T&E Acquisition Process for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Marine Corps and the Army to be the successor of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. The aim is to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles that can replace most of the...
T&E Acquisition Process for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is being developed by the Marine Corps and the Army to be the successor of the High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) that has been in service since 1985. The aim is to develop a family of future light tactical vehicles that can replace most of the HMMWV currently being used. The HMMWV was developed during the cold war and during this time there were no attacks aimed at vehicles. During this period, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other anti-vehicle explosive devices were never a concern when performing military planning. Attempts have been made to up-armor the HMMWV, but they have been less successful and vehicle survivability has now become one of the key emphasis of the military. There was a requirement to have the JLTV configured with a variable ride-height suspension, which is described as the ability for the vehicle to raise and lower the suspension for it to meet certain mission requirements (Osborn & John, 2010). The JLTV will comprise two variants a four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support Vehicle. The idea behind JLTV is to have a more reliable, maintainable, all-terrain mobile, and equipped link to current and future tactical data nets. This program is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program. The Army bears all responsibility for developing the JLTV. JLTVs are designed to operate with high reliability in a wide variety of climates and terrain, which makes the vehicle more versatile and vital for the military.
Developmental Test & Evaluation
This stage comprises of materiel solutions analysis phase, technology maturation & risk reduction phase, and engineering, manufacturing & development phase. For the JLTV the analysis was already done and it had been identified there is a need for a vehicle that would transport soldiers safely. The current vehicle was deemed to be vulnerable to IED attacks and this jeopardized the safety of the soldiers being transported. Therefore, the JLTV had to be body proofed to withstand these attacks and other attacks aimed at vehicles. The JLTV program was approved in November 2006. The Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the program to move from concept refinement phase to technology development was signed in December 2007. ADM is what allowed the program to be able to issue an RFP inviting bidders to the program. Having already determined the technology and risk reduction the vehicle had to overcome the military had enough information to include in the RFP. The vehicle had to be used in all-terrain to ensure there will not be a need to have different vehicles being developed for different terrains and climates. This was quite vital as the military had been forced to develop special purpose vehicles to be used in Afghanistan and different ones to be used in Iraq. This increases the production costs as the vehicles are not multi-purpose.
Three technology development awards were given for the JLTV technology development (TD) phase. The three contractors selected for the TD phase were BAE Systems Land and Armaments, Ground Systems Division, Santa Clara, CA, and NAVISTAR Defense, Warrenville, IL, General Tactical Vehicles, Sterling Heights, MI—a joint venture between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General, and Lockheed Martin Systems Integration, Oswego, NY, BAE Systems, Alcoa Defense, Pittsburgh, PA, and JWF Defense Systems, Johnstown, PA (Feickert, 2020). The TD phase lasted 27 months and the contractors were required to build four test sub-configurations within the first 15 months. Testing was to take place during the next 12 months. The TD phase was needed to determine and mature the appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into the full system, reduce technology risk, and demonstrate the integration of critical technology elements on the prototypes. In this phase, the three contractors would develop prototypes that would be based on the RFP given. There would be an assessment of the viability of the technologies and refinement of user requirements during this phase. By using three contractors, the military received three competitive prototypes aimed at accomplishing the key TD tasks (Grgurich, 2013). The three contractors delivered prototypes with unique aspects and they were all suitable for testing. The prototypes were delivered in accordance with the contract schedule terms. Tests were carried out to confirm the usability and verified if the program processes were met by each prototype (Feickert, 2020). Soldiers, Marines, and the Australian Army were involved in the actual performance evaluation of the prototypes. This ensured the prototypes were properly tested in different climates and terrain to ensure they met the required capabilities (Osborn & John, 2010). The operational performance of the program was increased through testing and evaluation. The prototypes were thoroughly tested to ensure they met the requirements and notes were taken where changes needed to be made. Program processes were either improved or verified and this was vital before the next phase began. All the three vendor prototypes had problems with mobility in soft soil and integrating government-furnished mission equipment into the prototypes. Another issue uncovered for the three prototypes was reliability, which fell well short of the threshold reliability of 2,400 mean miles between operational mission failure (Werner et al., 2018).
