Hitler\'s Rise to Power

Appeasement

Abraham Ascher was a noted author of history and distinguished Professor Emeritus at City University of New York until his death in 2012. His scholarly article in The Journal of the Historical Society discusses in great depth the failure of European leaders to recognize the harmful intentions of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich -- until it was too late.

Ascher points out with well-crafted narrative and well-verified sources that Hitler should not have been a riddle at all -- albeit the Nazi leader had a "penchant for contradictory pronouncements" and few European leaders had read Mein Kampf -- because all the signs showed Hitler's villainous obsession with power and his ability to stir up extreme nationalistic emotions (Ascher, 2009).

The purpose that Ascher had in writing the article was to carefully, thoroughly review the way in which European leaders (in particular, British leaders) came to slowly understand Hitler's "…commitment to militarism" and in the process appeased the fanatical dictator who hated Jews.

The article's main contention / argument is that Hitler was crafty and clever in his ability to use propaganda to coax the German people into giving him dictatorial powers; and that all along Hitler had hideously violent plans driven by his anti-Semitism. Ascher uses several pages of his essay to reference reports / dispatches authored by Sir. John Horace Rumbold, the British ambassador to Berlin (1928-1933), which boldly and clearly spelled out Hitler's fanaticism and apparent plans to dominate Europe. If Hitler has his way, "The German race…would now be master of the globe…" Rumbold wrote (Ascher, p. 8).

The main point Ascher is trying to get across is that notwithstanding the repeated official warnings about Hitler's huge military build-up and ambassadorial reports referencing Hitler's raging, unstable personality -- from Rumbold and from Sir Eric Phipps (ambassador who took over in 1933) -- England apparently was reducing its forces and wasn't overly concerned. Here is a typical report mentioned by Ascher: "Phipps warned his superiors at the Foreign Office that it would be folly for Western countries to make concessions to the Germans" (Ascher, p. 13).

Here are quotes that present the principal supporting arguments from Ascher vis-a-vis Britain's appeasement policies: a) officials in London (in 1938) "…shied away from confronting him as a leader unscrupulous in the pursuit of his goal, the enhancement of Germany's Power" (p. 14); b) ambassador Nevile Henderson reported (1938) that Hitler "…may have crossed the border-line of insanity" (p. 16) and yet Henderson also said Hitler "hates war as much as anyone" (p. 17); c) Prime Minister (PM) Neville Chamberlain was "the chief architect of appeasement"; and after visiting with Hitler three times in September, 1938, the PM said Hitler could be "relied upon when he had given his word" (p. 17-18); d) "It had taken Chamberlain over six years" to fully understand what "Rumbold and Phipps" had been saying (p. 19); and e) had the advice of ambassadors in the early 1930s been "heeded" the British "could have stopped Hitler… history of the twentieth century might well have been different…" (p. 19).

Critique on the article: Ascher makes his points without using emotional language, and every new point is logically linked to the last point. The author's juxtapositions (pointing to Hitler's madman outbursts contrasted with Britain's apparent indifference to vividly presented dispatches from its ambassadors) are very effective. I really enjoyed reading this article and most of the points Ascher makes are credible. I most certainly bought into his narrative approach to identifying appeasement towards Hitler. The article achieves its goal and there were only a couple points in his conclusion that were less than totally believable.