The Korean War and MacArthur

Psychological Traps and Intuitive Decision-Making
Psychological traps can be especially dangerous when engaging in decision-making. There are a number of different psychological traps that leaders and decision makers can fall into. This paper will discuss some of these traps, explain how they affect decisions and the intuitive decision-making process, and provide two examples of how this can be seen in the “Korea 1950” case study.
One type of psychological trap is the anchoring trap, which occurs when a decision maker gives disproportionate weight to the first bit of information received, allowing this tidbit of data to inform and shape his entire outlook when subsequent data would better help to explain a situation so that a more informed and rational decision could be made.[footnoteRef:2] The status-quo trap occurs when one has a bias towards maintaining a current situation even though better options exist for organizing or implementing a course of action. This trap can cause a leader to keep an organization from achieving its objectives out of fear or pride. The sunk-cost trap occurs when one continues to repeat the same mistakes of the past: an individual will make choices not based on objective assessment but rather out of a prejudice or desire to see previous choices justified—i.e., the individual will continue to throw good money after bad with the hope that the sinking plan or project will turn around and rebound. [2: John Hammond, Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa, “The Hidden Traps in Decision Making” Harvard Business Review (1999), https://hbr.org/1998/09/the-hidden-traps-in-decision-making-2]
Psychological traps can be dangerous because if the decision maker is not aware of them, he can unconsciously fall into them. Past experiences can help a decision maker to improve his intuitive decision making, but having alternate perspectives can also be a safeguard against falling into psychological traps. To make good decisions, one must engage in analysis and synthesis of data. Leaders have to use their intellect, knowledge, experience and education as inputs when they make decision.
In the “Korea 1950” case, it can be seen how decision-makers’ understanding is affected by personality, past experience, and cognitive bias. One of the psychological traps that Gen. MacArthur fell into when he made an intuitive decision to appoint Almond to command X Corps was the status-quo trap. Almond was considered “safe” by MacArthur because of the former’s loyalty to the latter. MacArthur was judging on past experience while the situation at hand was new and presented new challenges that required a specific type of expertise which Almond lacked. MacArthur was not using all of the available data or alternate perspectives to make an objective decision—instead, he was maintaining the status quo so as to feel protected. Another example of a psychological trap that MacArthur fell into was the anchoring trap. MacArthur relied a great deal on his past experiences to inform his decision making. He judged that since he had gambled against significant odds in the past and won, he could do the same thing again in his attack at the Yalu River. However, he was not considering other information that was available. He had surrounding himself with “Yes Men” who only provided confirmation and cognitive bias. He did not examine the other factors that would have led to formulating a more cautious decision; neither did he apply lessons learned from the past to new experiences. He simply anchored down on one tidbit of information—he had gambled in the past and won—and therefore he could do the same again in this situation and expect similar results. LTG Walker and MG Smith could have told him otherwise, as they understood that this was a new kind of enemy and a new kind of war[footnoteRef:3] that required a new set of inputs. [3: Bob Rielly, “Defeat from Victory: Korea 1950,” Case Study, 5.]


Bibliography
Hammond, John; Ralph Keeney and Howard Raiffa, “The Hidden Traps in Decision
Making” Harvard Business Review (1999), https://hbr.org/1998/09/the-hidden-traps-in-decision-making-2
Rielly, Bob. “Defeat from Victory: Korea 1950,” Case Study.