Kennedy's political motivations behind the Apollo program launch

John F. Kennedy and the Apollo Program

Among other things, the 1960's will probably be remembered most prominently for its culmination in the moon landing, successfully achieved by the United States of America. Often hidden from public view is the political intrigue and innuendo accompanying such large, prestigious projects. President John F. Kennedy, the American president at the time, played the main deciding role in the launch and success of the Apollo program. Interestingly, his interest was not so much focused on space exploration itself, but rather on the political ends to be gained from the success of such a publicly popular endeavor. While President Kennedy announced the goal of an American moon landing before the end of the decade on 25 May 1961, there was a large amount of uncertainty regarding the launch and sponsorship of the program. The final deciding factor, and the driving force behind the eventual success, was motivated by President Kennedy's political goals. According to Dick (Oct 22), only the Panama Canal compared with the Apollo program in size of a non-military endeavor.

Political Motivations

President John F. Kennedy was elected as president of the United States in 1960. As such, his focus was upon power structures and American/Soviet relations rather than romantic visions of conquering the last frontier of space (Dick, Oct 22). He therefore had little direct interest in the space program itself. What was mainly important for him was maintaining the balance of power and influence, especially as these relate to Russia.

When the Soviet Union however began to make significant non-military progress in space, this forced Kennedy to pay more attention to the space program in his own country. From the beginning, his interest was politically motivated, although the space program itself was built upon American pioneerism. For Kennedy, the space program became a competition, or the "space race," as it became known.

To prove that the United States was as capable as Russia in their space endeavors, Kennedy was obliged to commit government time and resources to NASA's civil space program. The Cold War therefore served as a basis from which NASA could expand its program to culminate in Project Apollo. For Kennedy, however, this was not of primary importance. Instead, the civil space program was to serve as a concomitant research endeavor with the military space program in terms of such developments as ICBMs and satellite reconnaissance systems.

With this in mind, Kennedy was nonetheless not prepared to launch the civil space program without an advisory committee. This entity was headed by Jerome B. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Wiesner's 12 January report in 1961 focused largely upon the importance of space exploration in the minds of civilians. He emphasized to Kennedy the importance of gaining civilian popularity by these means, and warned against letting Russia take precedence over the United States in this area:

Space exploration and exploits have captured the imagination of the peoples of the world. During the next few years the prestige of the United States will in part be determined by the leadership we demonstrate in space activities." (Dick, Oct. 22)

While Wiesner emphasized the importance of several space technology applications, including non-military and national security applications, he considered human spaceflight less important. The reason for this was the status of the American launch vehicle technology at the time. It was not developed sufficiently to safely place an astronaut in space without significant risk and a concomitant low chance of success. Furthermore, the scientific value of such an endeavor was low, while other more established space technologies yielded better results. Wiesner therefore recommended developing the programs that were already strong and use these to establish the United States' position in space technology. Kennedy however disagreed with Wiesner's assessment (Dick, Oct. 22).

Kennedy was in fact more motivated to pay attention to human space flight. Again, this is motivated by politics and public support. The public was much more entranced by the prospect of putting human beings in space than the other, more "useful" applications mentioned above. Kennedy was therefore motivated not as much by scientific use as by public support for his administration. The president did however recognize that the risks to the astronauts themselves were minimized, while also minimizing Russia's chances of preceding the U.S. manned space flight effort. He therefore addressed these risks by a clever political innuendo.

President Kennedy offered to cooperate with the Soviet Union to explore space. He spoke directly to the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in January 1961, asked the Soviet Union publicly for their cooperation, and called for a limitation on war during the exploration of space. Consequently, Kennedy accomplished a number of political goals. It is interesting to note that Kennedy knew that the Soviet Union would be unlikely to accept his offer of friendly cooperation (Dick, March 24). Nevertheless, in the eyes of the public, his diplomatic role as statesman was established by seeing friendly cooperation instead of competition. By refusing, Russia would contrast with the apparently friendly Americans, by attempting to monopolize space for their own benefit. This in turn minimized the prestige of the Soviet Union regarding their own space accomplishments as opposed to those of the United States. Even if Russia did accept the agreement, this would still provide a favorable picture of the United States as recognized equal in terms of their space technology as compared with that of the Soviet Union (Garber, 2002).

