Government Emergency Management and the

Government Emergency Management and the Government Both Nice and Grosse (2001) and Farazmand (2001) agree that the structural nature of the U.S. federal government results in very specific policy-making patterns when it comes to crisis. Nice and Grosse (2001) argue that crises are focusing events for legislators and that government policy is always a function of crisis. In other words, the emergence of a crisis is what will most likely spur on action at the federal level because it draws attention to an existing problem.

Similarly, Farazmand (2001) points out that policy-making in the United States is fundamentally reactive instead of proactive, primarily because rapid changes in political power make consistent policy decisions all but impossible. From an emergency response perspective, this reality of federal inconsistency and reactive qualities represents a major issue. Ultimately, if all policy decisions are based on reactions to crises only, then the problem of management will be significantly worsened because attention will only be focused on an issue when it has surpassed a critical point.

Perhaps this will always be an issue for the U.S. federal government because under the existing political system there are few substantial options for making policy decisions that can extend across political elections. Situations that represent a problem for one politician or political party will be ignored by the next, making consistent, proactive responses difficult if not outright impossible. From an emergency management position, this means that agencies will always have to be designed to react to the worst-case scenarios, instead of more reasonable, proactive.