George Berkeley's Principal Metaphysical Position Is Idealism;

George Berkeley's principal metaphysical position is idealism; nothing including material objects, exists apart from perception; external objects are ultimately collections of ideas and sensations. From his earliest writings in the philosophical commentaries, Berkeley's idealism is evident. Taking into consideration his thoughts as taken from The Empiricists when he contends that his belief is that apples, trees, mountains exist out there, unperceived by any mind. Some may view this as a contradictory view. The reasons that some interpret this as contradictory are numerous.

If we examine more of Berkeley's views as set forth in his essays from The Empiricists the disagreements regarding his view may be clearer. Berkeley's early treatment of idealism is evident. He refers to his doctrine of "the immaterial hypothesis. Only persons exist: "all other things are not so much existences as manners of the existence of persons." This could be perceived as a contradiction to his belief that apples, trees, mountains and other matter does not exist out there, unperceived my any mind.

In his quote he insinuates material items exist in a person if the person exists. Even if they are in the mind of the person they exist in the mind if not materially. He anticipates that "a mighty sect of men will oppose me," that he will be called young and upstart, a pretender, vain but his confidence is not shaken. This could be perceived as paranoid if not contradictory because he has thoughts that exist that his views will not be accepted.

This is a thought that exists and is perceived by Berkeley. Berkeley's early work is devoted to explaining the apparent immediateness with which the distance of an object is seen. The essence of the whole consists of two propositions (1) that the object (or ideas) of sight have nothing in common with the objects of touch and (2) that the connection of sight and touch is arbitrary and learned by experience only. The connection is arbitrary but it is regular and constant.

What we see suggests to us that we may experience only. The connection is arbitrary but it is regular and constant. What we see suggest to us what we may expect to touch and handle. (Atherton). Given this scenario on Berkeley's thoughts it and be received that he does not believe that objects are figments of our imaginations. Rather if it does not exist as a tangible touchable object it does exist as an idea. The idea is not imagined it is real, therefore it exists.

The whole visible world, according to Berkeley in his work Theory of Vision or Visual Language, consists of a set of signs which, like a language have for their purpose to convey a meaning, though like the words in a language they neither resemble not cause that meaning nor have any necessary connection with it. In using sight to guide our movements we interpret the language of God. (Atherton). Once again an implication that 'something' exists even if it is as a thought or idea.

It exists more deeply than imagination it is a conviction and so in some form it must be perceived as something tangible in nature. Berkeley's early theory of idealism, the version now associated with his name, is found in The Empiricists in his essays. In his writings Berkeley argues that no existence is conceivable and therefore not possible. This is not either conscious spirit or the ideas (i.e. objects) of which such spirit is conscious. Locke affirmed secondary and primary qualities of the material world.

Secondary qualities including color and taste do not exist apart from sensations; primary qualities exist irrespective of our knowledge. Berkeley denies this distinction. (Atherton). He holds that external objects exist only as they are perceived. There are however, two classes of ideas (1) the less regular and coherent, arising in the imagination, and (2) the more vivid and permanent, learned by experience.

"Imprinted on the senses by the author of nature." So Berkeley is saying that even perceptions and the idea of the belief that they were made some higher order does exist. They exist as memories and perceptions and are real memories and perceptions therefore they are not imagined. Berkeley further contends that they are the real things, matter is not an objective reality but a composition of sensible qualities existing in the mind.

"No object exists apart from the mind, mind is therefore the deepest reality it is the prius, both in thought and existence, for a moment we assure the popular distinction between the two." For Berkeley, the great obstacle to knowledge is the misuse of words, particularly the substitution of words for ideas.

"It is the mist and evil of words that has chiefly obscured from us the nature of reality." Berkeley is saying that a reality exists beyond the imagination or in ideas through the words and the perception of the words and their meaning put on objects. All our ideas are really particular and concrete; it is only because we have been content to accept words in place of ideas that we have imagined the possibility of abstract general ideas.

Locke himself is the victim of such verbalism and abstraction, for what else is this material substance but an abstract idea, or a mere words which represents no idea at all? Berkeley's discussion of abstract ideas are a refute to Locke's thinking. For Locke an idea is whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, hence the term expresses. For Berkeley ideas means an object presented to the senses or represented in imagination.

It is not a figment of the imagination if it can be represented and have a concrete idea or memory to attach to it. An abstract idea although abstract still exists. It is not part of Berkeley's polemical purpose in the discussion of abstract ideas to develop the realistic implications of this position, or to show how it is that an idea in itself particular, is qualified to represent other particular ideas of the same class. The abstract terms which he is concerned to invaluable are merely general.

Of these the best example is Locke's abstract matter, from which all particular and therefore all general qualities have been removed. The reality of all external things, then, consists in the particular sensations from which they derive these names, and by which they are distinguished from one another, think away these particular ideas.

Berkeley retorts with the question, "what can be the support of ideas or sensations but percipient mind? The thing is nothing but the sum of its qualities, what is true of each of the qualities is true of their sum. The thing itself is far as we can intelligently speak of it, depends for its existence upon percipient mind. Berkeley disagreed with Locke on the perception of what exists.

Berkeley's thoughts on the existence of an apple or a tree seem contradictory until his thoughts on what is real are examined deeper. Berkeley's contention was that even in the most abstract sense an object exists if it can be attached to a real memory.