Interestingly, the Moon program itself was not as much a priority as manned spaceflight in terms of an orbiting astronaut. However, specific radical advancements by Russia during 1961 decided the issue of the moon landing, despite Kennedy's marked unwillingness to commit to a space program that was significantly aggressive. This unwillingness was evident in Kennedy's reluctance to provide the expanded budget for the program requested by James E. Webb, NASA Administrator, in March 1961. The lunar landing program was already in existence as a long-term goal during the Eisenhower administration. Webb, however, wished to accelerate this goal. Once again, Kennedy's unwillingness was motivated by his public image. He was unwilling to raise the necessary taxes to allow for the large increase. On the advice of his budget advisor, therefore, he provided NASA only with a modest increase (Garber, 2002).

Kennedy's unwillingness changed radically as a result of two significant events during this time. The first and most important was the successful effort by the Soviet Union to send the first human being into space. This occurred on 12 April 1961, when Yuri Gagarin entered space in a one-orbit mission in the craft, Vostok 1. This momentous event almost immediately placed the Soviet Union most prominently in the public eye. This was greatly assisted by Gagarin's outgoing personality, which made him an effective spokesman for the Soviet Union.

Not only had the chance to place the first person in space therefore been lost for the United States, but they have also faded to the background of the public consciousness. The country's effort to send a man of its own, Alan Shepard, into orbit, was dismally bleak when compared to the Russian accomplishment in more than one respect (Garber, 2002).

Most importantly, the United States appeared to attempt an imitation of the Russian effort, which in itself is not a very prestigious accomplishment. While Shepard was the first American in space, his suborbital flight lasted only 15 minutes, with 5 minutes of weightlessness, while Gagarin spent 89 minutes in weightlessness. Gagarin's spacecraft was much bigger at 10,428 pounds than Shepard's, which weighed 2,100 pounds (Dick, Oct 22). According to the media, the United States still led the way in terms of military and technological space research, the Russian effort was by far more spectacular, and therefore more prominent in the public view. For the public therefore, the United States had fallen behind in the space race. Again, this had important implications for the Cold War, because the United States apparently lagged technologically behind the Soviet Union. President Kennedy therefore faced the desperate necessity of needing to demonstrate his nation's technological leadership in the eyes of the world (Garber, 2002).

Another motivation for reconsidering the importance of the Moon program was an important event in the Cold War. The Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba occurred in April of 1961, with the purpose of overthrowing Castro. Because the attack was conducted by Cuban refugees, it was assumed that they would be welcomed by their compatriots. This was however not the case, and the mission was a failure. President Kennedy's and the American reputation was badly damaged by this disaster.

Combined with the Soviet space situation, the Bay of Pigs invasion served as part of the motive to accelerate the Moon program. According to Dick (Oct 22), Kennedy made his commitment to Project Apollo public on 25 May 1961. This announcement speech was filled with references to the contrast between the "free" world and that of "tyranny."

Kennedy used the space effort as a symbol of winning "the battle for men's minds." The spectacular effect achieved by the Russians therefore had a significant effect upon the minds of citizens around the globe (Dick, March 24).

The financial and political implications of the Apollo program became significant once the president made the decision to commit the United States to a Lunar landing. It was important to the president to set a goal that his country had a good chance of achieving before the Soviet Union. After a definite decision for the launch of the project was made, further important issues of politics and financing became deciding factors in the growth and development of the program.

The decision proved to be sound if the reaction of the nation could be used as a measure of effectiveness. The American imagination was captured, and they lent overwhelming support for Kennedy's decision to sponsor the moon landing. In the eyes of the nation, difficulty, expense and complication were minor issues in the light of the grand achievement that it promised to be.

In terms of the political issues mentioned above, the Apollo program and intended moon landing were so ambitious that it effectively dealt with most of the problems faced by the administration during the time. If they were successful, the Soviet leadership in space and technology would be effectively rivaled, and any other embarrassing political decisions, such as the Bay of Pigs would vanish into the background. Indeed, the presidential commitment to the program was sufficiently dramatic to once again place the United States at the forefront of the space race. Interestingly, this was accomplished by no more than announcing the president's intention to commit to the program. Nothing practical had been accomplished to back the commitment. Yet the size of the program was sufficient to impress the nation's imagination in symbolic terms, and Kennedy effectively refocused the spotlight of the world upon the United States (Dick, Oct 22).

The timing is also significant. In 1961, neither the United States or the Soviet Union had nearly the technological or scientific capacity to carry out a moon landing. This was in fact so far beyond the ability of either country that the early success of the Soviet Union's space endeavor could in no way predetermine whether they would be able to rival the American in a project of such scale. The United States therefore had a reasonable, or even a strong chance of success. The public mood, as seen above, was therefore one of excited optimism and complete support.

The concomitance of political and public support for the program provided NASA with the drive and resources necessary to launch the project on a very large scale.

