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Eyewitness Testimony
The Supreme Court, in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375 (1972), set out some guidelines as to what a court must consider when it is trying to determine how much credibility to give to eyewitness testimony. This case involved a woman who identified a man who she claimed had raped her. The case revolved around the credibility of her identification. The Court laid out the following factors that must be considered in such cases. The Court said that courts had to consider:
Whether the witness had a good chance to see the criminal.
How much the witness was paying attention.
How accurate the witness's description was.
How certain the witness was.
How long of a time elapsed between the crime and the identification of the criminal.
The Supreme Court set these out as the factors that must be considered. It did not, however, say how much weight must be given...
It also did not say how long, for example, is too long between crime and identification. In other words, it gave factors to consider, but no clear rules for how exactly to apply those factors.
In the case of The State v. Lawrence Edward Moore, 334 S.C. 411; 513 S.E.2d 626; 1999 S.C. App, the defendant was convicted of second-degree burglary and grand larceny. He appealed his decision, arguing it was error to refuse to suppress an eyewitness's identification. In reversing the decision, the court held that the reliability of the witness was not evaluated in light of the factors articulated in Neil. No determination was made that her identification was reliable. Court discretion was not exercised, and instead it was erroneously decided that reliability was a jury issue.
In determining that Davis's identification was admissible the lower court stated: "The court's finding is that there is evidence -- I won't say…
In determining that Davis's identification was admissible the lower court stated: "The court's finding is that there is evidence -- I won't say reliable, but I think that's a matter for the jury -- that she can identify them. I don't find it unduly suggestive. I find the issues -- the weight is a matter for the jury." The state Supreme Court found that the lower court did not look at the reliability of Davis's identification in regards to the guidelines established in Neil and did not make a decision that her identification was unfailing, which was an error.
As shown by the record, without Davis's identification, the State's case against Moore was tenuous. Accordingly, the court found error in admitting Davis's identification testimony without first figuring out that her identification was dependable, which was not harmless. Therefore, this case was remand back to the trial court in order to hold a hearing to figure out, under the whole of the circumstances, that the identification of Moore was dependable.
In another case State of Connecticut v. Julian Marquez, No. 17663, 2008, the court proposed that in the influential case of Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. At 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, the Supreme Court explained the overarching apprehension that courts face when evaluating a disputed identification procedure. The court said that the primary goal is to avoid a very substantial probability of irreversible misidentification. It is the likelihood of misidentification which infringes a defendant's rights to due process. As courts apply the two-pronged test to decide if a specific identification procedure is so suggestive and untrustworthy as to necessitate suppression, they forever should weigh the pertinent factors against this standard. In other words, an eyewitness identification should be barred on the foundation of the procedure used to extract that identification only if the court is sure that the procedure was so suggestive and otherwise untrustworthy as to give rise to a very considerable probability of irreversible misidentification.
Authorities This firm's client, Franklin Olsen ("Olsen") was arrested and subsequently charged with burglary of the home of Lindsay Young ("Young"). Young informed the police that she had found Olsen in her home on October 15, 2010, at dusk and observed Olsen for approximately one minute prior to his leaving the property. Young described Olsen as being dark haired, wearing all black clothing and being extremely tall. At that time