France paid a high price for this conflict, and the conditions demanded by the Germans were harsh (Franco). France lost Alsace and Lorraine and were forced to pay 5 billion Gold Francs in reparations (Franco). Germany entered the conflict with a total of 797,500 men, against France's 935,960 troops (Franco). France lost 150,000 men, while Germany lost only 44,000 (Franco). To add further humiliation, Bismarck insisted that France allow a German triumphal march down the Champs Elysees (Siege).
While the Franco-Prussian War was a war declared, it was essentially a 6-month conflict. Although the French outnumbered the Germans, they were careless and underestimated the Germans' military tactics and strategies. Emperor Napoleon III had basically played right into Bismarck's hands. Napoleon lost his power and reign, while Bismarck achieved exactly what he had set out to do, unite Germany.
The aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War generated considerable apprehension throughout Europe concerning the changing nature of warfare (Paris 1993). The ease with which Prussia defeated France was attributed to the new technology of war, as well as to superior training and motivation. Railways, sophisticated rifles and new forms of artillery played a major part in the Prussian victory (Paris 1993). During the following decades, Europeans attempted to define how these technological advancements would be used in future conflicts and considered what other new and even more horrifying weapons might be created by industrialized nations (Paris 1993).
According to author David Wetzel, the Franco-Prussian War was "the product of well-considered and compelling national interest" or the consequence "of self-interest, prejudice, and intrigue" (Ross 2003). Prussia preferred a peaceful, evolutionary solution to the problem...
Bismarck "had every reason for wanting peace," because the country was unprepared for taking on a war with France. Moreover, as Wetzel notes, wars breed heroes and this would potentially create rivals to the minister-president position, and likely as not foment domestic opposition and calls for reform (Ross 2003). Thus, the War of 1870-1871 was less the result of seismic political and economic shifts that molded and shaped Bismarck's policies than the unfortunate consequence of French miscalculation (Ross 2003).
Germany's use of new artillery, railways, and sophisticated rifles certainly played a major role in victory, however it must be noted that the French entered the conflict unprepared and over-confident. From the very beginning, the French military was in a state of confusion, for there was no coordination or organization.
Basically, the French were unable to ever gain a proper foothold. Early defeats simply led to more confusion, and eventually a divided army that was ultimately overcome. The German troops, however, were better equipped, better trained, and the use of keen military tactics proved victorious.
Works Cited
The Franco-German War 1870/71. The History of Warfare. Retrieved November 30, 2006 at http://www.zum.de/whkmla/military/19cen/francoger.html
Paris, Michael. (1993 June 01). Fear of flying: the fiction of war 1886-1916.
History Today. Retrieved November 30, 2006 from HighBeam Research Library.
Siege of Paris: 1879 Franco-Prussian War. Paris Annals. Retrieved November 30, 2006 at http://home.eckerd.edu/~oberhot/paris/paris-1870.htm
Ross, Ronald J. (2003 June 22). A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War. The Historian. Retrieved November 30,…
