Greece and the Pending European

Greece and the Pending European Constitution Under development pending feedback from client] An Analysis of the Impact of the European Constitution on the Countries of Europe in General and Greece in Particular Europe is now presented with a historically unique opportunity...The (constitutional) contract must be such as to ensure mutual gains from trade.. The only constitutional structure that is consistent with the historically constrained setting of the 1990s is that of a federal union.

- Bernard Steunenberg, 2002 The epigraph above suggests that the nations of Europe are faced with some profound challenges in the years to come. Indeed, as these countries attempt to forge an increasingly close political and economic alliance that promises to represent one of the world's leading marketplaces, they have encountered a number of obstacles that many observers did not expect, while others point to the historical differences that have always existed between some of the nations of Europe and suggest that such an alliance is not necessarily in everyone's best interests.

Nevertheless, the trend is clear and Europe has moved inexorably in the direction of a "United States of Europe" by virtue of adopting a common currency and eliminating trade and travel barriers between their respective countries. According to Hylarides, "For many years, a united Europe was promoted as something practical. Your passport was not inspected at the border and the introduction of the euro gave the freedom to travel without having to change currency" (p. 86).

Furthermore, the various treaties, agreements and other documents executed by the European Union in recent years have made it clear that some type of umbrella constitution is needed to help complete this process, but the leadership of some countries in Europe have been reluctant to approve a European constitution for a wide range of reasons that specifically relate to their own respective interests.

Statement of the Problem Before analyzing the European Constitution and its communications techniques, it is crucial of understanding the political situation existing today in many European countries and the historical effect that the Union had on each country. As such, the examination of the political reality will reveal on going impacts and provide helpful conclusions for its present form. Other areas that will require special attention in the future are the psychology of the masses and modern sociology which will expose deeper human behaviour.

Therefore, in order to create effective public relations strategy and tactics, the whole public relations sphere in Europe must be analysed. Purpose of Study The main areas of concentration in the research will be why the people of two founding members of the EU, France and the Netherlands, have rejected the proposed constitution and what this rejection actually means for the other European countries.

The purpose of this study, then, is to identify timely answer to the following research questions: Are there any others to follow? Is it an objection against the Union or the Constitution? Which are the actual problems found behind this negative vote? Do people know what the Constitution is all about or is it a matter of communication in politics? How can public relations best introduce and support the European Constitution establishment to these countries? This author's predictions about the perceived problem is that the European citizens have not been involved with the European Constitution, mainly because they feel neglected from the whole concept of the unite Europe.

By rejecting the Constitution they express a feeling of doubt for an unknown institution. The fast forward play of the new enlargements, new treaties, and new policies did not give any chance for the citizens to adapt to the new Europe. The political parties played a misleading role in communicating effectively the meaning of each new policy that was made. The reality is that most of the people do not know what the Constitution is all about; people just wanted to send a message.

Another question here arises; that the referendums with negative result that conducted may cause a domino effect in other key player countries like UK. It is sure that the major countries will play the influencer role in another countries and that is why the communications campaign must be targeted towards these countries. Importance of Study In his essay, "The Draft European Constitution," Kallmer (2003) reports that the importance of the European Union and its implications for the rest of the world are profound.

"The European Union (EU)," he advises, "has been one of the most successful creations in the history of political institutions. For the past half-century, harmonization of the policies of many European countries has helped make war in Western Europe unthinkable, enhanced the living standards of millions of people, and enshrined into law a vast array of important social, political, and human rights. Integration has fundamentally altered the way Europeans think about their relationships to one another, to their governments, and to the outside world" (p. 2).

According to Dale (2003), relations between the United States and the nations of Europe have experienced some rocky times in the recent past, particularly following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, due in large part to the ongoing power struggles within Europe as the European Union enlarged itself from 15 to 25 members and attempts to craft itself a first-ever European constitution. "These epoch-making events are unsettling traditional power relationships inside Europe and leading to new alignments and alliances of European states," Dale emphasizes (p. 39).

Despite the turbulent times and the current controversies between the United States and some of the countries of Europe, the fact remains that these countries share much in common and it is reasonable to expect that these are transient issues that will be amicably resolved. Nevertheless, today, the increasingly dominant German and French axis is confronting its most serious challenge yet as the European Union expands for the first time across the former Iron Curtain (Dale, 2003).

