Nation Building in Iraq

Policy Advisement on Efficacy of Nation Building in Iraq Dear Mr. President and Mr. Secretary of State, After a decade to examine the consequences of America's decision to invade Iraq -- and engage in a massive nation building effort after successfully ousting the brutal Baath Party dictatorship of Saddam Hussein -- it has become abundantly clear that a war fought under false pretenses can never be productive in a geopolitical sense.

As foreign policy scholars have observed in the wake of your predecessor's calamitous course of action, "President Bush said that our goal was a unified, democratic Iraq that could govern itself, sustain itself, defend itself, and serve as an ally in the 'War on Terror' & #8230; (but) it's apparent that no part of this goal has been achieved, and that the progress made toward them is fleeting" (Babbin, 2012).

This is why the administration's current commitment to a more responsible foreign policy must remain of paramount importance, because as the power in the Middle East continues to crumble and recalibrate via revolution, the temptation to engage in further nation building efforts will inevitably intensify. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria, caused by the merciless drive towards civil war by dictator Bashar al-Assad and his militant actions, has exposed the limitations of an American foreign policy apparatus motivated more by than compassion than pragmatism.

When the authoritarian regimes of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt were threatened by the revolutionary power of public protest, the State Department and other wings of the federal government offered indirect assistance and moral support to the dissenters, while effectively tabling the option of direct military intervention for fear of repeating the mistakes made in Iraq.

Many international foreign policy experts agree with the prevailing assessment that "the Afghanistan and Iraq wars have diminished the United States' political will, military capability, and diplomatic credibility to conduct future humanitarian interventions" (Kurth 2005, 87), but American influence on the Egyptian and Libyan "Arab Springs" cannot be understated.

The ultimate fall from power of both Gaddafi, who chose to turn his army against the Libyan people before being killed by an angry mob, and Mubarak, who sensibly sought refuge abroad, demonstrated that America is still capable of delivering democratic freedoms to those who seek it without pursuing a strategy premised on nation building; provided there is a clear strategic objective to be secured.

Of the many reasons to finally acknowledge the failures of America's nation building campaign in Iraq, perhaps the most compelling comes from our military's current state of strength and morale. Simply put, nation building within the confines of enemy territory for a duration of several years is an extremely demanding, high-risk/low-reward task to burden a volunteer army with, and the appalling rise in suicide rates among service members has widely been linked to the overextension of personnel that foreign policy directives based on nation building demand.

As a prominent and vocal critic of American nation building observed of the Iraq War -- prior to the final pullout authorized by your administration -- "if the American-led coalition had started pulling out on that date, whatever happened afterwards, it would have departed victorious. Whatever happens now, America will withdraw in defeat. Armies are for winning wars, not building nations. Armies that keep fighting a war they've won, will lose it" (Jonas, 2010).

This distinction between the role and mission of our armed forces is fundamental to this debate, because as a nation founded on the ideal of democratic freedom, becoming a force of occupation does not align with our military's legitimate objectives.

As one prominent foreign policy journalist observed in 2007, when the Iraqi insurgency had reached its bloody crescendo of suicide bombings and assassination attempts -- "the moment the United States invaded the way it did, and occupied the nation as boorishly as it did, the outcome couldn't have been any different than it is now" (Tristam).

Although the preponderance of evidence clearly demonstrates that nation building in Iraq proved to be a disastrous military strategy, legitimate signs of progress have emerged from the wreckage of the Middle East which show that nation building, if performed in strict moderation, may provide tangible benefits for native populations while serving wider national security interests.

As respected national columnist David Brooks wrote in an op-ed published by The New York Times, "it's hard to know what role the scattershot American development projects have played, but this year Iraq will have the 12th-fastest-growing economy in the world, and it is expected to grow at a 7% annual clip for the next several years" (2010), and this economic growth is surely an encouraging sign that America's sacrifices may not have been wholly.