Player Games Vs. Two Player Essay

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The conclusion is of course interesting however, the why which is elucidated in the analysis will compel the reader to read on. The literature review is thorough and sets up a fundamental reason for the author's undertaking of the project; the available research is fragmented and not conclusive in its determination of why cooperatives and investor-owned models are different and why they are used. The author's strength in presentation is not in its subtlety but in its direct statement of fact, rationale, and logic. Citing pages five six, the discussion of profit maximization as the objective of firms is contrasted with evidence that this is not always the case, particularly for cooperatives. In creating this dichotomy the author purposefully or perhaps outlines their later argument that outcomes under the Nash Equilibrium are in fact consistent with the divergent objectives of one and two player actors in their respective business models. The discussion section provides a solid continuation of the thorough and well-presented analysis section (discussed earlier in regards to the model). The author does a fine job of presenting the findings inside the analysis. Where the analysis section depends on a thorough understanding of economic, econometrics, and theory the discussion takes the conversation to a level which a cooperative user could find pragmatic and useful. In totality the exposition provides considerable insight and thoughtfulness in answering the questions outlined in the opening sections. The ending of the discussion though could use some counterpoint analysis in regards to its supposition on the continuing use of the cooperative model in agribusiness. The model is different because of the objectives of the economic players, and it has a demonstrated success record in achieving the goal of social welfare maximization. That said the analysis...

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This idea is not one to be presented in the paper but rather a point for the author to consider in the context of further research and alternative explanations.
Evaluation

One Player Games vs. Two Player Games: Comparing Agribusiness Cooperatives with Investor-Owned Business Models is definitely worthy of publication. The subject of cooperatives and the rationale for their differences from those of investor- owned models has not been particularly well studied, nor is the analysis currently published in agreement on the why? This paper does a thorough and competent job of developing a practical answer to the question by using an econometric model to predict outcomes under Nash equilibrium. The results point to a difference in objectives of the economic agents of cooperatives as opposed to those of an investor-owned model. These different objectives produce significantly different equilibrium outcomes, pointing the way towards the reasons why cooperatives are successful for agribusiness and why they have been sustainable. There is no missing piece to the submission nor are there any suppositions or loose ends which provide obturations to the papers concrete conclusions. Noting the relatively few changes presented for consideration by the author in this report, I strongly encourage publication of the paper in the belief that its questions, analysis, and conclusions augment and deepen the conversation inside the economics discipline.

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