Not only are there some fundamental differences in how these processes are viewed by observers in the U.S. And elsewhere, there are clear differences emerging between the countries of Europe themselves. In fact, some nations of Europe, though, particularly those with historically close ties to the United States, are caught up in this political maelstrom because these countries continue to want close relations with the United States more than some other existing EU members (Dale, 2003).

In this regard, Dale reports that, "At their deepest level, the clashes reflect inevitable tensions between a United States that feels its sole-superpower status gives it a broad entitlement to get its way in world affairs and a uniting Europe that is struggling to become a more influential political and economic actor on the global scene" (2003, p. 39). Therefore, an effective and sophisticated public relations campaign will bring people closer to the European Union as there is much room for advancement.

Scope of Study This study will extend to include implications of the European Constitution for the nations of Europe in general and to Greece in particular. Overview of Study This study uses a five-chapter format to answer the above-stated research questions. The first chapter introduces the topic under consideration, the scope of the paper, the problem to be addressed and its importance.

The second chapter consists of a critical review of the relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature, and chapter three describes the mixed methodology used to accomplish the goals of the study. Chapter four provides an analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data identified, and chapter five presents a summary of the research, salient conclusions and recommendations for policymakers and areas of future research. Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature History of the European Constitution.

According to Steunenberg (2002), "The European Union has evolved during the last fifty years through the conclusion of several treaties among the governments of European countries. Its evolution resembles that which one would expect for a confederation of autonomous states, and it seems most accurate to characterise the European Union as a confederation rather than as a federation. The locus of political power in the European Union has been the Council of Ministers located in Brussels.

Each member country is represented on the Council, with some collective decisions being made using the unanimity rule, and some made using a qualified majority rule, with larger countries receiving more votes than smaller ones" (p. 48).

The European Community was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1958; the mandate of the new union, as stated in article 2, was to forge a common market in order to promote "a harmonious development of economic activities"; the Treaty of Rome also established a broad range of institutions, including a Council, a Commission, a Parliament, and a Court of Justice, thereby providing the basis as well as the requisite impetus, for the development of a genuinely supranational legal and political community (Ward, 2003).

According to this author, "Famously, the real drive came from the Commission and the Court of Justice, with the former zealously pursuing the stated aspirations of the Treaty, and the latter ensuring that the law of the market was uniform and fully effective" (Ward, 2003, p. 2091). Today, the European Union is an international organization comprised of 25 European countries that governs common economic, social, and security policies.

While it was originally restricted solely to the nations of Western Europe, the EU has since expanded to include several central and eastern European countries (Gabel, 2006). The countries of the EU today are, in alphabetical order, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Originally, the EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force on November 1, 1993; this treaty was intended to enhance European political and economic integration by creating a single currency (the euro), a unified foreign and security policy, common citizenship rights, and by advancing cooperation in the areas of immigration, asylum, and judicial affairs (Gabel, 2006). In recent years, these trends towards unification and Europeanization have appeared unstoppable. In fact, in February 2005, voters in Spain ratified the European Constitutional Treaty or the European Constitution, as it is generally called (Gurfinkel, 2005).

According to this author, "As the world knows by now, this is the document intended to supersede every previous all-European treaty and pact and to provide the European Union (EU) with a unified legal and political framework. Most Spanish political parties, including the ruling Socialist party and the main opposition party, had campaigned for a yes vote, which won by a resounding 75%. The turnout, however, was very low: 42% of registered voters" (Gurfinkel, 2005, p. 39).

At the time, this low voter turnout was largely ignored and the conventional wisdom among both pundits and politicians suggested that the results of the Spanish referendum would establish the trend for the other EU Member States that had likewise chose to conduct popular referendums on the constitution rather than deciding the matter in parliament.

These nations were France (where the vote was to be held on May 29, 2005), the Netherlands (June 1, 2005), Luxemburg (July 10, 2005), Poland (September 25, 2005), Denmark (September 27, 2005), Portugal (October, 2005), Ireland (by end of the year 2005), the United Kingdom (Spring 2006), and the Czech Republic (June 2006) (Gurfinkel, 2005). "Each would surely vote yes," Gurfinkel notes, "perhaps not overwhelmingly but by a workable majority. As for the fifteen countries that had opted for ratification by parliament, the outcome seemed no less predictable: almost everywhere, Europhiles outnumbered Euroskeptics" (p. 40).

