European Unification "The Trouble Is

European Unification "The trouble is that those designs for Europe unification that were peaceful were not implemented, while those that were implemented were not peaceful." In the content of European history between 1900 and 1945, do you agree or disagree with this statement? In his lecture, "Is Europe Becoming Europe," lecturer Timothy Garton Ash defends his curious title with the following justification: "I refer of course to 'Europe' as an idea and an ideal, a dream, a vision, a grand design.

To those idealistic and teleological visions of Europe as project, process, progress towards some finalite europeen: visions and ideas which at once inform and legitimate, and are themselves informed and legitimated by, the political development of something now called the European Union. And of course, the very name 'European Union' is itself a product of this approach. A Union is what it's meant to be, not what it is" (Ash 1).

Today, the ideal of European unity is fostered upon a concept economic unity that will theoretically create a lasting European peace through commonly shared interests. The ideal of Europe has changed over time -- before World War I, a balance of power was supposed to keep stability, then the League of Nations and disciplining Germany, followed by NATO and the Cold War, and finally cumulating into today's European Union. The EU is the first organization created for economic empowerment, not military containment.

Before World War I, Europe's major powers were entangled in secret alliances that resulted in a kind of 'domino effect' of war declarations after the Austro-Hungarian Empire declared war upon Serbia after the assassination of the Archduke. During the period from the end of the Great War to the outbreak of World War II, potentially uniting institutions such as the League of Nations were ignored, while ideals such as nationalism were used for self-justifying reasons, as in the case of Hitler's annexation of Austria.

The League of Nations was not successful because so many of the member nations were impoverished as a result of World War I, and still torn by historical animosities. Germany was punished, rather than rehabilitated. Historic grievances still existed between many of the prevailing European powers, such as France and Germany. After World War I, the United States retreated to isolationism and did not provide either strength or a mediating force upon the warring European powers.

During World War II, Europe was divided by war and the only unity that existed, such as the alliance between England, the U.S., and Russia, were based upon expediency, not upon shared values that could continue in a time of peace. Ash's essay was written in 1996, when much of Europe was still in disarray after the breakdown of the Soviet empire. One wonders if he would still agree with his contention: "no continent is externally more ill-defined, internally more diverse, or historically more disorderly.

Yet no continent has produced more schemes for its own orderly unification" (Ash 2). Ash has a point when he notes that post-1945 Europe unity was 'helped' when the Cold War was "cutting off most of Central and Eastern Europe behind the iron curtain. This meant that European integration could begin between a relatively small number of nation-states, bourgeois democracies at.