Military Ops Military-Led Reconstruction and Fiedler's Contingency

Military Ops Military-Led Reconstruction and Fiedler's Contingency Theory In light of the unfolding instability, violence and difficulty that characterized the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States military must reexamine its approach to the strategic invasion, occupation, reconstruction and power-handover that have evolved into a war-making template for the nation. Accordingly, the research conducted hereafter considers the need for a change in leadership orientation, using Fiedler's Contingency Theory as the lens for the literature review thereafter.

The Findings drawn from the review of literature are presented in this account and, generally, provided confirmation of the pertinence of Fiedler's contingency theory to modern military strategy as well as the pertinence of Fiedler's Least-Preferred Coworker checklist to defining ideal military leadership. The reported findings connecting Fiedler's ideas with strategic and empirical documentation on applied military policy contribute to a number of policy recommendations.

In particular, these policy recommendations revolve around two major dimensions of military leadership; generating sufficient cultural sensitivity to achieve a collaborative environment and providing contingency leadership capable of function in the unstable context of a power transition as well as in its aftermath. Introduction If we are to take any meaningful lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, these must revolve around the various difficulties and even failures where achieving cultural respect and understanding are concerned.

With the imperative to bring about civil advancement, democratic representation and fair market behaviors in these slivers of the developing sphere, the United States would impose a considerable task upon its military leadership without necessarily supplying it the resources, knowledge and leadership orientation to achieve said task. The result has been a pair of persistent quagmires that have cost a great deal of life and have rattled the developing sphere's confidence in the United States to lead developing nations forward in a positive, progressive and non-exploitive manner.

As the research and discussion hereafter will demonstrate, a new leadership orientation is required if the United States anticipates achieving any level of lasting success in pursuing the invasion/occupation/reconstruction global military strategy. With a focus on certain dimensions of Fiedler's Contingency Theory, the discussion will articulate the need for culturally-conscious Contingency Leadership.

Moreover, by employing the fundamental precepts of Fiedler's contingency theory as it pertains to the military setting, as well as by regarding the criticisms lodged by scholars with contrary viewpoints, it is possible to determine the most advantageous leadership style for military leaders to employ both on base and in battle. This, in turn, should produce recommendations for a more positive and constructive orientation in helping transition nations from occupation to rebuilding and, eventually, to self-determination.

Primary Issues The focus of most research content leading up to this overarching discussion have focused on the role played by leadership in shaping military outcomes. This is a concept which drives the sources consulted, the findings presented and the resulting policy recommendations offered in the resolution. It is also the basis for the issues upon which these sections will focus.

As we have learned as a collective nation through the experiences of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, transitioning from occupation to reconstruction is the most difficult and lasting phase of most conflicts. This reality is only further complicated by the role played by cultural misunderstanding in confounding collaborative reconstruction. Poor conduct by both U.S. military personnel and members of the local communities may stand in the way of true and permanent progress.

Both the transition dimension and the culture dimension of reconstruction present a wide range of largely unpredictable factors. This is especially true when, as is often the case, this process immediately follows or even overlaps with a conflict. This points to several issues of importance to the subject. Specific among them, are the issues of: Strategic Planning Task-Orientation Inter-agency Cooperation Cultural Respect These issues provide the conceptual basis for the arguments endorsing Contingency Leadership as the primary mode of leadership orientation in a reconstruction endeavor.

Theoretical Background The theoretical background for this discussion is significantly informed by the works of Fred Edward Fiedler's (1963) A Contingency Model of Leadership Effectiveness. This examines the role of the surrounding environment in informing leadership style, decisions and strategies. Further, it provides a framework for the present discussion, offering instruments such as the Least-Preferred Coworker (LPC) scale through which to evaluate the desired orientation of a Contingency Leader. As additional sources consulted on the subject demonstrate, when inserted into military-leadership discussions, Fiedler's theories perform quite well.

For instance, the text by Yardley & Neal (2005) notes that "work conducted by Fiedler suggested that context created circumstances in which a preferred leadership style was best suited. Researchers such as House and Mitchell added to the debate by developing the 'path-goal theory' which suggests that leaders help develop their followers behaviours in order to achieve specific goals." (p. 21) This invokes a particular acknowledgement of the need for cultural sensitivity as a permeating product of leadership orientation.