In 2003, though, the heads of state of the European Union failed to reach an agreement on the proposed constitution. Following the collapse of the negotiations, British Prime Minister Tony Blair recommended a "time for reflection," and suggested that representatives of the Member States should now demand another version (Kallmer, 2004). According to this author, "Europe certainly deserves better.

The EU is at a pivotal moment in its history, and the way in which Europe's leaders craft its constitution could affect its second fifty years as profoundly as World War II affected its first" (p. 2). Likewise, a policy statement from the Ecumenical Review (2003) emphasizes that, "Europe is a diverse and evolving region, with multiple geographic, economic and religious parameters.

The enlargement of the European Union to the east and south in 2004, and the expansion of NATO, along with the proposals for a new European Constitution by the convention on the future of Europe, will be decisive factors in shaping the destiny of the continent" (Statements on Public Issues, 2003, p. 401).

In fact, a European constitution could provide a viable framework to promote democratic values and potentially improve the economic performance of its Member States; however, even this initiative would only represent part of a first step into a new sense of a European union with diversity (Werz, 2001). Clearly, then, there is much to be considered when studying the current situation in Europe, but it is difficult to keep track of what is taking place at various levels throughout the region.

In their book, European Constitutionalism beyond the State, Weiler and Wind (2003) report that, "The pace of change in European public discourse has been dizzying. At the beginning of the last decade, in the heady days before Maastricht, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament were poised to divide the reporting spoils - such as they were then - between themselves.

The two big prizes were the report to be presented as Parliament' input into the Maastricht process and the grand project, dating back to Spinelli' Draft Treaty, of writing a constitution for Europe" (p. 1). At that time, the Socialist party enjoyed the majority and the right of first choice; Weiler and Wind note that they chose Maastricht and rightly so. Today, though, the debate has moved from "Does Europe need a constitution?" (Grimm, 1994, p. 37 cited by Weiler & Wind at p.

2) to, "What should be in the new European Constitution? A list of competences? A Constitutional Court? A reconfigured Council with a president? An elected president? et cetera." (Weiler & Wind, 2003, p. 2). Not surprisingly, the heated debates and national referendums have also been fuelled, in a very typical European fashion, by a political agenda (enlargement) and timetable (the Intergovernmental Conference (Weiler & Wind, 2003, p. 2). The ratification process for the Constitution of Europe, though, ground to a virtual halt in 2005 (Helm, 2006).

Originally, the constitution was established through a European Union treaty signed in Rome in 2004 and was intended to make a community originally designed for six founding members in the 1950s more workable with a membership of 25 disparate countries.

Governments that were faced with selling the document to a heavily skeptical electorate, such as that in the U.K., claimed that the treaty did not amount to a large extension of the EU's powers and was little more than a "tidying-up exercise." Meanwhile, many pro-integration political leaders in France and Germany billed it as a significant move toward the full "political union" to which they had always aspired.

The document, which would supersede all previous community treaties (except the so-called Euratom Treaty, which established the European Atomic Energy Community), contained several significant -- "and highly controversial -- "changes to the structure and functioning of the 25-member European Union (Helm, 2006). The constitution was established through a European Union treaty signed in Rome in 2004 and was intended to make a community originally designed for six founding members in the 1950s more workable with a membership of 25 countries with wide-ranging and sometimes disparate interests.

Governments that were faced with selling the document to a heavily skeptical electorate, such as that in the U.K., claimed that the treaty did not amount to a large extension of the EU's powers and was little more than a "tidying-up exercise." At the same time, a number of advocates of further European integration, including various political leaders in France and Germany, characterized the initiative as being a substantive move toward the full "political union" that has been promoted in recent years (Helm, 2006).

The proposed European Constitution would in fact supersede all previous community treaties (except the so-called Euratom Treaty, which established the European Atomic Energy Community), but it contained several significant -- "and highly controversial -- "changes to the structure and functioning of the 25-member European Union (Helm, 2006). The constitution would introduce fundamental changes in the way that EU members voted on European issues so that majority voting -- "where no one country could block a decision -- "would become the norm.

