Faragher v. Boca Raton 524 US 775 Sexual Harassment

Faragher v. City of Boca Raton

Argued March 25, 1998

Decided June 26, 1998

PARTIES:

Beth Ann Faragher: petitioner; City of Boca Raton:

respondent

FACTS:

Beth Ann Faragher worked part-time and during summers between 1990 and 1995 as a life-guard for the Parks and Recreation Department of the City of Boca Raton, Florida. Her immediate superiors during this period were Bill Terry, David Silverman and Robert Gordon.

After resigning as a lifeguard, Faragher brought an action against Terry, Silverman and the City under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for nominal damages and other relief, alleging, among other things, that the supervisors had created a "sexually hostile atmosphere" at work by repeatedly subjecting Faragher and other female lifeguards to uninvited and offensive touching, by making lewd remarks, and by speaking of women in offensive terms. Asserting that Terry and Silverman were agents of the City, and that their conduct amounted to discrimination in the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of her employment, Faragher sought a judgment against the City for nominal damages, costs, and attorney's fees.

Following a bench trial, the District Court found that Terry and Silverman had indeed indulged in the kind of inappropriate behavior as alleged by Faragher towards her and other female lifeguards. That Faragher did not complain formally to higher management about Terry or Silverman but spoke of their behavior to Gordon informally, who did not take any action nor did he report the matter to any city official.

The District Court, therefore, held that the City could be held liable for the harassment of Faragher by its supervisory employees because of three reasons: a) the harassment was pervasive enough to support an inference that the City had "knowledge, or constructive knowledge" of it; b) the city was liable under traditional agency principles since Terry and Silverman were acting as the City's agents when they committed the harassing acts; and c) a third supervisor had knowledge of the harassment and failed to report it to City officials.

The full Court of Appeals reversed in a 7 to 5 decision. It held that the City could not be held liable because: a) in harassing Faragher, Terry and Silverman were "acting outside of the scope of their employment and solely to further their own personal ends"; b) that the supervisors' agency relationship with the City did not assist them in perpetrating their harassment; c) that the City lacked constructive knowledge of the supervisors' harassment.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held the City liable for harassment of the petitioner by its supervisory employees. (1994)

2. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the judgment against the City. (1996)

3. In a 7-to-5 decision, the full Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, adopted the panel's conclusion; thus confirming the reversal of the District Court's decision. (1997)

4. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' holding by a 7-2 decision (1998)

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the City of Boca Raton (employer) should be held liable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for the acts of its supervisory employees (Terry and Silverman) for the sexual harassment of their subordinate (Faragher)?

2. Whether the sexual harassment of Faragher (and other female life-guards) by Terry and Silverman created a hostile work environment 'pervasive enough' to amount to employment discrimination?

RULE

1. Sexual harassment so "severe or pervasive" as to "alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment" violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as clarified in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, (1957)

2. A "master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." [Restatement §219(1)], i.e., the Employer is vicariously liable for the acts of its employees as long as they employees are acting in the "scope of their employment."

APPLICATION OF LAW

The Court discussed all aspects of the case by reviewing its previous rulings in cases of sexual harassment and vicarious liability in order to determine the levels of sexual harassment that are serious enough to make the employers vicariously liable and what exactly constitutes "the scope of employment."

Referring to Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. (510.U.S. 21-22), the Court noted that it has already held that all cases of "sexually objectionable behavior" would not automatically qualify to be actionable under Title VII and that "a sexually objectionable environment must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive" to qualify as "altering the of the victim's employment." In Faragher, repeated sexual harassment over a considerable length of time did create a sufficiently objectionable environment.

The Court also noted that thus far, the Court of Appeals in Title VII cases had typically held, or assumed, that supervisory sexual harassment falls outside the scope of employment because it is motivated solely by individual desires and serves no purpose of the employer. Such cases were in conflict with others in which "the scope of the employment" was defined broadly to hold employers vicariously liable for employees' intentional torts, including sexual assaults that were not done to serve the employer, but "were deemed to be characteristic of its activities or a foreseeable consequence of its business." Hence, the key question here was whether "an employer can reasonably anticipate the possibility of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace." The Court felt that in the prevalent working environment a large organization such as the City should be able to anticipate the possibility of sexual harassment occurring in the workplace.

The Court also made a distinction between "peer-to-peer" (co-worker) sexual harassment and sexual harassment of lower-level employees by supervisors. It observed that cases of sexual harassment by supervisors deserved to be treated separately and more seriously because the supervisors have special authority which enhances their capacity to harass and the employer can guard against supervisory misbehavior more easily.

The Court inferred from its above stated discussion that in Faragher, the degree of hostility in the work environment had risen to "an actionable level" and was attributable to the immediate supervisors of Faragher, who was isolated from the City's higher management. It also concurred with the District Court's observation that the City had failed to disseminate its sexual harassment policy among the beach employees and that its officials failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent the supervisors' harassing conduct. It concluded that the level of sexual harassment was pervasive enough and the supervisors who were responsible for the harassment were acting within the scope of their employment; hence Title VII was violated and the employers could be held responsible vicariously liable.