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¶ … French and the British were both experienced colonial masters. Why do you believe the French essentially failed to maintain order and control whereas the British maintained control? What were the differences in their adversaries? What were the most and least effective components of the French response?
In contrast to the British experience in its colony of Malay, the French faced a relatively organized and unified force in French Indo-China. The French attempts to install a 'puppet' leader were a miserable failure and he had little popular support. Thus "France was less successful in Indochina…unlike the British in Malay…the French faced an opponent that had a secure neighboring base."[footnoteRef:1] The French, also unlike the British, were spread over a wide territorial area in Indochina. The French leadership was vulnerable to attack, particularly upon their communications systems, and while the French had advanced weaponry like napalm, the road system was poor, making guerrilla warfare easier to wage against the French. The Vietcong also had financial support via possession of local opium fields (although the French eventually did regain control of these) as well as from the Chinese.[footnoteRef:2] Finally, the French made a number of tactical errors such as the failure...
Jeremy Black, War Since 1945, (London: Reaktion Books, 2005): 37.] [2: Black, 28.] [3: Black, 39.]
However, although the French made a number of blunders militarily, it is unclear if a more effective campaign would have really made a difference in the long-term. "There are those who have suggested that if the French fought their campaign in a different way, if they had followed the pattern that the British had in Malay, they would have succeeded. But conditions were very different."[footnoteRef:4] The Vietnamese people "bitterly resented" the French in a uniform fashion, in contrast to the divisions which riddled the relationships between the opponents of the British in Malay.[footnoteRef:5] French commanders felt that the only hope was to create an indigenous army to oppose the Vietcong, yet they had no ideological rallying point to encourage the development of such a fighting force. One possibility was that France could have granted "real and immediate independence to Tonkin and Annam" and "concentrated her efforts on maintaining control in Cochin-China" but that would have been a "bitter pill to swallow."[footnoteRef:6] Part of the campaign in Vietnam was ego-driven: France wished to…
Bibliography
Black, Jeremy. War Since 1945. London: Reaktion Books, 2005.
Carver, Michael. War Since 1945. Dublin: The Ashfield Press, 1990.
Therefore an indigenous accounting profession did not evolve in this period either and no accounting or audit rules were established" (2000, p. 16). In this free-for-all environment, it is difficult to discern any influence from the French accounting profession, except to the extent that its transactions involved the international community where certain documentary practices must be followed in order to conduct international commerce. For example, according to a contemporaneous
French Foreign Legion l. Jones The French Foreign Legion For many, the French Foreign Legion evokes images of adventure, perhaps men traipsing over sand dunes in khaki knickers, and flapped white hats -- tough, and a bit, shall we say, unorthodox in a mercenary kind of way. However, the French Foreign Legion was, and continues to be, a legitimate fighting force, unique to France and the French experience, while still capturing the
For instance, Algerians saw the defeat of the French as a means to their own independence. When the French were defeated by the Vietminh, the French were so humiliated and embarrassed in the eyes of the world that they decided to stiffen their resistance to others seeking independence. This led to a decade long war in Algeria which the French were resolved not to lose. Unlike Indochina, there were large
The U.S. supported the Thieu regime in an election so fraudulent all opponents withdrew. The war officially ended in 1973; Nixon resigned in 1974 so did no t preside over the rout of the South Vietnamese in 1975 when the North took over the entire country. Results for America: One and a half million counted dead in Indochina, 58,000 of whom were Americans. Millions maimed. Over 500,000 refugees. Between 1965 and 1971, the
" (The Wars for Vietnam) There was also in increase in bombing and the air war over North Vietnam. Conflict intensified and Nixon severely bombed targets in Hanoi and Haiphong in 1972. This action brought condemnation for the international community and further increased the problematics for America of pursuing the war. This was to have the effect of forcing the Nixon administration to reconsider its negotiation strategies. After fifteen years of
Indochine and the Battle of Algiers Director Gillo Pontecorvo's The Battle of Algiers and director Regis Wargnier's Indochine showcase French colonialism. In Indochine, the political aspects of colonialism take a backdrop to a love story set amid gorgeous scenery, while The Battle of Algiers is an uncompromising look at the bloody cost of French rule in Algeria. In essence, Indochine provides a cursory look at French colonialism before the onset of