Upon completion of the TD phase, the JLTV Program Office delayed the awarding of the Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) contract by one year as there were some changes to be incorporated into the requirements (Feickert, 2020). The requirements were for the JLTV to have the underbody protection that was equivalent to the one on the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). The initial contract was to be for 24 months but the DoD opted for a 48 months EMD phase. The EMD phase contracts were awarded to three companies namely AM General, LLC (South Bend, IN); Lockheed Martin Corporation (Grand Prairie, TX); and Oshkosh Corporation (Oshkosh, WI). The EMD phase would also capitalize on the competitive prototyping model used during the TD phase. The contractors were given nine months to refine their designs. Each contractor was required to deliver 22 prototypes complete with armor coupons, and corresponding blast hulls. After the delivery, the contractor will have three months to perform testing, which will then be followed by the military tests in key areas like reliability and performance assessments, ballistic and blast testing, corrosion testing, and a series of transportability and mobility evaluations. While affordability was the main concern the final vehicle had to have a price tag of $250,000 or less. The overall goal of the EMD phase is to select a single vendor and move to the Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP). The EMD phase was designed to prepare and test the next-generation vehicles for a Limited User Test, Milestone C procurement decision, and Capabilities Production Document (Osborn & John, 2010). The issues identified during the TD phase had to be corrected and the prototypes had to be tested to ensure they were able to operate in different soil types. The mobility of the vehicles in soft soil is vital if the vehicle is to pass the tests. Having established the three prototypes lacked reliability during the TD phase, it was vital to confirm if this issue had been sorted and this could only be done during the EMD phase. The vehicles were evaluated and the reliability issue was found to be existing.
Operational Test & Evaluation
The RFP for the final production indicated the winning contractor would build about 17,000 JLTVs for the Marines and Army for three years during LRIP (Werner et al., 2018). This would be followed by five years of full-rate production. Oshkosh was awarded the LRIP contract in August 2015 (Feickert, 2020). This meant production for the first batch of operational vehicles could begin. Even after production has been approved, the Army still needed to conduct testing to ensure the vehicles do meet the required test qualifications. It is for this reason that the Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) performed the majority of the Production and Reliability Qualification Testing. The main aim of these tests was to ensure the JLTV performance, weapons integration, reliability, and transportability met the outlined requirements in the JLTV Capabilities Production Document. The Reliability Qualification Test was performed at Aberdeen Proving Ground and Yuma Proving Ground where they both accumulated 32,000 combined miles assessing the vehicle. All the JLTVs offered sufficient protection against tactical mobility. The vehicles were able to negotiate complex terrain, and they have the agility to react to changing tactical situations. To support tactical decision-making, the vehicles had the necessary command, control, and communication capabilities (Werner et al., 2018). The test results were slowed for the JLTV towing since the trailer had less mobility. It was noted the JLTV increased its detectability due to its loud aural signature and large visual.
Transportability of the JLTV was assessed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground and Airborne Operational Test Directorate. Due to the size of the vehicle, few of them can be fitted on Maritime Prepositioned Force ships as compared to HMMWVs. Therefore, there is a need to reconfigure loads to effectively store the required amount of JLTVs. Overall, the testing confirmed the JLTV was not operationally suitable since there were deficiencies in maintainability, reliability, manuals, training, crew situational awareness, and safety. There were notable defects like engine wiring problems, brake system faults, and damaged tires. The lack of training and manuals denied the crews an opportunity to attempt to fix some of these issues. The vehicle is meant to be light but there is still a need to increase its operational capability (Osborn & John, 2010). It is a tricky balance as when there is an increase in armor, the weight of the vehicle will increase and this will hinder its trafficability and transportability.
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