A qualified majority would consist of "at least 55% of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65% of the population of the Union." The national veto would disappear in 39 policy areas, including sensitive matters such as justice and home affairs.

In an effort to achieve better management of EU business and improve continuity in policy making, the document called for the creation of the post of EU president, who would be voted in by the heads of governments for a period of up to five years (Helm, 2006). The president replaced the system of rotating presidencies, under which member states took turns chairing EU meetings and coordinating business for six-month terms. An EU foreign minister would be chosen by national governments for up to five years.

The foreign minister would have his or her own supporting diplomatic service, the European External Action Service, and would represent the EU's interests in foreign affairs -- "for example, in official dealings with the UN. A formal Charter of Fundamental Rights was incorporated into the constitution and given legal force.

It stated: "Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited." The constitution also confirmed that EU law had "primacy" over national law and gave the EU the power to sign international treaties on behalf of its member countries; the document also created the post of European public prosecutor and devised common policies on foreign affairs and defense matters, though national vetoes would remain in these areas (Helm, 2006).

To achieve the force of law, though, the new constitutional treaty had to be ratified by all 25 member states either through referenda or by votes in the national parliaments. Its rejection in France and the Netherlands therefore meant that it had to be abandoned for the foreseeable future, though proponents insisted that they were going to continue to pursue a viable constitution in the future (Helm, 2006).

In this regard, Rees-Moog (2006) reported recently that, "There is bad news for all those who believe in British independence and do not want a United States of Europe: we may be losing the battle. Last year looked so good, with the defeat of the European Constitution in the Dutch and French referendums. We thought Foreign Secretary Jack Straw might be right when he said the constitution was dead. He wasn't; it isn't" (p. 65).

Before an agreement on a new set of rules was reached (and there was no alternative announced as of end-of-year 2005), the EU would have to work under the existing treaty rules. Not surprisingly, a number of the failed constitution's advocates argued that this situation would mean ineffectual decision making and would leave the EU less effective than it should be in international affairs (Helm, 2006). Europeans and the European Constitution.

When the original 13 colonies of the United States hammered out their constitution, there was an enormous amount of dissension involved based on the sometimes mutually exclusive interests of the respective states involved. It is not all that surprising, then, that the disparate nations of Europe have encountered similar difficulties in their road to unification based on such individual differences in customs, values and social processes.

For example, in their book, Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation?, Eriksen and Fossum (2000) report that in their attempts to more accurately conceptualize the EU, some researchers have transcended the "simple supranationalism embedded in neo-functionalism and the state-centric view of intergovernmentalism, to conceive of the EU as a system of multi-level governance which consists of multi-tiered, geographically overlapping structures of governmental and non-governmental elites" (p. 14).

In this dynamic political and economic environment, it is difficult to predict what the eventual outcome will be, but it is clear that the most of the nations of Europe are seeking to continue this process to their mutual advantage. For example, in his timely essay, "Europe's Fake ID," Stutzman (2001) makes the point that there are a number of alternatives available to the nations of Europe today as they forge increasingly close political and economic alliances, and asks, "In which category does Europe fall?" (p. 94).

In other words, just how compatible is the progressive formation of a supranational "Brussels Man" identity created through the various media with the lingering effects of local and national identities? In this regard, Stutzman maintains that the European project need not mirror historical fluctuations between ethnic and civic conceptions of identity. Rather, the EU might well fall somewhere in the middle ground where "the nation would allow scope for the maintenance of cultural and ethnic differences" (Stutzman, 2001, p.

94) This "marble cake" model, then, in which distinct local or national cultural identities are harmoniously embedded in a broader European identity, reinforces the principle of devolution that already has become evident in the various EU states that have been able to provide their citizenry with unrestricted access to the various global media; these countries include federal or regional countries such as Belgium, Germany, and Spain, but also more unitarian states such as France, Italy, and the United Kingdom (Stutzman, 2001).

Given this historic differences that have existed between many of the nations of Europe, though, these economic and political initiatives appear to be insufficient to overcome them. Despite these constraints, though, there is much to be gained by continuing the process through the adoption of a formal constitution. In fact, given the numerous treaties and other legal agreements that have been adopted in recent years, Europe could be said to already have an all-but-in-name constitution that merely needs to be codified in a single document.