The findings denote that through leadership that instills goal-oriented behaviors like truly informed cultural sensitivity and meaningful collaboration with local leaders, military endeavors have a far greater chance of bringing about lasting peace. With reference to the LPC as contextualized by military objectives, research confirms that Fiedler's ideas are of value in producing desired goal-outcomes. By attributing an importance to identifying with the characteristics of task-orientation in military settings, Ellyson et al. provide the present research with a driving assumption. Ellyson et al.

(2012) report that "findings concluded that goal orientation and the personality trait of conscientiousness significantly influenced the job performance of military leaders. Both of the influencing factors are characteristics found in task-oriented leaders. The low LPC scores, recorded in the data, substantially add to this conclusion." (p. 7) These theoretical constructs drive the focus of the research that is included hereafter. They also help to inform the path of policy recommendations yielded by the research.

Methodology Given the limitations of both time and financial resources, the present study is entirely grounded in literature. The emphasis on connecting certain leadership constructs with applicable military philosophies and reconstruction scenarios required an examination of an array of previously substantiated research documents. The aim in the present study is to synthesis the findings from such documents into a compelling case connecting Fiedler's leadership ideals to real-world military reconstruction scenarios.

The literature review hereafter touches on a wide range of issues that have been especially illuminated through the protracted struggles engaged under the War on Terror banner over the last decade. Findings The Findings presented hereafter are the product of a literature review dedicated to making the connection between Fielder's theoretical constructs and the practical leadership pressures facing the military.

Accordingly, the most critical findings presented hereafter will center on the important role played by effective leadership in planning for a positive process of rebuilding by way of culturally sensitive contingency leadership. For instance, a guiding source in this synthesis has been that provided by Haskins (2010), a Colonel for the United States Army whose experience has given him over to a vocal and detailed support of greater cultural sensitivity training.

More specifically, Haskins indicates the need to standardize this training in order to achieve more meaningful and permeating results in its personnel. Haskins reports that "as an Army, we have undoubtedly become more attuned to culture and seem to be more adept at working with it. Yet no one is satisfied. In a typical unit, two observations seem clear: its members vary widely in cultural ability, and experience is the best predictor of success.

In other words, our Army's greatest gains in cultural fluency have come the hard way, and we have no satisfactory system for passing that knowledge along." (Haskins, p. 80) This suggests that even when the United States military has enjoyed success in bridging cultural gaps and manufacturing peace through a smooth transition of power, the broader military structure has experienced little success in devising a template from these experiences. The result is that such successes are rarely replicated in a new environmental setting.

The discussion here proceeds from Haskins' concerns to describe the type of leadership necessary to overcome this absence of standardization. In doing so, it lends strong credence to the ideas expressed by Fiedler's Contingency Theory research. Under this umbrella view, additional leadership constructs such as participative leadership emerge as being pertinent as well. For instance, Heilman et al. (1984) point to participative leadership as having high-reported levels of efficacy in producing group compliance and achieving intended outcomes.

This is especially important because our research finds that coordination of the interests of multiple parties is critical to executing a rebuilding plan. Perhaps most critically, military leaders in various capacities both on the ground and in administrative positions must find ways to work constructively with leaders and civilians in the developing nation if they are to enjoy the required level of cooperation. In the policy recommendation section of the present research, this finding will be applied in a discussion on the need for cultural sensitivity training standardization.

This 'cultural sensitivity' is characterized as an 'Understand First' approach in the documentation by U.S. Army Major W.D. Conner (2005). In his strategic assessment of the U.S. military, Major Connor offers a perspective on military achievements in Iraq and Afghanistan that perhaps too optimistic. This may be forgiven in light of the source's proximity to the initial invasions. However, in full retrospect, we can scrutinize both the value and error in Conner's observations.

According to Conner, "during recent operations, including Operation DESERT STORM and the major combat operations phase of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the U.S. Army has demonstrated an unmatched capability to combine advanced technology with superior training, leadership, organization and planning. The U.S. military's preeminence in conventional warfare has forced potential adversaries to adapt their approach to warfare if they are to succeed against U.S. forces. The result is the contemporary operational environment (COE), such as the U.S.

Army and its joint and coalition partners face in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM today. This environment is characterized by complexity, ambiguity, dynamism and uncertainty. The enemy takes full advantage of such an environment in order to exploit the asymmetric opportunities inherent in the COE and to obviate the conventional strengths of the U.S. military. In such an environment, success for the U.S. Army hinges on its ability to understand first." (Conner, p.

