Individuals Become Terrorists? As the Costly Global

¶ … Individuals Become Terrorists?

As the costly global battle against terrorism continues, the question is constantly begged, "Why do some individuals become terrorists while others do not?" Certainly, there are some generic attributes that distinguish many individuals who are considered terrorists in the eyes of the international community, including being young and male, but the generalities tend to stop there because women and even children have also been involved in terrorist attacks in the past. To gain some fresh insights about these issues, this paper provides a review of the relevant peer-reviewed and scholarly literature concerning the various motivational factors that have been shown to turn ordinary individuals into terrorists. Following a discussion of these issues, a summary of the research and important findings concerning why some individuals become terrorists are provided in the conclusion.

Review and Discussion

What is terrorism, anyway? Although a single, universally acceptable definition of terrorism is not available, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives" (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). In addition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) further differentiates terrorism as being domestic or international as follows:

Domestic terrorism is the unlawful use, or threatened use, of force or violence by a group or individual based and operating entirely within the United States or Puerto Rico without foreign direction committed against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof in furtherance of political or social objectives.

International terrorism involves violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any state. These acts appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. International terrorist acts occur outside the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (Terrorism 2002-2005, p. 1).

An important point made by Wilkinson (2001) in defining terrorism is that is different from other forms of social responses, even if its overall objectives are similar. In this regard, Wilkinson emphasizes that, "Terrorism is a special form of political violence. It is not a philosophy or a political movement" (2001, p. 107). Having distinguished what terrorism is not, Wilkinson then goes on to explain what it is: "Terrorism is a weapon or a method, which has been used throughout history by both state and sub-state organisations for a whole variety of political causes or purposes" (2001, p. 107). The five major characteristics of this special form of political violence are as follows:

1. It is premeditated and aims to create a climate of extreme fear or terror;

2. It is directed at a wider audience or target than the immediate victims of the violence;

3. It inherently involves attacks on random and symbolic targets, including civilians;

4. The acts of violence committed are seen by the society in which they occur as extra-normal, in the literal sense that they breach the social norms, thus causing a sense of outrage; and,

5. Terrorism is generally used to try to influence political behaviour in some way: for example to force opponents into conceding some or all of the perpetrators demands, to provoke an over reaction, to serve as a catalyst for more general conflict or to publicize a political or religious cause, to inspire followers to emulate violent attacks, to give vent to deep hatred and the thirst for revenge, and to help undermine governments and institutions designated as enemies by the terrorists (Wilkinson 2001, p. 107).

Clearly, then, there terrorism is a broad-based concept but there are some useful distinguishing characteristics of terrorism that can help distinguish terrorists from political activists and others who seek political change through less violent means (Wilkinson 2001). An important point made by Silke (2003), though, is that most people do not just wake up one morning and decide, "Well, my life is terrible so today is the day I become a terrorist." Rather, Silke emphasizes that, "Becoming a terrorist is for most people a process. It is not usually something that happens quickly or easily" (2003, p. 35). Because the question is so important, it is not surprising that there has been an increased amount of interest by researchers concerning why some people become terrorists. To date, though, no overarching explanation has been advanced that is supported by valid and reliable clinical evidence. For instance, according to Silke, "As yet there is no scientific evidence of any genetic role in determining why certain people become involved in terrorism, and specific biological approaches to explaining terrorism have tended to be flawed" (Silke 2003, p. 35).

Despite these limitations, it is possible to evaluate the known actions of thousands of terrorists over the years to develop some level of consensus concerning the precise motivational factors that can turn ordinary people into terrorists. Just as there is no universally accepted definition of "terrorism," there remains a lack of consensus concerning which motivational factors are most operative in compelling people to make the fateful decision to turn their lives into a "weapon" in their capacity as terrorists; however, what is known is that the more motivational factors present, the more likely an individual is to make that decision. In this regard, Silke emphasizes that, "It is important to stress again that neither are these single-issue explanations of why people become terrorists. Rather each factor works in combination with other factors, and the more factors present, and the more pronounced each factor is, then the more likely it is that the individual could become a terrorist" (2003, p. 36).