Additional programs were also created for further scientific and technological support and research that could be used prior to and after the moon landing. From the beginning, the program was therefore conducted on an integrated basis (Dick, Oct 22).

This integration also occurred on the public scale: in addition to international prestige, the technological group assigned to the Apollo program proposed a national effort that would incorporate not only scientific, but also commercial components. In this, the positive mood of the nation could then be used to full effect to encourage continued support for the Apollo. In retrospect then, it is easy to see how Kennedy, despite his initial misgivings, had little other choice than to announce his commitment to the program. The overwhelming confluence of people, institutions and interests moved the administration inevitably towards the decision and its culmination. Once the decision had been made, financial and technical issues, along with the promised time scale, needed particular and close attention.

Project Mercury

The aim of Project Mercury was an American manned orbital space flight. There are several reasons for the relative obscurity and lateness of the Shepard flight. The flight was for example postponed for a number of weeks in order to resolve problematic details. it's final culmination on 5 May 1961 took place less than three weeks before Kennedy made the Apollo announcement. Another, suborbital mission was launched on 21 July, and was also problematic and resulted in the astronaut Gus Grissom nearly drowning upon his return to Earth. These experiences were however valuable in terms of resolving potential problems in space flight, as well as the eventual moon landing (Dick, Oct. 22).

In the final stages of Project Mercury, a capsule was developed that would support a human being in space for as much as three days, instead of just minutes. The choice of the Atlas instead of Redstone launching vehicle was furthermore problematic in terms of controversy. In addition to the practical problem of mating the vehicle to the capsule, NASA engineers were in disagreement regarding the vehicle's propriety for human space flight. It was believed that the flimsy-looking technology would not be safe for human spaceflight. However, after several successful tests, the dissent began to clear. On 20 February 1962, John Glenn, as the first American to do so, circled the Earth three times in the Friendship 7 Mercury craft (Dick, Oct. 22).

Although there were still problems, this was much more spectacular than the Shepard attempt, and provided the United States with a much-needed boost in reputation and morale regarding the space program. Problems included the failure of the autopilot and a loose heat shield. In general, and in the light of previous experience, the flight was a resounding success. Glenn became symbolic of the national pride cultivated by this success as a representative of heroism and dignity. As such, he was also representative of the potential power of not only the space program, but particularly the astronauts taking part in the program, over public opinion. NASA made full use of this discovery and frequently used not only Glenn, but also other astronauts in their public relations endeavors (Dick, Oct. 22).

After three more successful flights during 1962 and 1963, Gordon Cooper circled the Earth 22 times in 34 hours on 15-16 May 1963. The culmination was not only successful in terms of accomplishing the spaceflights themselves, but also in terms of the technical data NASA was able to gather for the future of the Apollo project. Aspects of tracing, control, microgravity and biomedical issues were for example clarified during the flights (Dick, Oct. 22).

Despite this enormous learning experience, however, there still existed several technological gaps between the requirements for orbital travel and those for a Lunar landing. Project Gemini was launched with the purpose of filling this gap.

Project Gemini

Project Gemini was created to supplement the learning that could be accomplished by ground-level experimentation and training. Three major areas to be addressed by the project included the ability of spacecrafts to dock with each other in space, astronauts working outside the spacecraft, and data regarding physiological issues related to extended spaceflight (Dick, Oct. 22).

Gemini included such features as the ability to sustain two astronauts during flights lasting more than two weeks. Fuel cells were used instead of batteries. The most important research goal was rendezvous and docking techniques. Costly delays were however caused by unforeseen problems such as the redesign of fuel cells and long hours of overtime to fuel flow and vehicle control. The financial implications of these difficulties were significant: the initial estimate of $350 million rose to more than $1 billion. The commitment to the Apollo program however took precedence over financial concerns, and NASA had little trouble justifying the rising costs (Dick, Oct. 22).

After the resolution of difficulties, Gemini was occupied by human begins for the first time in 1965. Edward H. White II performed the first spacewalk in June 1965 during a four-day flight. By November 1966, eight more flights had been completed. The precedent was now set for the implementation of the Apollo program.

Speculation: What if Kennedy had lived?

It is obvious that Kennedy played a very significant role in the success of the Apollo program, despite his early death. Nevertheless, it remains true that his motives were political rather than scientific. For this reason, and on the evidence of certain letters, reports and documents, authors such as Dwayne a. Day speculate regarding the fate of Apollo if Kennedy had not been assassinated.