In this regard, Eriksen, Fossum and Menendez (2004) report that, "The claim, by a good number of scholars, that Europe already has a constitution, must be understood from such a perspective. The Court of Justice and national constitutional courts have developed the means to determine the contents of this material constitution of the Union out of the basic constitutional materials, that is, essentially the founding Treaties and the common national constitutional traditions" (p. 5).

The fast track to the adoption of such a constitution, though, has been derailed, perhaps fatally so - at least in the short-term. According to Hylarides (2005), "At the start of the summer [2005], two founder members of the European Union voted against the new European constitution. Although the results were to be expected, they still sent a shockwave through the political establishment. Both France and the Netherlands were, until recently, considered to be standard-bearers of closer European integration.

The No-vote in these two countries in particular provides a clear signal to eurocrats that they are out of touch with reality" (p. 86). Nevertheless, the citizens of Holland and France made it abundantly clear that they did not consider the proposed constitution in their best interests: "With a strong turnout of 70 per cent of the electorate, 55 per cent of the French voters said No to the constitution. Only three days later the Dutch had their say, the first time they were given the opportunity to vote in a nationwide referendum.

It was a resounding No with an even greater majority: 61.6 per cent of the electorate rejected the proposed treaty, misnamed the European 'constitution'" (Hylarides, 2005, p. 87). Today, there are global structures of finance, production and trade that already diminish the boundaries of the nation-state; the process of globalization has also created increasing interdependence and an increase in the risks that could lead to and ultimately require transnational and supranational cooperation (Eriksen et al., 2004).

In order to maintain pace with the forces of globalization, then, regional political alliances such as the EU are clearly needed and many observers believe that a European constitution provides the best means of protecting Europe's distinctive form of solidarity in a globalizing world. Despite these views, though, there are some profound challenges ahead. "The challenge before us is not to invent anything but to conserve the great democratic achievements of the European nation-state, beyond its limits.

This raises the larger issue of what to retain from the nation-state, and, further, whether the forging of a European constitution does imply the need to establish a European state, or whether the present structure can be reformed so as to accommodate such a union (Eriksen et al., 2004). Indeed, many of the nations of Europe have long-standing disputes that policymakers appear to have ignored in their quest for unification that will not simply go away.

"Insecurities concerning political strategies, national self-perception, and individual well-being have contributed to a revival of nationalist traditions and ethno-religious distinctions that were thought long left behind. Therefore, the most pressing question is whether new democratic and multinational traditions will be successfully invented in continental Europe to supersede the pitfalls of twentieth-century nationalism" (Werz, 2001, p. 1). Communicating the Attributes of the European Constitution.

When the chairman of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, presented the efforts of his work in June 2003 following a lengthy period of diplomatic negotiations, he passionately sought a referendum to be held in all EU countries (Hylarides, 2005). At the time, the government in the Netherlands did not evince any particular enthusiasm for such a referendum.

In fact, Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende maintained that the subject of a new European constitution would be too complicated to lend itself to a simple Yes or No vote; however, fully 80 per cent of the Dutch population believed that a referendum on the proposed constitution would be appropriate and in May 2003, three members of parliament from GroenLinks (Green Party), PvdA and D66 sponsored a bill that provided for a referendum on the new constitution (Hylarides, 2005).

As Kallmer (2004) points out, though: "The essential merits of a constitution are found as much in the process as in the substance. An effective constitutional document not only sets out the core rights of citizens and the basic structures of government, but does so in a way that is clear, concise, definitive, and accessible. A constitution is for people, not bureaucrats, and it is imperative that it speak as plainly as possible. Regrettably, the draft constitution produced by Mr. Giscard and his colleagues shows few of these procedural virtues" (p. 2).

According to Hylarides, an important component of the proposed Law on the Consultative (i.e. non-binding) Referendum concerning the European Constitution was the creation of an Independent Referendum Commission, consisting of scientists, politicians and communication strategists who would write a summary of the constitution; this document would then be delivered by mail to the electorate two weeks prior to the conduct of the referendum (Hylarides, 2005).