Although every individual is unique, of course, the two biological factors that have been consistently linked with individuals becoming terrorists are gender and age. According to Silke, "While a causative role for these factors is not entirely unambiguous, there is certainly a correlation between the two factors and most recruits to terrorist organisations" (2003, p. 36). While it would be disingenuous to suggest that profiling is a socially acceptable tool, from a strictly pragmatic perspective, domestic and international law enforcement authorities looking for terrorists would be well advised to first look for young men because these are the overwhelming majority of terrorists today as well across time and cultures. Indeed, Silke points out that, "Most people who join a terrorist group are teenagers and people in their early twenties, and most new recruits are male" (emphasis added) (2003, p. 36).

This pragmatic assessment is supported by a ponderous amount of scientific literature confirming that adolescent and young adult males are responsible for the overwhelming majority of violent crimes around the world (Silke 2003). For example, Silke notes that, "Statistics on violent crime across the world consistently show that the perpetrators of violent crimes are most likely to be males aged between 15 and 25 years of age. This is a very robust finding that is remarkably stable across cultures and regions" (2003, p. 36). In fact, adolescent and young adult males are responsible for more criminal activity than any other age group (Silke 2003). It is also not surprising, then, that most terrorists are also young men, an outcome that is likely associated with their propensity to engage in other high-risk and dangerous activities that are associated with this age group -- again across time and cultures.

As noted above, the more motivational factors that are present, the more likely an individual is to make the decision to pursue life as a terrorist (but likely not with this term in mind). According to Silke, "With terrorism, the same factors that attract young men to deviant activity in other spheres can also play at least a partial role in the attraction terrorism holds for a few. Higher impulsivity, higher confidence, greater attraction to risk-taking and needs for status can all work to give life as a terrorist a certain appeal for some young males" (2003, p. 36). Other extremely common motivational factors that have been consistently associated with the decision by individuals to join known terrorist groups include retribution and revenge (Reich 1998). The research to date suggests that young men are most likely to be attitudinally positive concerning retribution and vengeance as motivational factors and younger men are responsible for the majority of the violent attacks carried out by terrorist organizations (Silke 2003).

All of this is not to say, though, that just because they are young and impulsive, that terrorists are also stupid. Indeed, according to Abrahms, "The international community cannot expect to make terrorism unprofitable and thus scarce without knowing the incentive structure of its practitioners. The strategic model -- the dominant paradigm in terrorism studies -- posits that terrorists are political utility maximizers" (2008, p. 78). From the strategic model's perspective, people make the decision to become a terrorist when their cost-benefit analysis makes the alternative the most attractive of the options that are available to them (Abrahms 2008). Therefore, the optimal approach to combating terrorism is to make other forms of protest more attractive, or terrorism less attractive, or both. In this regard, Abrahms reports that, "[E]xtant counterterrorism strategies seek to defeat terrorism by reducing its political utility. The most common strategies are to fight terrorism by decreasing its political benefits via a strict no concessions policy; decreasing its prospective political benefits via appeasement; or decreasing its political benefits relative to nonviolence via democracy promotion" (2008, p. 1).

Similarly, Schwarzmantel suggests that individuals make the decision to become terrorists when they become sufficiently disenfranchised from their societies that they see no viable alternative. The solution, Schwarzmantel argues, is to reduce this disenfranchisement to the point where terrorism no longer comes out ahead in the cost-benefit analysis. In this regard, Schwarzmantel writes, "Terrorism can be seen . . . As a sign that liberal-democracies are not living up to their proclaimed or professed principles. The most effective way of responding to this challenge is to minimize the distance between the principles of liberal-democracy and the reality of the society in question" (2011, p. 94). This is an important point because in order to be labeled a "liberal-democracy," the society in question must be egalitarian and to the extent that it marginalizes segments of its society is the extent to which such hypocrisy represents a motivational factor for some people to join with others of a like mind in what the mainstream society terms a "terrorist organization." As Schwarzmantel points out, "Terrorism functions as a challenge to liberal-democracy and can be effective only where there is such a gap between principles and reality" (2011, p. 94). Likewise, Gupta (2008) stresses that individuals, read young males, make the decision to join terrorist organizations and perpetrate violent acts based on this perception of a collective identity. Moreover, while they may be young and impulsive, effective terrorists are sufficiently savvy to recognize that their actions will be ineffective if they focus on a single grievance to the exclusion of other compelling historical or religious factors because in liberal-democratic societies, there will always be disparate views from different interest groups and there are usually political mechanisms available to address them such as replacing existing lawmakers at the polls.

