Gonzales v. Oregon and the Politics of Medicine

¶ … Briefings on Administrative Law

Case facts

In 1994, the initial state law that gave physicians the authority to prescribe lethal amounts of controlled substances to terminally ill patients was established by Oregon. However, in 2001 the Attorney General Ashcroft affirmed that the physician-steered suicide dishonored the Controlled Substances Act enacted in 1970. The Attorney General threatened to revoke all the medical physician licenses of those who took part in the practice. As a result, Oregon took a step and filed a claim against Ashcroft in the federal district court. The Federal court and Ninth Circuit declared that Ashcroft's directive as illegal. Both courts asserted that the Controlled Substances Act did not authorize to the attorney general to control the physician-assisted suicide. The case touched on medical issue that was historically entrusted to the states (Lindsay 2006).

Issue

The actual issue from the case is whether the Control Substance Act grants the Attorney general the authority to prevent doctors from prescribing regulated drugs to facilitate the physician-assisted suicide. Is the state law wrong for particularly authorizing such medical uses?

Holding

No, the control Substance Act does not grant the Attorney General any form of authority to prohibit medical practitioners (doctors) from prescribing the lethal control substances to enhance the physician-assisted suicide in a manner that is encouraged by the state law.

Reasoning

Justice Kennedy submitted the opinion of the court. At the start, the Justice affirmed that under the Chevron deference, the interpreting agencies are afforded deference through their interpretation of the ambiguous laws or statutes, as long as the congress has granted authority to the agency to make regulations that have the force of law. Therefore, it can be asserted that the attorney general did not apply the considerable experience of his agencies as well as their professionalism to give a regulation that would assist in establishing an ambiguous law. The court affirmed that the attorney general had only restated the statutory language and paraphrased different portions.

Besides, the justice department and the attorney general were not entitled to the Chevron deference in this case. It was affirmed that as the attorney general tried to explain the ambiguous phrase "legitimate medical purpose," he surpassed the authority given by the congress under the plain language of the Controlled Substance Act. In this case, he was neither adding constituents to the schedule nor registering physicians. According to the majority, the interpretive rule was highly unreliable with the painstaking manner in which the congress had specifically listed the protocols for classifying drugs as well as listing the physicians. Moreover, they asserted that nothing concerning declaring entire sessions of conduct illegitimate under the law. The attorney general has an extensive authority over various legal interpretations. However, it is significant to identify that the power does not exceed to exercising control over the medical field decision best left to doctors and all the knowledgeable professionals. Later, the court affirmed that the Control Substance Act could not be explained as the Attorney general suggested. Evidently, the congress aimed at prohibiting doctors from issuing recreational drugs hence evading the act.