHAM et al., Appellants, v. Lois D. JARVIS et al., Appellees. 253 So. 2D 923; 1971 Fla. App. (1971) Court: Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, opinion delivered by Hobson. Facts: Appellees brought a petition in order to establish a lost or destroyed will of decedent. Appellants answered and appellees introduced as evidence written interrogatories of the attorney who drew up the will.

The trial court entered an order probating the will and establishing the provisions of the original will as being the terms and provisions set forth in a copy of the will located in a safety deposit box.

Did the court err when they entered an order probating the will and establishing the provisions of the original will as being the terms and provisions set forth in a copy of the will located in a safety deposit box? Law: Appellants sought review of an order of a Florida trial court that established and probated the lost or destroyed will of decedent based on evidence introduced by appellees, on grounds that the unconfirmed copy of decedent's will could be considered a true copy as required by Fla. Stat.

Chapter 732.27(3) and was not the equivalent of one witness. Stewart v. Johnson, 1940, 142 Fla. 425, 194 So. 869. Reasoning: There was sufficient proof in the record, namely, the answer to interrogatories filed by the attorney who drew the will, to prove the execution of the original will and that it was either lost or destroyed. The correct copy referred to in Florida Statute § 732.27(3), F.S.A. is not for the purpose of proving the execution of the original will but for proving the actual contents of the original will.

Therefore, it was not necessary that the copy contained a copy of the signature of the testator and copies of the subscribing witnesses. Holding: Affirmed. Saul Azar, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Old Willow Falls Condominium Association, Defendant-Appellee.228 III.App.3d 753,593 N.E.2d 583, 170 III. Dec. 694. (1992). Court: Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division Facts: The beneficial condominium owner's condo units were the subject of a land trust.

The association increased and made an additional assessment for roof repairs and legal fees without submitting the assessments to a vote by all unit owners.

Issue: Did the trial court err when they held that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring this action; that the land trustee and other beneficiaries should have been permitted to join the action as additional party plaintiffs; that the proposed increase should have been separately assessed; and that the size of the increase in the special assessment requires approval by two-thirds of the unit owners? Law: The beneficial condominium owner stated a valid claim under § 309(d) of the Condominium Property Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. Chapter 30, para.

309(d) (1989); the roof repairs and legal fees were non-recurring expenses which required special assessment. Moreover, the assessments had to be approved by owners because the increase was greater than the annual increase permitted by statute. People v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 479, 389 N.E.2d 540, Department of Conservation v. Franzen (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 374, 356 N.E.2d 1245, Chicago Title & Trust v. Exchange National Bank (1974), 19 Ill. App.

3d 565, 312 N.E.2d 11 Reasoning: The beneficial condominium owner had standing to bring the lawsuit; though equitable title to the condo units resided with the trustee, true ownership was in the beneficial condominium owner. Legal fees, engineering and roofing costs should be treated as non-recurring expenses and thus require separate appraisal which requires prior approval by two-thirds of the unit owners. Holding: Reversed. Thomas a. Andrews et al., Plaintiffs, v. Laura Steinberg, Defendant. 122 Misc.

2d 468; 471 N.Y.S.2d 764 (1983) Court: Supreme Court of New York, Special Term, opinion delivered by Evans. Facts: As a result of a statement made by the client that the attorney had created a false affidavit, the attorney was the subject of a complaint made to the disciplinary committee. It was later determined that there was no basis on which to proceed against the attorney.

The attorney, however, brought an action against the client, seeking damages for having been forced to defend himself against the complaint, for interference with his work, and for impeding his ability to obtain new work and clients. Issue: Does tort law provide a right of action to an attorney for injury caused by a client's allegedly perjurious testimony in a prior proceeding? Law: The defendant's motion seeks, inter alia, an order directing repleading of plaintiff's third cause of action.

Clevenger v Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 NY2d 187, Aikens v Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204, Beardsley v Kilmer (236 NY 80, 90), Musso v Miller (265 App Div 57), Dubourcq v Brouwer (124 NYS2d 61), Sheppard v Coopers' Inc., 14 Misc 2d 180, Purofied Down Prods. Corp. v National Assoc. Of Bedding Mfrs., 97 NYS2d 683, Gale v Ryan (263 App Div 76), Brandt v Winchell (283 App Div 338. Reasoning: The complaint set forth a cause of action under the prima facie tort doctrine. In addition, the complaint set forth the requisite intent for an injurious falsehood claim was substantiated.

The attorney had not alleged a prior adjudication of perjury. Therefore, the court was constrained to find that the complaint was insufficiently pleaded. Holding: The Plaintiff's third cause of action was dismissed, with leave to replead on proof of a perjury conviction. Benjamin R. Villmer and Gertrude Villmer, Appellants, vs. Household Plastics Company, a Corporation, and W.L.M. Clark, Inc., Respondents. 250 S.W.2d 964 (1952) Court: Supreme Court of Missouri Division 2, opinion delivered by Barrett, C.

Facts: In this case a husband's and wife's right to recover on certain notes depended on whether they had substantially complied with the terms of a contract or whether they had breached the contract or not. The husband and wife argued on appeal that their motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence should have been sustained and that the verdict for the company and the corporation was not supported by the evidence.

Issue: Did the trial court err when it rendered a judgment in favor of the company and the corporation in an action filed by the husband and wife on two nonnegotiable notes? Law: The plaintiffs asserted that their motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence should have been sustained and that the verdict for the defendants was not supported by evidence.

They also claimed that the jury's failure to return a verdict on Household's counterclaim was prejudicially erroneous and that the court erred in admitting certain evidence in regards to the counterclaim. In connection with their principal cause of action the plaintiffs also assert that the trial court prejudicially erred in the giving and refusal of specified instructions. City of St. Louis ex rel. And to Use of Sears v. Clark, Mo.App., 35 S.W.2d 986, Mackey v. First Nat. Bank of Centralia, Mo.App., 293 S.W. 66., Keller v.

Keklikian, Mo.Sup., 244 S.W.2d 1001; State ex rel. Fawkes v. Bland, 357 Mo. 634, 210 S.W.2d 31; Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 359 Mo. 282, 221 S.W.2d 471. Reasoning: There was evidence from which the.