GE Moore

G.E. Moore According to G.E. Moore, Ethics is a "systematic science," that seeks to offer "correct reasons for thinking that this or that is good," (6). As a science and a rational discourse, Ethics must be based in logic and must not reflect any logical fallacies. Therefore, in sections 5-13 of Principia Ethica, Moore systematically analyzes the nature of 'good' and proves that it is logically impossible to define the term.

In fact, Moore shows that one of the most common philosophical pitfalls is the attempt to define 'good,' either in absolute or relational terms. As Moore illustrates, good is indefinable because the concept is too simple and too fundamental. A definition necessarily implies a breaking down of something into relational parts; because the concept of 'good' cannot be broken down into any smaller elements, it cannot be defined logically.

Because Ethics is a logical discourse, no philosopher studying Ethics can define 'good.' Although good is indefinable, Moore ironically asserts that "how 'good' is to be defined is the most fundamental question in all Ethics," (5). Moore calls the question "What is good?" The "first question" of Ethics, and proposes that "Unless this first question be fully understood and its true answer clearly recognized, the rest of Ethics is as good as useless from the point-of-view of systematic knowledge," (5).

Moore believes this for two reasons: one, because 'good,' however, indefinable, is central to the study of Ethics; and two, because Ethics is a "systematic science" dependent on logic. Interestingly, the answer to the question "What is good?" does not imply that good can be defined. Rather, the "true answer" that Moore wants his readers to recognize is that 'good' is an indefinable concept that is nevertheless the primary consideration of Ethics. In fact, 'good' is to Ethics as 'foot' is to podiatry.

However, a foot can be more easily defined than 'good' because a foot can be broken down and analyzed in terms of its parts and of its relationship to the rest of the body. Moore uses the analogy of a horse to illustrate why one term can be defined and not another. One can define a horse as a "hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus," for example, but one cannot define 'good' in this way.

'Good' is too simple, too pure of a concept to narrow down any further than it already is. Similarly, Moore points out that it would be impossible to define the color yellow because there is nothing to compare it to, nothing more fundamental than the appearance of the color itself. To define yellow in terms of its physics is useless because we cannot actually perceive the physical vibrations of color.

Likewise, it is impossible to define 'good.' One of the reasons why the "first question" is fundamental to Ethics is because the 'good' is the "only simple object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics," (5). No other discipline concerns itself so singularly with what is 'good' and what is 'not good.' 'Good' is the domain of Ethics much as 'God' is the domain of theologians and 'brain' is the domain of the neuroscientist.

However, philosophers providing definitions of 'good' fail to ascribe to reason and logic, which Moore believes are necessary for Ethics to be a viable, practical "systematic science.' Another reason why the "first question" is so important is that a mistaken definition of 'good' leads to more "erroneous ethical judgments than any other," (5). Ethical judgments must be based on reason; otherwise they are vacuous proscriptions. Moore states that the object of Ethics is "to give correct reasons for thinking that this or that is good," (6).

Simply stating that "being nice is good" is not enough. The only way to reasonably deem one thing or another as 'good' is to understand the nature of the "first question." Until the answer to that first question is known, no once can make any Ethical judgment, for there would be nothing to base a judgment on. Although Moore tries to prove why 'good' cannot be defined in these passages, he does clarify that 'good' can't be defined verbally.

However, 'good' can be understood; Moore implies that understanding 'good' is as innate and natural as recognizing the color yellow.

Moreover, understanding 'good' is more important than defining 'good,' in the same way that for a theologian understanding 'God' is more important than defining 'God.' While many Ethicists would attempt to define 'good,' such definitions are ultimately as fruitless as for a theologian to define 'God.' Moore criticizes Ethicists that attempt to offer solid definitions of 'good' because these definitions are illogical and improvable and because a definition of 'good' cannot be made with words.

Words are constrictive; words can no more define 'good' than they can define 'yellow.' Any verbal definition of 'good' would be, in Moore's words, "synthetic and never analytic," (7). Therefore, a verbal definition of 'good' cannot conscribe to Moore's definition of Ethics as a "systematic science." Good' is impossible to define because it is a simple concept. In fact, 'good' is one of the essential parts that can help define other objects or concepts.

"All things that are good are also something else," whereas 'good' itself cannot be broken down into any other parts and cannot be anything else but good (10). The Ethicist must concern him- or herself with understanding the nature of 'good' without succumbing to what Moore calls the "naturalistic fallacy," (10).

Essentially a logical fallacy of circular reasoning, the "naturalistic fallacy" entails defining 'good' in terms of other objects that have already been labeled 'good.' Moore demonstrates that if 'good' is defined in relation to something else, then it would be logically impossible to refute that definition.

For instance, someone could posit that "good is having a big nose." With no other reasonable definition of 'good,' no one could logically refute that statement any more than one could refute the statement, "Playa means beach in Spanish." Someone who doesn't speak Spanish would simply have to believe.