Authors such as Day argue convincingly that Kennedy had been unenthusiastic about the space program from the beginning. It was only the political factors mentioned above and a desire to win the nation's favor that drove the decision for rather than against support. Day then argues that Kennedy was having serious misgivings regarding the costly program during 1963. During this year, he again made a proposal for a joint lunar landing effort with the Soviet Union during his address before the 18th General Assembly of the United Nations. When asked about this, Kennedy asserted that he wanted to demonstrate America's position of strength via such cooperation.

As further evidence that Kennedy might have wished to withdraw from Apollo, Day uses Kennedy's request for a budget report on NASA shortly before his death. Specifically, Kennedy asked his committee to investigate the question of "backing off from the manned lunar landing goal" (Day), upon which the answer was "in the absence of clear changes in the present technical or international situations, the only basis for backing off from the Manned Lunar Landing objective at this time would be an overriding fiscal decision." (Day).

The question now remains whether these fiscal considerations would have been sufficient to deter Kennedy from continuing the Apollo program. In retrospect, the moon landing was a momentous event, and of very significant importance for the United States as a country. The whole world witnessed with awe and wonder as Neil Armstrong and his colleagues landed and stepped out onto the moon. It was an extremely intense historical moment.

Given Kennedy's keen intuition for politics, along with the importance he attached to his public image, one could ask the question whether he would truly have considered withdrawing after the grand publicly lauded promises made in 1961. At this stage, it is only possible to make an educated guess, but one has to take into account the issues carrying the most weight with Kennedy. Certainly he must have been aware of the public outcry had he made the decision to withdraw the program. Furthermore, this would have given the Soviet Union a gap to continue making way in their own space program and possibly sending an astronaut of their own to the moon.

Successfully completing the mission to the moon was not only a technological and scientific feat beyond all human accomplishment until 1969, it was also a very large public relations feat. It is hard to imagine that Kennedy would have seriously considered withdrawing from such prestige and its concomitant power in the public mind.

So significant is the accomplishment, that even today the moon landing is used as symbolic of the ultimate human accomplishment. Indeed, authors such as Kipp Teague even today hails the great accomplishment that was the moon landing from the perspective of a then 12-year-old boy. These are memories that have formed the American nation, and many believe that the nation would have been poorer without it.

Finally, when taking into account all the evidence, and Kennedy's own assertions that he was more interested in politics than space, it seems possible, but perhaps not likely that he might have been planning a withdrawal from the Apollo program. Although the world may have had to remain without an American moon landing had Kennedy not been killed, it is also possible that Kennedy's hunger for political power and prestige would have won over financial considerations. On the other hand, until more evidence comes to light, it is only possible to speculate and be grateful that the moon landing, despite all the difficulties involved, did after all take place.

Kennedy's death is an undeniable tragedy. Perhaps history would have been much different - for both good and bad - had he lived. Nevertheless, if he were observing from some post-mortem location, I believe he would have been proud of himself and his team for the accomplishment that was the Apollo program.

Sources

Bell, David. Memorandum for the President, "National Aeronautics and Space Administration Budget Problem," 22 March 1961, NASA Historical Reference Collection. Available online: http://history.nasa.gov/JFK-Webbconv/pages/bellmemo.pdf

Bizoni, Piers. "Politics of Apollo - U.S. moon flight mission." Omni, July, 1994. Database: FindArticles.com

Day, Dwayne a. "Murdering Apollo: John F. Kennedy and the retreat from the lunar goal (part 2)." The Space Review, Nov. 6, 2006. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/739/1

Dick, Stephen J. "Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis." National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Oct 22, 2004. http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Apollomon/Apollo.html

The Decision to Go to the Moon: President John F. Kennedy's May 25, 1961 Speech before joint Session of Congress. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. March 24, 2004. http://history.nasa.gov/moondec.html

Garber, Stephen J. "A Historic Meeting on Spaceflight: Background and Analysis." NASA History, Nov. 5, 2002. http://history.nasa.gov/JFK-Webbconv/pages/backgnd.html

Multiple Means to an End: A Reexamination of President Kennedy's Decision to Go to the Moon." 2006. http://history.nasa.gov/JFK-Webbconv/pages/james-letter.pdf

Teague, Kipp. "Contact Light': a personal retrospective of Project Apollo." 2007. http://www.retroweb.com/apollo_retrospective.html

Transcript of Presidential Meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Topic: Supplemental appropriations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 21 November 1962.

Webb, James E. Letter to President Kennedy. October 29, 1962. NASA History

http://history.nasa.gov/JFK-Webbconv/pages/james-letter.pdf.