Euthanasia (Pro) Debates Regarding the

Euthanasia (pro) Debates regarding the ethical validity of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide date back to ancient times. However, it is reasonably safe to say that little progress has been made towards reaching a consensus one way of the other, either within the field of medicine or the field of philosophy, through the millennia that the topic has been discussed. Largely, this stalemate can be thought of as a consequence of the multiple moral and ethical positions that human societies, and those within them, are routinely required to take.

First, each of us has a moral obligation within society to aid those around us -- either by working a job or through charity -- under the condition that the other members of society must aid us as well. Additionally, one of the most central premises under which we operate our lives is that it is morally wrong to end the life of another member of society.

The difficulty is that this can either be understood as a consequence of our obligation to society or as a moral maxim unto itself -- subject only to the condition of human existence. Obviously, if this notion is regarded as some independent moral law, then preservation of human life must occur at all costs. However, if our social obligation is thought to take precedence, then there must be some instances under which mercy killing or suicide is justifiable.

Even more questions arise if one ponders specifically what can be accomplished through euthanasia.

Is it reasonable to kill oneself to end individual suffering? Is it reasonable to kill oneself if death is already imminent? Is it only reasonable to kill oneself given that overall happiness will be maximized in so doing? Or, is it reasonable to kill a family member or medical patient if it can be inferred that they would have agreed with the decision? With reference to the utilitarian perspective, it may be wrong to bring about a human death, unless that death prevents more deaths from occurring in the future.

Overall, these represent the main obstacles to any workable laws regarding euthanasia, and the debate remains fundamentally unresolved. Although the idea of euthanasia is very old, taking a firm stance on the issue has never been more important than today: "In recent decades, medical advances have allowed physicians to prolong life to a greater extent than ever before.

While this on the surface may appear to be a positive development, many people now fear living too long in ways they would not choose: dependent upon machines, unconscious, or in terrible pain." Furthermore, "There is a broad movement within the medical community to improve the quality of end of life care, and this freedom is most aptly illustrated by the freedom granted to physicians in providing adequate pain control at the end of life; a goal which can be pursued even to the point of hastening death." This has brought euthanasia to the forefront of social, philosophical and medical discussions, more so than ever in the past.

The fact remains that many individuals, unable to gracefully end their lives on their own, freely choose to have their lives ended by others; consequently, it is no-longer fully possible for a society or government to take an utterly passive position with reference to euthanasia. Passivity endorses it by allowing it to occur. Accordingly, despite the ages that the debate has gone unresolved, modern governments have essentially been forced to take a position on euthanasia and, in doing so, suffer the consequences and criticisms.

To begin with, it is important to define specifically what sort of actions the term "euthanasia" encompasses: it is commonly understood to cover passive euthanasia, active euthanasia, and assisted suicide. Passive euthanasia occurs simply when medical treatment for a serious disease or injury is ceased; thus, allowing the patient to die sooner. Active euthanasia, on the other hand, occurs when a physician or family member physically takes the life of a dying patient; usually, this would be done by giving them some sort of lethal injection.

Assisted suicide involves the rational input of the patient: it demands a situation in which they have decided to die, but cannot carry-out the suicide on their own. Generally, assisted suicide would fall under active euthanasia, but this cannot be thought of as being universally true. For example, an individual might decide that they no-longer wish to receive their life-preserving medication, but also may lack the strength to physically stop the personnel who administer this treatment; such circumstances could be categorized as passive assisted suicide.

So, the term euthanasia is reasonably broad since it can be applied to all of these situations. It should not be surprising, therefore, that many people have taken issue with the practice of euthanasia depending upon their particular categorization of its subsets. Many theorists have seen fit to enter into a discussion of euthanasia from the perspective of an individual human being's right to suicide. One such group of contrasting moral and political philosophers came together under Ronald Dworkin to produce The Philosopher's Brief on assisted suicide in 2003.

Dworkin et al. presented a rather comprehensive and convincing argument for physician-assisted suicide based upon the fundamental doctrines and moral positions of the United States.

