Immanuel Kant Philosopher

¶ … Philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre [...] MacIntyre's criticism of duty-based and goal-based moral theory, and his reasons for preferring a right-based moral theory. It will also include reactions to his views and his virtue-based moral theory. MACINTYRE'S MORAL THEORIES MacIntyre criticizes duty-based and goal-based moral theories on several levels. He feels morals based on duty and goals are not virtuous, and therefore do not belong in moral theory, and that the moral character people develop from living by these theories is flawed.

The child learning to play chess is an excellent example of both of these theories, and why MacIntyre feels they do not work. The child is not learning to play chess because it wants to learn.

The child is learning to play chess because MacIntyre wants it to learn, and gives it a goal, candy, and a duty, "play with me." Eventually he hopes the child will derive satisfaction and learn new skills from playing chess, and then the moral theory will change, and the child will derive enjoyment from the entire practice. Thus, goal- and duty-based morals may lead to satisfaction, but that is not always the case, and they are not as preferable as the virtue-based morality.

There is another criticism of goal- and duty-based theories, and it is based on the accumulation of external and internal goods. MacIntyre defines a virtue as "an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods." He goes on to say that the more external goods, such as property and possessions, a person has, the less there are for others.

Therefore, a virtue-based morality will leave more property and possessions to go around for everyone, while goal- and duty-based moralities tend to leave less property and possessions to go around. MacIntyre prefers a right-based moral theory for several reasons. It is more virtuous than the other theories, and so fits into his thoughts on practice much more effectively.

A right-based moral theory helps the members of a practice work together for the common good, or "right," and helps each individual develop the characteristics necessary to benefit the whole, unlike a goal- or duty-based theory, which is more self-serving. Doing business would not be a form of practice for MacIntyre. He cites the game of football and farming as practices, and these are both businesses, but those who engage in them get more internal satisfaction than external (for the most part).

He also cites the "creation and sustaining of human communities" as a practice. He defines his practice as any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.

Businesses rarely if ever fall into that category, as there are certainly many businesses that have absolutely no standards of.