1) This understanding must further be reinforced by leadership that is prepared to use it in order to navigate through highly uncertain conditions. As the text by Zweibelson (2012) highlights, one of the most compelling arguments in favor of Contingency Leadership as a guiding philosophy is because there is an inevitability that change will constantly impact the path of reconstruction. Zweibelson's discussion on the War in Afghanistan provides an especially useful real-world demonstration of how leadership must be adaptable in order to be viable.

According to Zweibelson, the need for leadership which can thrive under less-than-ideal conditions and which can execute contingency plans when primary plans cannot be met has been especially required as U.S. troops have drawn down their longstanding presence in the Southeast Asian theatre.

According to Zweibelson, "under a compressed timeline, senior leadership directed a planning effort with the goal of producing a simple, cohesive plan that combined the various subordinate elements within NTM -- A and synchronized them with both the Afghan security forces and sister Coalition organizations conducting combat operations." (Zweibelson, p. 1) Naturally, this synchronization with Afghan security forces could not have been possible without first achieving the trust of these collaborators. Given the violence that has unfolded in Afghanistan in the last decade, this is no easy task.

This is why the Zweibelson text is especially useful to the present discussion. It recognizes that there has been a great deal of cultural healing required and that most of the effort must first be channeled through the United States military. At this juncture in the history of the war, there is good cause for suspicion between both sides, denoting that collaboration must come from a place of genuine cultural empathy.

Military personnel working toward transition in Afghanistan have had to learn an unfamiliar culture with an intimacy that might generate camaraderie with local leaders. Moreover, and particularly evocative of Fiedler's ideas, Zweibelson states of Afghanistan that "the reason we term it a 'messy' or 'wicked' problem set is because the environment would continue to adapt after the initial implementation of this planning deliverable. Our own organization as well as the Afghans would adapt and new, unexpected problems related to this would emerge later.

Yet a successful fusion of design and detailed planning should produce a design deliverable that is flexible and provides the organization an ability to adjust, refine, and anticipate as conditions change." (Zweibelson, p. 1) This indicates that even after handover, the demands upon leadership to adapt with ever-changing conditions is only likely to grow. Therefore, in addition to providing leadership that is capable of working in a contingency environment during transition, this leadership must be capable of training local leaders to work with the same heightened versatility.

Policy Recommendations Key solutions to this problem must start at the highest levels of leadership. Government personnel, corporations, elected Department of Defense personnel, intelligence agencies and the government of the host nation will all play a critical and collaborative role in ensuring the success of a strategic rebuilding plan. Particular sensitivity in this approach must be given to the needs and will of the host nation, whose receptiveness to the conditions and philosophy of a rebuilding plan will be determinant of its ultimate success in bringing about economic evolution.

This speaks to one critical policy recommendation. As noted here above, the text by Colonel C. Haskins (2010) is especially pertinent where the cultural dimensions of reconstruction are concerned. For Haskins, the goal is to produce a model of military orientation that is highly conscientious of the cultural needs of the targeted population. This, Haskins indicates, is the only way to make reconstruction achieve its intended goals of collaborative transition and lasting peace.

Haskins refers to the sheer wastefulness of engaging in reconstruction without priming both military personnel and the local population for some level of cultural compatibility. As Haskins indicates, "construction programs that cost hundreds of millions of dollars ended up not satisfying local needs (and in some instances creating further resentment). Programs developed state institutions that seemed normal to Americans but were ill-suited to the local society. The need is plain enough, but practical methods for achieving cultural understanding seem to be lacking.

The Army is currently looking for a better way of achieving 'situational understanding." (Haskins, p. 79) This points to a clear need for a cohesive policy effecting the manner in which military leaders and personnel are trained in the area of cultural sensitivity. It is incumbent upon the military to update and expand its process of cultural sensitivity training in order to produce a fighting force that understands the local population, its customs, its experiences and its needs.

We must instill a concept of cultural understanding that, as Haskins indicates, goes beyond the decidedly limited and superficial checklist of sensitivity and extends into a genuine ability to work within the demands presented by the environment and its defining populations. The environment, our findings suggest, is a key determinant of task orientation. According to the text by McFarland (2007), task-orientation inherently calls for optimization of strategy according to.