Central to their discussion was the notion that individual members of American society must be allowed the "most intimate and personal choices central to personal dignity and autonomy." However, this consideration must be tempered with the fact that the state is additionally responsible for the physical well-being of its citizens; in this light, the government should act to eliminate deaths resulting from ignorance or with insidious intent.

Obviously, these two central considerations of the role of the state in individuals' lives come to a head with regard to the issue of physician-assisted suicide. The dilemma arises because the government must protect the lives of its citizens while simultaneously affording them the constitutional right to use or misuse their own bodies as they see fit. Dworkin et al. attacked this issue head on, and rigorously assessed the strengths of the most common philosophical and legal objections to physician-assisted suicide while offering a more morally consistent stance.

Judging from the appeal to personal liberty that the United States Constitution presents for members of American society, it seems almost undeniable that personal suicide should fall under the actions that an individual should be able to perform. After all, such an action definitively flows out of each person's particular moral, ethical, and religious stances with regard to themselves and death; accordingly, the state cannot constitutionally force anyone to choose one way or the other.

However, "States have a constitutionally legitimate interest in protecting individuals from irrational, ill-informed, pressured, or unstable decisions to hasten their own death." Dworkin et al. explicitly identifies this point and subsequently deconstructs some moral positions that deny the liberty of individuals or deny the responsibility of the state.

The weakest objection to physician-assisted suicide is summarized by the philosophers: "Some deny that the patient-plaintiffs have any constitutionally protected liberty interest in hastening their own deaths." However, the philosophers note that not only is this almost blatantly false with respect to the United States Constitution, but that the courts have routinely upheld the moral rights of people to make such significant decisions with their rulings.

The second objection, as the philosophers perceive it, rests on the difficulty of drawing a definitive line between those instances in which death is a well-informed or justifiable choice and when it is not. The fallback position, historically, has been to simply ban physician-assisted suicide because to allow it would be to venture into this grey area. Dworkin et al.

rejects this contention as almost laziness on the part of the courts, and they argue that many decisions by the courts have already forced them to wander into this uncertain region. Overall, the argument presented in "The Philosophers' Brief" is a strong one with regard to assisted suicide. The issue cannot be properly addressed with blanket laws because it is intrinsically linked to the individual circumstances of the patient.

Certainly, it is difficult to decide when human choices are well-informed and rational and when they are not; yet, this is exactly why assisted suicide must be analyzed on a case by case basis. Is there an arbitrary element to the divisions that the law must make upon suicide? Doubtlessly. Still, haziness is inevitable with respect to moral decisions -- consequently, the laws of human beings must remain flexible if they are ever to mimic the foundational premises upon which we conduct out lives.

As reasonable as this line of reasoning may seem, many others categorically deny that there are any circumstances under which active euthanasia is ever appropriate. One author, Ronald Otremba, writes, "Active euthanasia is never morally justified. On what basis do I make this decision? First, there is the principle that life itself is intrinsically valuable.

This value is independent of one's physical or mental state of health." Otremba goes on to assert that this principle rides upon the shoulders of the idea that God is the sole creator and taker of life. He argues that if society were to allow the terminally ill to commit suicide, then it would be a small step to allow other members of society -- like the handicapped -- to do so as well.

This is not a completely trivial argument for two reasons: first, it is the point-of-view held by the majority of the Christian right -- a powerful political force in the Untied States; and second, if we accept his principle that life is intrinsically valuable, regardless of individual's rights over their own bodies, then we should be inclined to believe that active euthanasia is always wrong. Yet, Otremba is willing to concede that passive euthanasia may, sometimes, be permissible; this, however, only under the conditions of extreme suffering and impending death.

Fundamentally, it is a precarious moral position to contend that each and every human life demands society's active preservation. Otremba, and many others, must rest this concept upon the role of God in the world; yet, it is the explicit function of U.S. society to not take legal stances based upon subjective religious grounds. Essentially, if you agree that human life must be preserved at all costs, then this comes at the cost of free will, or even the greater good.