Depending on one's perspective, the need for an aggressive public relations campaign became abundantly clear at this time: "One million euro would be set aside to finance the campaign, dividing the money equally between proponents and opponents of the constitution. The bill was finally and reluctantly approved by the First Chamber of the bicameral Parliament in January 2005.

When the decision was made to let the people speak, Prime Minister Balkenende set off the campaign by emphasizing that a No vote would lead to 'unavailing stagnation, fixation on self-interest and lack of vigour in getting to grips with problems that affect people'" (Hylarides, 2005, p. 87).

The first opinion poll conducted in January 2005 on behalf of the government indicated that just 30 per cent of the Dutch population approved of the proposed constitution and more than 80 per cent of the electorate indicated they had no idea what the constitution was about, while fully two-thirds believed the European constitution would replace the Dutch constitution (Hylarides, 2005). By all accounts, then, more effective public relations were going to be required to overcome these profound misperceptions and suspicions.

In this regard, this author emphasizes that, "There was a lot of work to do for the government if they really wanted a Yes vote. According to Foreign Affairs minister Bernard Bot the government's campaign should be impartial. This would then prove to be the best approach to convince the electorate" (Hylarides, 2005, p. 87). The Dutch government's public relations campaign, though, required longer than expected and the results of what was produced was regarded as less than a stellar effort by some observers.

For instance, Hylarides notes that, "Although a dry summary of the constitution could be read on the internet and the actual text was published in an equally boring special newspaper by the beginning of April, there was no sign of government ministers actively pursuing the goal of a Yes vote. One MP compared their attitude to the 'behaviour of a rabbit in the spotlight'. Even when it became clear that the French were tilting towards a No vote, there was no reason to panic according to Bernard Bot.

'When you start too soon, it [the momentum] will be lost. The last few weeks are vital to put the message across'. In retrospect, Mr. Bot was clearly wrong. Near the end of April opinion polls showed the No vote to be at an estimated 58.2 per cent" (p. 88). The political leadership in Holland followed these missteps with still other public relations campaigns that clearly had the opposite effect of what they were intended to achieve.

For example, speaking at a political rally in April 2005, Dutch Justice Minister Donner cautioned the audience that a No-vote would endanger peace in Europe: European integration has brought us peace and stability for the past sixty years. In order to maintain this, we should not run aground in impotence. Whoever thinks nature should run its course would do better to look back at the situation in the Balkans.

Yugoslavia was more integrated than the Union now, but the unwillingness and inability to limit mutual annoyances and rivalry led to war in a short period of time.. Those who want to.. put the future at stake should, above all, vote No in the coming referendum. (cited in Hylarides, 2005 at p. 88) Furthermore, the Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende also created dissension among the nation's citizens by associating a No vote on the constitutional referendum to the holocaust: "I went to Auschwitz and Yad Vashem; these images still affect me.

We need each other in Europe to prevent these kinds of things"; by contrast, the Dutch Minister for Alien Affairs, Mrs. Verdonk, indicated during a televised talk-show that the Dutch government might simply ignore a No vote on the constitution and the Economic Affairs Minister, Brinkhorst suggested in an interview that a referendum was not an appropriate instrument to secure this approval because the general population has no idea what Europe is about (Hylarides, 2005).

According to this author, "When the government started a full-blown campaign for the Yes vote it was already too late. Two separate summaries of the constitution had been mailed to the electorate. The first summary contained a sentence that played into the hands of opponents of the constitution. It clearly stated that EU law would prevail over national law" (Hylarides, 2005, p. 88).

While this in fact was already the case under the existing various treaties and agreements that forged the European Union in the first place, the Referendum Commission determined that it should be mentioned separately as it was the first time that this rule was referred to in the new constitution (Hylarides, 2005). In retrospect, then, it is a fairly straightforward matter to identify some of the missteps involved in this public relations campaign, but these were not the last PR missteps to take place in the Netherlands and France.

According to Gurfinkel, the public relations blitz used by the French government was poorly conceived and was not executed appropriately. "From the start," he advises, "the overriding reason for the constitution's unpopularity was its sheer clumsiness. Every French citizen awoke one morning to find in his mailbox a 191-page booklet containing, in fine print, the projected Constitutional Treaty itself (87 pages), protocols and annexes (72 pages), and a final.