¶ … Operational Art
In comparison with each other Myanmar and Thailand's forces are of more or less equal capability, although Myanmar far outnumbers Thailand in terms of ground force troop numbers. According to the United States Naval War College (2008), Myanmar features about 95,000 ground force troops in comparison with 435,000 for Myanmar. The two countries' aircraft capabilities compare well, while Thailand's Naval forces are far stronger in number than those for Myanmar. However, the document also states that Thailand's Naval craft have not enjoyed much maintenance attention due to budget constraints. The number of craft is therefore not as indicative of the country's Naval strength as the quality of those craft.
On the other hand, the document also states that Myanmar's international support in terms of military equipment is minimal, even from China, which is the only country that has demonstrated willingness to ally with Myanmar in its military efforts. The current situation is in favor of Myanmar only because of its superior number of ground force troops. It is therefore suggested that upgrading the country's ground force capabilities are of primary importance, while air and Naval capabilities can then duly support these forces.
Specifically, it is suggested that the United States support the country by means of capability deployments including communications, intelligence, and language capabilities. Additionally, material support such as ground force fires and reinforcements, and funding for Naval upgrades are suggested.
In terms of communications, the United States need only establish a network to integrate military communications and operations in Thailand. Thailand has a highly capable communications system in place. However, its ground force battalions operate separately and therefore lack the strength of unity. Such unity can be established by means of an adequate communications network (U.S.A. Joint Publication 3-0, 2008: III-9).
According to The U.S.A. Joint Publication 3-0 (2008), effective communication system planning will also lead to effective operational planning and the application of capabilities at the critical time and place. Such application is vitally important for the mission in Thailand, particularly in the fact of the superior Myanmar numbers. Such planning needs to take place with interoperability and communications security (COMSEC) planning in mind. Part of the communications planning process is establishing a network means of which information dissemination management can take place.
Related to communication is intelligence. Intelligence capabilities are vital in understanding the operational environment (U.S.A. Joint Publication 3-0, 2008: III-16). From the United States' point-of-view, this can be accomplished on two levels: intelligence already collected by local military bodies, and fresh intelligence gathered by means of technology implemented by the United States. Intelligence also includes information regarding the topography and climate of the combat theater. In this regard, the United States will be deploying collection capabilities. These include surveillance and reconnaissance of enemy forces.
The conflict in Thailand generally occurs by means of ground combat, with some air support. For this reason, it makes sense to focus the U.S. capability effort on the ground as well. Hence U.S. weapon systems should be combined with Thailand's ground force system to provide optimal fire power. This will mitigate the superior troop numbers enjoyed by Myanmar, as the latter has very little means of obtaining international operations support.
Other Services, such as the Naval and Air Force fire systems can also offer support in this regard, but the main focus should be ground weapons systems. Thailand's good ground transport system is also conducive to this decision.
In order to successfully complete operations in Thailand, it is also vital that language and regional expertise capabilities are deployed. The Thai and American cultures differ greatly. Communications and the success of operations will be much facilitated with the help of translators and regional experts to facilitate communications and mutual understanding. According to The U.S.A. Joint Publication 3-0, such capabilities can even save lives during combat situations.
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For the situation in Thailand, the priority is ground force reinforcements and fires. These can however not be deployed properly without the necessary language and intelligence capabilities. It is therefore suggested that language and intelligence capabilities be deployed first. On this basis, intelligence can then be gathered regarding the existing capabilities on both sides, while communications can be established with local military leaders.
Once this is complete, the next step is to deploy reinforcements to increase the ground force troop numbers. Language capabilities by means of translators and regional experts should be installed in sufficient numbers to ensure optimal ground operations.
The third step is to deploy fire capabilities for the ground forces. This can be done by reorganizing existing weapons and transport, as well as reinforcing the amount of fire power among the ground forces. Furthermore, a communications network should be established among the various ground forces that protect Thailand. Currently, these forces work in isolation. A higher quality of communication network will provide a basis for more integrated and more effective operations.
The communication network can also be extended to include air support for the ground forces. Neither Myanmar nor Thailand are optimizing their air support operations. A better communication network, along with funding for aircraft upgrades, will significantly improve Thailand's strategic advantage.
Finally, Thailand's Naval capabilities must be upgraded by means of funding and the deployment of personnel. Here also, communication, networking and language are integrally important to the success of the operation.
Some risk is posed by Myanmar's advance and superior number of troops. Time is therefore of the essence, which could mean that the necessary deployments may not be properly integrated before the necessity of combat. This risk can be mitigated by proper initial communication among high-level commanders, and ensuring the proper installation of sufficient language capabilities to create a culture of trust among U.S. And Thai forces. This will ensure that no misunderstandings occur during deployment or operations.
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