According to Gupta, many young men resort to terrorist activities out of a sense of religious obligation. The collective identify provided by terrorist organizations is accentuated when there are shared religious views that frame violent actions in positive terms. In this regard, Gupta reports that, "In human groups, religion provides the grist which holds a society together by clearly identifying those who are members of the community. . . . This process of identification also allows members to be altruistic toward their own group while providing justification for extreme violence against non-believers" (2008, p. 49). In order to be effective, though, terrorist organizations must be careful in shaping their message, at least initially, to make their cause sufficiently attractive to gain credence and recruit new members. In this regard, Schwarzmantel notes that, "The 'framing' has to be capable of convincing, in the beginning at least, a small number of followers who constitute the nucleus of a movement" (2011, p. 94). Likewise, Gupta points out that besides religion, economic and nationalistic issues can also represent motivational factors in the decision-making process for individuals who become terrorists. According to Gupta, there must be a "strong enough collective identity, which is formed through the framing of a grievance by political entrepreneurs by expressing them in the context of religion, nationalism or economic class' (emphasis author's) (2008, p. 73). When it comes to religion in particular, Gupta suggests that many young people are "ready to kill" (2008, p. 73).

As noted throughout, the more motivational factors that are present, the more likely individuals will be to make the decision to become terrorists through this accentuated sense of collective identity. Indeed, Atran points out that, "Although millions of people support violent jihad, very few are willing to do it. Those who do pursue violent jihad usually emerge in small groups of action-oriented friends" (2008, p. 1). Although calling Al-Qaeda a "group of action-oriented friends" makes them sound like a new line of toys, these otherwise blood-thirsty, revenge-seeking madmen are just that -- friends that have forged a sense of collective identity by taking part in the normal activities that characterize life around the world. According to Atran, would-be terrorists "come from the same neighborhood and interact during activities, such as soccer or paintball. Often they become camping and hiking companions who learn to take care of one another under trying conditions, which causes them to become even more deeply attached" (2008, p. 1). Just 2 years before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and clearly reading the handwriting on the international wall than many of his contemporaries, Laqueur prophetically wrote that this sense of collective identity would form the basis of future global terrorism: "Traditional terrorism will certainly continue; for years to come it will remain the prevalent mode of conflict, sometimes in its 'pure' form, at other times within the framework of civil wars or general lawlessness" (1999, p. 274).

This enhanced sense of collective identity therefore serves as the foundation for the violence that follows when these individuals become sufficiently disenfranchised that terrorism seems like a good idea. In this regard, Hoffman emphasizes that, "Even when terrorists' actions are not as deliberate or discriminating, and when their purpose is in fact to kill innocent civilians, the target is still regarded as 'justified' because it represents the terrorists' defined 'enemy'" (1998, p. 163).

This means that even the most heinous terrorist acts can be whitewashed into something more acceptable by the terrorists themselves -- and even the rest of the world -- if the framing has been performed correctly and the Big Lie is told often enough. According to Hoffman, "Although incidents may be quantitatively different in the volume of death or destruction caused, they are still qualitatively identical in that a widely known 'enemy' is being specifically targeted. This distinction is often accepted by the terrorists' constituents and at times by the international community as well" (1998, p. 163). The Palestinian terrorists that committed the attacks on the Munich Olympic Game in 1972 followed this precise methodology. In a letter written by the terrorist group that carried out the attacks, the point was made that:

We are neither killers nor bandits. We are persecuted people who have no land and no homeland . . . We are not against any people, but why should our place here be taken by the flag of the occupiers . . . why should the whole world be having fun and entertainment while we suffer with all ears deaf to us? (quoted in Dobson, 1975, p. 95)

Taken together, it is reasonable to suggest that individuals that make the decision to become terrorists do so based on the multitudinous motivational factors that have been associated with these groups rather than a desire to become a "killer," "bandit" or even "terrorist" because these are incongruent with the positive attitudinal views they hold as a result of their sense of collective identity. Indeed, it would seem that most terrorist groups view themselves in a highly positive light irrespective of their bloody past. In this regard, Hoffman reports that, "Terrorist organizations almost without exception now regularly select names for themselves that consciously eschew the word 'terrorism' in any of its forms" (1998, p. 30). Just as "Al Qaeda" does not mean "bloody cut-throats" but rather, "The Base," well-known terrorist organizations have selected names that reflect their positive perceptions of themselves, including the following: