Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)

Joint direct attack munition (JDAM) Implementing Acquisition Reform: A Case Study on Joint Direct Attack Munitions - July 1998 Given the early Phase II in the JDAM program, critically assess and evaluate the transformation decisions, strategies, processes, and techniques the government and industry leaders used to implement Acquisition Reform. What are your general impressions (who, what, when, where, why, how)? Who: The primary protagonists and numerous "players" listed below.

What: The JDAM program aims at developing sophisticated -- but affordable -- "strap-on" guidance kits that can be attached to standard Mk-83 and BLU-110 1000-lb "dumb" bombs, and Mk-84 and BLU109 2000-lb "dumb" bombs. Through the use of an inertial navigation system augmented by updates provided by GPS, which guide active control surfaces, JDAM kits permit highly accurate delivery of bombs from a variety of aircraft platforms under a wide range of adverse weather and environmental conditions.

8 JDAM has a range of about 15 nautical miles when dropped from high altitudes (Lorell, Lowell, Kennedy & Levaux, 2000, p. 140). When: JDAM was initiated in late fiscal year 1991 and had its roots in Desert Storm. It was during that conflict that military leaders realized the need for all-weather, extremely accurate bombs capable of being dropped from a number of aircraft platforms (Ingols & Brem, p. 6). The competition among the two primary contractors bidding for this project was fierce.

According to the case study authors, "McDonnell Douglas -- along with rival Lockheed Martin -- had been competing head-to-head for the $1 billion Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) contract" (p. 18). Where: National in scope; Florida in particular and system-wide in general. Why: There were three main reasons for this initiative: (a) the American public became increasingly vocal in their demands for a "peace dividend" following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War; (b) dwindling defense budgets; and - the need to identify superior defense acquisition processes.

Based on the need to identify superior acquisition approaches quickly during this period, the JDAM was selected because it represented a high-profile and was strictly military in application. According to the case study authors, "Because JDAM was a high-profile Defense Acquisition Pilot Project (DAPP), there was also a lot on the line for Terry Little and the Department of Defense" (Ingols & Brem, p. 1).

Likewise, the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition Lieutenant General George Muellner, described the JDAM initiative as being "the linchpin" of "the broader Department of Defense's acquisition streamlining activities" (quoted in Lorell, Lowell, Kennedy & Levaux, 2000, p. 140); the JDAM initiative has been placed in Category (ACAT) 1D programs at the time, representing the most important Air Force acquisition category (Lorell et al.).

How: The initiative described in this case study was achieved by identifying inefficient government regulations and procedures that contributed to cost overruns and discouraged cost-saving initiatives.

Who are the primary protagonists? Terry Little, Air Force program manager for Joint Direct Attack Munitions Lieutenant Colonel Joe Shearer, leader of the McDonnell Douglas advisory team Charlie Dillow, McDonnell Douglas program manager for JDAM Lockheed Martin McDonnell Douglas What were their dilemmas, success issues? There were numerous dilemmas and a few successes identified in the case study; the dilemmas included a strongly entrenched organizational culture among both military and civilian personnel that made effecting substantive change difficult without on-going top-down support.

As McDonnell Douglas's program manager for JDAM, Charlie Dillow, found out, "He had to turn the team around, to implement a whole new strategy, and to redesign the system almost from the ground up. Above all, in only 12 months, he had to submit a proposal that was much lower than he ever expected" (Ingols & Brem, p. 18).

In fact, it is unlikely that any such initiative could stand a chance of surviving the rigors of overcoming such powerful inertia without such top-down support, which could be regarded as one of the initiative's successes. In this regard, Little enjoyed some unprecedented support from the Pentagon brass: "I had a strong sense of empowerment, both from the Air Force Chief of Staff who said basically 'Do what you have to do to get the products under $40,000,' to the OSD program office and the leadership there.

My boss and my boss's boss gave me the freedom to innovate and experiment. I could not have been successful otherwise" (quoted in Ingols & Brem at p. 18). Likewise, the case study authors note that, "Dillow and his team had the unswerving support and guidance of Dave Swain, deputy general manager of New Aircraft and Missile Products" (p. 28).

Other dilemmas encountered by the respective development teams from McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin included identifying superior streamlined approaches to existing proposal preparation procedures as well as the need to achieve these goals to remain competitive and even to survive in the post-Cold War defense budget climate. As the case study authors emphasize, "Dillow thought of the thousands of personnel that had been laid off at McDonnell Douglas over the last six years due to de-militarization, lost competitions, and canceled programs.

He knew that neither he nor the company could afford to lose JDAM -- one of the few new projects the Pentagon was willing to fund" (Ingols & Brem, p. 19). One distinct success identified in the case study was the creation of development teams comprised of both civilian and military personnel: "From the beginning, it was clear that the government was treating this program differently. The most obvious evidence of change was the formation of government / industry teams.

The presence of government personnel gave the contractor direct communication and insight to the government's needs and expectations" (Ingols & Brem, p. 24). Some successes identified by the case study authors focused on the cost-saving goals achieved: "Both Boeing and the DoD have heralded the success of the JDAM initiative. There are many parameters by which to judge this success: McDonnell Douglas team's final proposal included an AUPP between $14,000 and $15,000 (from an original cost target of $40,000 and original cost estimate of $68,000)" (p. 33).

In addition, Ingols and Brem note that the McDonnell Douglas JDAM team reduced their R&D development costs by $70 million as well as reducing the development program length by 16 months. According to these authors, "The total procurement cycle length was reduced from 15 years to 10 years, while the product actually improved on original accuracy requirements" (Ingols & Brem, p. 34). Yet another success was the government's communication of the award fee criteria to the two winning contactors.

According to Kerry Bush, McDonnell Douglas team member: "The government did a good job making the award fee criteria very clear. We had a performance incentive program (PIP) that was tied directly to the award fee plan. That really focuses people" (quoted in Ingols & Brem at p. 26).

What were their assumptions? What decisions did they make? Why? How? The Pentagon's acquisition reform office assumed that the JDAM initiative represented a viable project to help achieve the federal mandates for streamlined acquisition procedures as well as providing a useful framework in which to establish precedents for the future. The decisions made throughout the JDAM's development were consistently targeted at achieving the established cost goals without sacrificing the key performance elements needed to satisfy the contract requirements.

These decisions were all made based on authority granted by the Congress to the Department of Defense and then to the respective defense contractors to achieve these goals in ways that took advantage of commercial-like approaches to the same processes. What are your assumptions? It quickly became clear that the political implications of a successful JDAM initiative far outweighed any potential contributions the device had for national security interests.

It was therefore reasonable to assume that both the civilian and military players were motivated by the desire to satisfy their superiors to help them advance professionally. In this regard, Ingols and Brem note that, "When Charlie Dillow received word that his team had won, he sat back in his chair and breathed a huge sigh of relief. It had been a grueling 18 months.

The rewards had been great, he was already in line to receive a promotion, and everyone on the team had enhanced their careers by being part of JDAM" (p. 33). What are the primary issues? The primary issues identified in the case study were the need to deliver the JDAM initiative within the cost estimates provided by Little for $40,000 a unit by implementing more streamlined administrative procedures for awarding defense contracts and how they were overseen during their development.

The JDAM project was started in fiscal year 1991 based on the country's experiences in Desert Storm. According to the authors, "It was during that conflict that military leaders realized the need for all-weather, extremely accurate bombs capable of being dropped from a number of aircraft platforms" (Ingols & Brem, p. 6). In 1993, General McPeak, the Air Force Chief of Staff, insisted that the JDAM per-unit price could not exceed $40,000.

At the time, Little had wondered how he could procure such a low cost weapon when cost estimates based on historical precedents placed the price at $68,000 (p. 2). In April 1994, the Joint System Program Office selected McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis, and Lockheed Martin in Orlando from five original competitors to design the tail kits and to submit proposals to win the development and follow-on production contracts, worth about $2 billion (Ingols & Brem, p. 1).

When informed by Little that the price for the individual JDAM units might be higher than expected, General McPeak flatly informed him that, "By god, if it's one cent over, I don't want it" (quoted in Ingols & Brem at p. 9). What are your recommendations for action? There were some valuable lessons learned in the JDAM initiative that could be used to develop some useful best practices for similarly situated projects in the future.

It is recommended, though, that future projects avoid the mandatory assignment of any specific civilian personnel from a given defense contractor to a project development team because this individual's expertise and contributions may be needed more elsewhere in the organization; such selections should be at the sole discretion of the defense contractor involved depending on the needs of the company at any given point in time. What are the important events? Establishment of the JDAM project in 1991 The Beginning of JDAM -- 1992 to 1994.

Epiphany by Little that commercial-like processes and products could replace more expensive government procedures and products to reduce cost and improve efficiency of supply chain management and streamlining the RFP process could contribute to cost savings in major ways. Engineering and manufacturing development phase I: April 1994 through July 1995. Engineering and manufacturing development phase II: Fiscal year 1996 through mid-Fiscal Year 2000. Production: 87,496 units by Fiscal Year 2002.

How much time elapsed during the events described? The origins of the JDAM initiative began in 1991 and were concluded with the award of the contract to McDonnell Douglas with the latest date identified by the case study authors being September 1995 in the case study itself with later years being described in the study's several appendixes. Who are the players? General Merrill a. McPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff Mr.

John Deutch, Under Secretary of Defense General Joseph Ralston, Air Force Deputy for Tactical Programs Mike Tenzycki, product test and integration engineer; member of the McDonnell Douglas team. Oscar Soler, Little's successor on the JDAM program Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Diane Wright, the OSD action officer for JDAM Dr. George R. Schneiter, Director of Strategic and Tactical Systems and chair of JDAM's Overarching IPT Colonel Joe Shearer, government advocate assigned to help McDonnell Douglas win the contract. John Capellupo, head of McDonnell Douglas. Charles H.

Davis III, supplier manager with Missiles Systems Division and subsequently McDonnell Douglas. Dave Swain, change sponsor at McDonnell Douglas. Carl Miller, McDonnell Douglas team member. Richard Heerdt, supplier manager for McDonnell Douglas's guidance and control unit. Mary Shutt, program manager with Loral. What are their backgrounds? The personnel identified in the case study as being part of the civilian component of the development teams at McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin generally had extensive request for proposal preparation experience as well as longstanding relationships with their governmental counterparts.

In addition, many had extensive experience in defense-related initiatives in the past that had some concomitant commercial applications but JDAM represented the first military-only application for both teams. As to the military personnel, although all of their respective backgrounds are not discussed in detail, the case study makes it clear that the top brass involved were veterans of the acquisition process and possessed the experience and authority to make the decisions needed to move the JDAM initiative along and delegate authority when necessary.

What are their motivations? While there were some clearly laudable military goals associated with the JDAM initiative, these appeared to take a back seat to the enormous economic consequences associated with the project's development and implementation in the field. There were also some powerful political motivations involved, with the powers-that-be in Washington insisting that cost be the fundamental guiding factor in the JDAM's development rather than the previous emphasis on how fast a contractor could respond.

Indeed, promoting an efficient acquisition and development process for appearance sake was one of the more important motivations for the vast majority of the players involved. For instance, the authors report, "The government's willingness to enter into a stable long-term contract motivated each company to work as a team member and to build trust" (Ingols & Brem, p. 32). Finally, the defense contractors were motivated by.".

Little's creative approach to the JDAM acquisition and the strong motivation supplied by the competition and incentive program [which] inspired McDonnell Douglas to come up with innovative ways to engage their supplier chain in the affordability initiative" (Ingols & Brem, p. 30).

What are their attitudes towards other characters and events? Notwithstanding the authors' emphasis that the JDAM represented a timely initiative for identifying improved defense acquisition procedures based on its uniquely military attributes and applications as well as the new non-adversarial approach represented by the RFP developmental process, there were clear overtones of competition among the surviving bidders and national interests appeared to take a backseat to the need to satisfy the mandates establish by Congress and the Pentagon to achieve more cost-effective ways of doing business as usual.

What does the organization look like and what are the reporting relationships? The case study makes it clear that the bureaucracies involved in the JDAM initiative are extensive and convoluted, with the Congress representing the top of the hierarchy, followed by the Pentagon brass and the higher-ups at McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed Martin.

Who has influence over whom? The influence inherent in the respective bureaucratic hierarchies of the respective defense contractors was clearly secondary to the law of the land promulgated by Congress: "The programs were provided legislative authority to implement the provisions before they were published in regulations, and authority to use the commercial item exemptions for non-commercial items. They were also provided expedited deviation authority from the FAR/DFARS and the DoD 5000 series regulations.

This would allow JDAM to issue a 'commercial-like' contract and authority to streamline the milestone review process and reporting procedures through expedited waivers" (Ingols & Brem, p. 5). In addition, as the Air Force program manager for Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Little had an enormous amount of influence over the competing defense contractor teams, but even here, he used an innovative approach that broke with traditional governmental acquisition processes.

According to the case study authors, a major difference in how Little administered the JDAM initiative was the manner in which feedback was provided to the contractors and sub-contractors: "Usually, the government gives the competing contractors little or no response to proposals until after the formal source selection process is concluded. It is common that losing bidders will protest the award, costing the government time and money, and driving the need for over-documentation" (Ingols & Brem, p. 15).

By contrast, the approach used in the JDAM initiative used a "report card" approach over the course of the 18-month selection period. In this regard, Ingols and Brem report, "The source selection team graded the companies on performance criteria and how well they performed to their original plan. The meetings were open discussions and included color-coded grades. The report cards were binding -- how the companies fared during the reviews directly factored into the final decision" (p. 15). Moreover, in many cases, it would appear that influence was reciprocal and fluid.

In this regard, McDonnell Douglas's supplier manager, Charles Davis, emphasized: "JDAM was a phenomenon -- it truly was defined as a product team. Functional roles were blurred and we rarely saw functionality. We didn't throw things over the wall, we did a lot of working around a table to get the best product we could" (quoted in Ingols & Brem at p. 23). What are the cultural overtones? The primary issue to emerge from the case study was the.