Is it ethical to invest millions of dollars into preserving terminally ill people's lives, people who wish to die, when impoverished members of society suffer and die from lack of food? After all, those individuals may die passively if we adhere to the notion that euthanasia is intolerable. Certainly, this is an extreme counterexample because it assumes that there are no readily-available solutions to poverty; but still, the underlying idea is that the greater good, in general, cannot be preserved by extending the lives of those who wish to die.

Accordingly, it should be expected that those who believe that ending human life, under any circumstances, is morally wrong, must attribute this premise to a higher authority; this is because a seemingly infinite number of instances can be imagined in which such a premise conflicts with the other fundamental principles of society. One group that has taken the position that euthanasia is wrong under virtually all conditions is the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force.

This group brings up the point that many of the aspects of death that people commonly imagine when they think of euthanasia truly do not properly fall under the category. They write, "A lot of people think that the person whose death would be a result of euthanasia or assisted suicide would be someone who doesn't want to be forced to remain alive by being hooked up to machines.

But the law already permits patients or their surrogates to direct that such interventions be withheld or withdrawn." To them, this is one of the leading reasons why euthanasia has remained a contentious issue: people misunderstand the ways that assisted suicide and euthanasia are carried out. This is an important point because it clarifies the position that the government of the Untied States has taken regarding euthanasia. Namely, that passive euthanasia is permissible given imminent death and the consent of the patient or the surrogate.

However, the argumentation put forward by the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force is misleading; they assert that passive euthanasia is not euthanasia at all but merely the cessation of using technologies to extend human life. They also argue that pain and depression, which often lead people to decide to end their lives, is treatable. As a result, they believe that anything other than what we might term passive euthanasia is unjustifiable. Broadly, the line of reasoning put forward by the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Farce is fairly compelling.

They attest to the fact that suicide is legal, and that people can choose to end their lives. However, their particular definition of euthanasia only includes physician-assisted suicide, which they believe is morally wrong. So, according to their invented notion of euthanasia, it is only wrong if the patient has not expressed their wishes to die and a third party -- a doctor or family member -- carries out the death. Since this is the only form of euthanasia they recognize, they conclude that all euthanasia is wrong.

Yet, according to our definitions, they have only taken a stand against active assisted suicide. So, upon further examination, it seems that the stance of the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force is less iron-clad than they might readily admit. Sill others have taken this iron-clad perspective, despite the numerous moral and legal difficulties. Daniel Callahan, medical ethicist and director of the Hastings Center, maintains that euthanasia is killing and all killing is wrong.

He goes on to argue that "should euthanasia be legalized, patients, families, and physicians would abuse this power to kill." Callahan believes that the surrendering of individual rights to those of doctors and other authorities leads to grave breeches of moral law. Specifically, he understands the legalization of euthanasia to be akin to providing medical agents the power to determine who is to live and die among portions of the populous unable to defend themselves.

Doubtlessly, many of Callahan's concerns are very real; though it is difficult to see why universally abolishing euthanasia is the only possible solution. He is successful in identifying one of the key conflicts: that which is between the individual rights of the patient, and those of medical authorities and family members. He avoids altogether the question of personal suicide; but he does suggest that there is little that can be termed categorically wrong about such an act.

Centrally, Callahan is calling for an end to all suicides that cannot be carried out by the individual wishing to die because of the vast moral and legal ramifications. The major reason why he seems to dismiss the situation of voluntary assisted suicide is because the doctor-patient relationship is already so intimate, that it would allow for nothing short of murder. Nevertheless, he fails to investigate how this relationship might be altered to ensure patient safety besides by ending euthanasia altogether.

Yet another contentious facet of the euthanasia debate surrounds the issue of specifically who should be permitted to make the fatal decision. Already, many of the arguments mentioned have suggested that the only person who can rightfully choose when to die is the person who plans to die. Some, however, have also claimed that family members or even the doctor can decide. One writer insists, "In virtually all cases one can presume that the family members love their dying relative and have the patient's best interests at heart.

There are probably some exceptions where hatred or revenge leads to the family's wish to be rid of a relative.. But these strange situations need not concern us." But even if we are to suppose that these truly are "strange situations," there is nothing to indicate that we should not be concerned with them. If families, as a rule, are given the.